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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters that set out to examine the effects of three different 
types of exogenous shocks - unpredictable deaths, pecuniary shocks and community level violent 
conflict - on the outcomes of children living in developing countries.  
 
Chapter 1 
 
The latest estimates from the United Nations Children’s Fund show that there are 
approximately 153 million orphans around the world, a figure that includes children who have 
lost a mother, a father, or both parents. Chapter I, “Parental Loss and Children Wellbeing”, 
examines the consequences of parental absence due to unpredictable death on children’s welfare. 
Based on six administrative datasets from Taiwan, a uniquely large and detailed sample is 
assembled. The sample period covers deaths occurring between 1981 and 2003 of parents whose 
children were born between 1981 and 1985. This rich data set permits the derivation of a cause-
of-death classification that is used to identify deaths representing exogenous shocks to children’s 
wellbeing. The results show that the death of a parent has deleterious effects on children’s human 
capital that are robust across time and gender. The derived cause of death classification reveals 
that the top causes of death claiming the lives of relatively young parents are often highly 
preventable.  
This study has two main policy implications: First, policies aimed at protecting the 
educational opportunities of children who have experienced the loss of a parent should focus on 
low income children, and particularly girls, because they are more adversely affected by the loss 
of either parent; second, cost-benefit analyses of whether to carry out new screening and 
prevention programs, or whether to continue support for promising current efforts to prevent the 
loss of young parents should consider all the benefits from such efforts. In particular, the savings 
from both the decreased wages and worker productivity due to the lower educational attainment 
of bereaved children, as well as from the possible negative spillover on future generations. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization estimates there are 925 million 
people who do not have enough to eat (FAO 2010). At the same time, the latest report from the 
World Health Organization (WHO 2011) describes an equally grim parallel development: by 
2015, approximately 2.3 billion adults will be overweight and more than 700 million will be 
obese. This chapter analyzes the effects of pecuniary shocks on the anthropometric outcomes of 
mothers and children. The collective model of intra-household allocation in the presence of a 
public good is used as a starting point of the analysis. This model permits analyzing the resource 
allocation decisions made by parents within a structural framework that captures the household 
bargaining mechanism governing the intra-household allocation of resources. The data used in 
this chapter comes from the evaluation of the Colombian conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program Familias en Acción (FA).  
This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: Do CCTs, inasmuch as they 
represent an exogenous increase in female held income, increase a mother’s bargaining power? If 
so, does this power shift matter for the nutritional outcomes of mothers and children? Are the 
nutritional outcomes of mothers and children Pareto efficient? Consistent with the predictions of 
the collective model, the income pooling hypothesis is rejected and the null hypothesis that intra-
household allocations are Pareto optimal cannot be rejected. The empirical results suggest that 
CCTs increase the bargaining power of mothers. This power revision results in a reallocation of 
resources that indirectly improves children’s anthropometric outcomes without having a negative 
effect on mothers’ BMIs. Interestingly, we find that CCTs also have a direct effect on 
anthropometric outcomes, suggesting perhaps that participation in the CCT program has a 
behavioral effect on the treated households. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The World Development Report (WDR 2011) reports that there are more than 1.5 billion 
people living in conflict countries. On the one hand, conflict affects individuals directly by 
disrupting their everyday activities, sources of livelihood, health and education. When high 
3 
 
 
levels of conflict are frequent or become the norm, the effect of conflict is likely to have severe 
lifelong impacts on wellbeing and to be particularly devastating to the more vulnerable (i.e. 
women, children and the disable). On the other hand, conflict also affects individuals indirectly, 
through the loss of physical capital and capacity of health and education systems to meet the 
needs of the population. Moreover, the destruction of capital and infrastructure may in turn lead 
to future conflict and to the proliferation of conflict related activities. 
This chapter examines how wellbeing links to both security and conflict in the context of 
Afghanistan. The analysis presented in this chapter combines data from the National Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007-08 household level survey, the first nationally 
representative dataset available in Afghanistan, with confidential geo-coded data on violent 
incidents from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. The empirical evidence 
presented shows an important two-directional causal pathway between conflict and access to 
basic services. This two-directional pathway, in which conflict (or the ensuing destruction) fuels 
more conflict and woe, is found to represent a significant barrier to donor assistance delivery. 
The results from this section highlight the importance of helping conflict affected countries like 
Afghanistan develop their basic infrastructure while making its access more widespread. Such 
efforts are well known to have positive effects on wellbeing, but in conflict affected Afghanistan 
they are also likely to have positive spillovers on conflict prevention. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Parental Loss and Children’s Wellbeing 
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Abstract 
 
The latest estimates from the United Nations Children’s Fund show that there are 
approximately 153 million orphans around the world, a figure that includes children who have 
lost a mother, a father, or both parents. Chapter I, “Parental Loss and Children Wellbeing”, 
examines the consequences of parental absence due to unpredictable death on children’s 
outcomes. Using six administrative datasets from Taiwan, a uniquely large and detailed sample 
is assembled. The sample period covers deaths occurring between 1981 and 2003 of parents 
whose children were born between 1981 and 1985. This rich data set permits the derivation of a 
cause-of-death classification that is used to identify deaths representing exogenous shocks to 
children’s wellbeing. The results show that the death of a parent has deleterious effects on 
children’s human capital that are robust across time and gender. The derived cause of death 
classification reveals that the top causes of death claiming the lives of relatively young parents 
are often highly preventable.  
The findings of this study give rise to two main policy implications: First, policies aimed at 
protecting the educational opportunities of children who have experienced the loss of a parent 
should be targeted at low income children, and particularly girls, because they are more 
adversely affected by the loss of either parent; second, cost-benefit analyses of whether to carry 
out new screening and prevention programs, or whether to continue support for promising 
current efforts to prevent the loss of young parents should consider all the benefits from such 
efforts. In particular, the savings from both the decreased wages and worker productivity due to 
the lower educational attainment of bereaved children, as well as from the possible negative 
spillover on future generations.  
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1.1 Introduction 
The latest estimates from the United Nations Children’s Fund show that there are 
approximately 153 million orphans worldwide, a figure that includes children who have lost a 
mother, a father, or both parents.
1
 Although the majority of orphans are from African and Asian 
countries, no country is immune to this woe. The loss of a parent has the potential to be 
particularly devastating for a child's future because it directly affects two important resources 
used in the production of human capital: income, if the deceased parent was the main income 
earner of the household; and time, if the deceased parent was an important source of mentorship, 
nurture, and stability. 
Most empirical evidence on at the relationship between parental loss and children's 
welfare validates the existence of a negative association. This association is found to depend on 
the genders of the child and the deceased parent. For example, a World Bank (2002) report finds 
that losing a parent to the HIV-AIDS pandemic affects girls disproportionately more than boys, 
suggesting that policies aimed at helping bereaving children should be gender based. Several 
studies echo this report (Kobiané et al. 2005; Gertler et al. 2004; Fronstin et al. 2001). The 
studies that look for a causal pathway between childhood bereavement and children's outcomes 
often find that losing a parent is detrimental to children's educational attainments and health, in 
particular after the death of a mother (Evans and Miguel 2007; Beegle et al. 2006; Case and 
Ardington 2006). In terms of the persistence of the effects of bereavement there is less of a 
consensus because most studies focus on short-term outcomes.
2
 Indeed, the empirical literature is 
vast, yet because the primary focus of this literature has been Sub-Saharan African countries, its 
                                                 
1
 Source: www.childinfo.org/hiv_aids_orphanestimates.php (accessed on April 2012).  
2
 Two important exceptions are the works of Beegle et al. (2006) and Fronstin et al. (2001), both of which find 
significant long-term negative implications from losing a parent. 
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implications may be limited to children losing a parent in a country struck by the HIV-AIDS 
pandemic.
3
 
Understanding the significance of losing a parent during childhood in a more general 
setting is difficult for at least three interconnected reasons. First and foremost, a large body of 
empirical evidence from the epidemiological literature has shown that certain causes of death are 
strongly correlated with the socio-economic status (SES) of the deceased (Link and Phelan 1995; 
Howard et al. 2000; Weires et al. 2008). Similarly, human capital research suggests that SES 
affects both parents' health (Grossman 2007) and children's educational attainments and health 
outcomes (Chou et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2007; Currie and Moretti 2003). The implications of these 
findings are that omitted variables (e.g., parental behavior, family genetics or environmental 
characteristics) are associated with both parental death and children's wellbeing, making 
orphanhood status endogenous. For example, it is possible that the omitted variables that make 
parents more likely to die also make a child more likely to experience adverse outcomes. 
Similarly, it may well be that the same omitted characteristics make a child better adapted to 
cope with various biological and environmental risks. In the former case, the bereavement effect 
is overstated; in the latter case it is understated. 
Second, studies assessing the existence of long-term bereavement effects are as rare as 
datasets that include measures of long-term outcomes. As a result, even if most of the studies 
suggest that parental loss has a negative impact on children's outcomes, it is often only the short-
term impact that is being analyzed. This is a key issue when trying to understand whether losing 
a parent has an effect on important lifelong decisions that children make later in their lives, for 
                                                 
3
 See Evans and Miguel (2007), Ainsworth and Filmer (2006), Beegle et al. (2006), Case and Ardington (2006), 
Kobiané et al. (2005) and Case et al. (2004); for exceptions, see Gertler et al. (2004), Fronstin et al. (2001) and Lang 
and Zagorsky (2001). 
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example, during their late teenage years or when they reach adulthood. Unaware of these later 
outcomes, we are unable to know whether losing a parent has in fact long-lasting implications for 
children's wellbeing. Finally, the fact that early parental death is a relatively rare event may lead 
to imprecise estimates of the bereavement effect.
4
 A small sample of bereaved children also 
makes it difficult to capture differences between long, medium and short-term bereavement 
effects and, as is the case of nearly all studies available to date, to explore the possible 
interactions between experiencing the death of a parent and different SES levels. 
In this paper, our goal is to identify and measure the effect of parental death on children's 
wellbeing. Using confidential identification information, we are able to assemble a large and 
detailed sample that links six administrative datasets from Taiwan. Our sample contains 
information collected at different points in children's lives and includes detailed cause-of-death 
and mortality records of all the deceased parents. Using this information, we first identify the 
causes of death that represent an exogenous shock to children's outcomes. Specifically, 
conditional on personal characteristics of the deceased we classify causes of death into two 
groups: those that are strongly correlated with measures of socio-economic status (termed 
informative cause-of-death, or ICOD) and those that are erratic in nature (termed uninformative 
cause-of-death, or UCOD). This strategy, from Espinosa and Evans (2008), allows us to 
introduce a source of exogenous variation. Although perfectly correlated with the death of a 
parent, the UCODs are by construction orthogonal to a child's socio-economic characteristics 
that are likely correlated with omitted third variables. 
We identify differential bereavement effects related to the gender of the deceased parent 
                                                 
4
 For example, Fronstin et al. (2001), who make use of a relatively small sample of bereaved children (about 8 
percent of the total sample of approximately 4,166 females, and 3,662 males), are unable to precisely identify the 
disruption effect by type (i.e. death versus divorce) or by age. It is worth noting that their study is also one of the 
few that analyze the long term bereavement effects in a non-Sub-Saharan setting. 
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by separating the analysis into death of a mother and death of a father. We ask first whether 
losing a parent has an effect on a child's likelihood of acquiring higher education and, if so, 
whether the effect of losing a parent has short-term or long-term implications for the child’s 
educational attainments or the quality of education he/she receives. We investigate whether boys 
and girls are equally affected by the loss and whether there is an interactive effect between 
bereavement and income. Finally, we also examine other potential channels through which 
parental loss may curtail children's wellbeing. In particular, we ask whether children 
experiencing the loss of a parent are more likely to substitute higher education for a paying 
occupation, or whether they are at a higher risk of teenage marriage. 
Our findings show that losing a parent is detrimental to children's prospects of acquiring 
higher education and to their wellbeing. We also find that children's educational attainment is, on 
average, more affected by the death of a mother than the death of a father. In terms of the 
persistence of the bereavement effect, while the effect of losing a parent is equally pronounced 
regardless of when in the child's life the death takes place, the short-term effect of a father's 
death is particularly deleterious for girls. Studying other channels through which the death of a 
parent may affect children's wellbeing, we observe two patterns. First, the quality of education of 
middle- and high-income children is significantly reduced, with high-income girls being the most 
severely affected following a father’s death. Second, low- and middle-income boys are more 
likely to substitute an income earning occupation in place of higher education, whereas low-
income girls are more likely to marry and to work during their teenage years. 
1.2 Human Capital: Theoretical Framework 
Becker and Tomes (1979) developed a robust theoretical framework that serves to 
analyze the linkage between the family “industry” and human capital formation. In their model, a 
10 
 
 
family is viewed as a production unit that uses inputs (e.g. time, income, genetic endowments) to 
generate utility increasing outputs (e.g. human capital, health). The family’s preferences can be 
aggregated into a single utility function. Hence, a decision such as the level of investment in a 
child’s human capital depends strongly on how profitable such an investment is (in terms of its 
expected contribution to the family’s future income). One important assumption of Becker and 
Tomes’ original model is the existence of perfect capital markets, allowing parents not only to 
borrow against children’s future earnings but also to protect the investment in children’s human 
capital from permanent or idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, following the death of a parent, the 
remaining household head should be able to completely smooth out any income loss. In other 
words, this model predicts that the loss of a parent would not have any effect on children’s 
human capital investment, provided that perfect insurance is available. 
Still, it is not clear whether perfect insurance is a reasonable assumption for a developing 
country, particularly for individuals residing in rural areas. A more suitable framework for 
studying the developing world, due to Becker (1986), relaxes the assumption of perfect 
insurance, allowing for liquidity constraints that may result in the reduction of both consumption 
and investments. This framework has been validated by several empirical studies.
5
 Hence, 
following the loss of a parent, the lack of perfect insurance markets would cause the remaining 
household head to revise his/her investment decisions under a new budget constraint. For 
example, it is possible that after the death of a mother, the daughters’ opportunity cost of 
education is higher; hence, marginal investments in daughters may be eliminated, causing some 
daughters to forgo acquiring higher education. That is, in this less restricted model it is possible 
                                                 
5
 For example, using a siblings sample from Taiwan, Parish and Willis (1991) discuss the idea that credit constraints 
and conditional altruism may result in older daughters faring poorly, as they assume the role of caregivers of their 
younger siblings.  
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that the death of a parent would have significant implications for the investment in children’s 
human capital, even more so when the deceased was the main income earner in the family, 
and/or the family is unable to borrow against children’s future income. 
Another crucial assumption of Becker and Tomes (1979) is the effective altruism of the 
household head who can be seen as a benevolent, rational, and altruistic dictator whose 
preferences are taken to represent the family’s utility function. This assumption, which allows 
for the aggregation of household members’ preferences into a single utility function, has been 
rejected repeatedly by empirical evidence.
6
 Hence, following the death of a parent, if the mother 
and the father have competing preferences, then one may expect to observe changes in 
investments in children’s human capital that depend on the gender of the remaining household 
head. Although it is not our goal to test the single-preference assumption, these competing 
models suggest the importance of studying the bereavement effect separately for mothers and 
fathers. 
Parents’ preferences aside, it is possible that exogenous forces - such as those affecting 
labor market returns to human capital investments or those resulting from cultural norms- may 
cause altruistic parents to optimally choose one child over another based on the child’s gender, 
particularly when resources (i.e. time, income) are scarce. In Taiwan, however, the rate of return 
to schooling offers clear incentives for both males and females to acquire higher education.
7
 This 
                                                 
6
 Thomas (1990) studies single-headed families and finds that mothers (fathers) in Brazil tend to prefer to devote 
resources to improving the heights and weights of their daughters (sons). In addition, the study finds that a mother’s 
income has a greater impact on offspring in general than a father’s income, suggesting that parents’ preferences may 
not be homogeneous. Similar findings are also found in the developed world. Han et al. (2003) focus on tertiary 
education in the United States and find that after controlling for income, single-mother families allot significantly 
higher investments in children’s education than single-father families, indicating that mothers may value human 
capital more than fathers. 
7
 Using Taiwan’s Manpower Utilization Survey data of 1996, Chuang and Chao (2001) estimate that the annual rate 
of return to schooling is 2.30 percent for senior high-school, 3.98 percent for vocational school, 4.58 percent for 
junior college, and 12.20 percent for university. The same study finds that females have a higher rate of return to 
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suggests that prevailing gender-based differences in human capital investments are likely the 
consequence of the culturally defined roles that sons and daughters are expected to play in the 
family. For instance, in many Asian cultures the care of the elderly traditionally has been a 
responsibility that rests primarily on the shoulders of sons, because daughters are expected to 
leave their family and adopt the family of their husbands after marriage, which is sometimes 
referred to as ”virilocality”.8 So, even if a son is ”the rotten kid” (Becker 1981), his economic 
incentives are often better aligned with those of his parents relative to those of a daughter, which 
renders the investment in boys an optimal decision. In other words, daughters may not 
necessarily be “rotten” but they are more likely to act that way, deeming investments in their 
human capital less productive than those made in their male siblings. Hence the parents’ decision 
to allocate more of the family’s resources into the formation of sons is both altruistic and optimal 
from the family’s point of view. To capture any existing gender based differences, our analysis 
in the current study is separated by gender. 
1.3 Parental Loss: Empirical Evidence 
The developmental psychology literature suggests that the effect of parental loss may be 
quite heterogeneous across children and may strongly depend on such factors as: (1) the gender 
of the deceased and the gender of the child; (2) the age of the child when the death takes place; 
(3) the time elapsed since the death occurred; (4) the type of death; and (5) family composition 
and socio-economic status (Dowdney 2000). 
A large body of empirical research already has examined the effect of parental loss or 
parental absence on children’s outcomes. In terms of the gender of the deceased parent, most 
                                                                                                                                                             
schooling than males. 
8
 We refer the reader to a study of Levine and Kevane (2003) for a more extensive evaluation of the effects of 
virilocality on female disadvantage. 
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studies validate the existence of a negative effect of a mother’s death or absence on the 
educational attainments of children. Interestingly, the link between the latter and paternal death 
has been substantiated less frequently (for exceptions, see Beegle et al. 2006; Gertler et al. 2004; 
Fronstin et al. 2001). Ainsworth et al. (2005) analyze a panel household survey from the Kagera 
region (Tanzania), focusing on short-and medium-term effects of adult death on the household’s 
decision to send children to primary school. They find that school attendance of children 7-10 
years old who have lost a mother is 10 percentage points lower than that of children with living 
parents or paternal orphans. Two-parent orphans suffer the same disadvantage as maternal 
orphans, though. Similarly, a study of a five-year individual-level panel from Busia District 
(Kenya) by Evans and Miguel (2007) finds that the impact of parental loss on primary school 
participation is more than twice as large following the death of a mother than a father. And using 
longitudinal data from KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa), Case and Ardington (2006) find a clear 
link between maternal death and children’s school enrollment and years of completed schooling, 
although no such link is found for the death of a father.  
Parental death also affects children differently depending on their gender. A World Bank 
(2002) report finds that losing a parent affects girls disproportionately more than boys, 
suggesting that policies aimed at helping bereaving children should be gender based. Several 
studies echo this report. Using a retrospective survey from Burkina, Kobian et al. (2005) 
investigate whether orphan status is detrimental to children’s chances of attending school. They 
find that following the death of a parent, boys are more likely to enter school than girls. Gertler 
et al. (2004) use a large cross-sectional sample from Indonesia and find that the loss of a parent 
disproportionately increases the school drop-out rate of the eldest daughters. Fronstin et al. 
(2001) use the British national Child Development Survey to examine the long-term effects of 
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parental divorce or death on labor market outcomes. They find that females, but not males, 
appear to be adversely affected by father’s death, particularly when death occurs before the 
child’s 16th birthday.  
In terms of the duration of the bereavement effect, Ainsworth et al. (2005) find that prior 
to an adult death children spent substantially less time at school, but following the adult death the 
hours spent at school are likely to return to normal levels. However, Evans and Miguel (2007) 
find no evidence that orphaned children return to their pre-parental-death academic performance 
levels after the loss of a parent. After they control for child fixed effects, they show that 
difference in school attendance between the orphans and the control group begins to widen two 
years prior to the death of a parent, and remains at a lower level for at least three years after the 
event. Beegle et al. (2006) are among the few that, like us, study the long-term effect of parental 
loss on the educational attainment of children. They use a sample of Tanzanian children who 
were first interviewed in 1991-94 and were re-interviewed in 2004. They find that the loss of a 
mother results in the permanent loss of about one year of schooling as compared to non-
orphans.
9
 
1.4 Data and Sample  
We use six administrative datasets from Taiwan to construct our sample. As a first step, 
we merge three sources: (1) the Annual Birth Certificate Records (BCR); (2) the Annual Death 
Certificate Records (DCR); and (3) the College and University Joint Entrance Examination files 
(CUJEE). The first two sources contain records for the entire population of Taiwan and were 
                                                 
9
 Their study is similar to ours in that they are able to observe children when they reach adulthood (i.e. 18 years of 
age) and that they explore how parental death affects children’s educational and non- educational outcomes. These 
authors also find that maternal loss affects children’s health outcomes; in particular, maternal orphanhood is 
associated with anthropometric deficiencies for children between the age of 11 and 18 at the time of the mother’s 
death. 
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assembled by Taiwan's Ministry of Interior Affairs. The third source covers the examination 
years 2000-2003 and was gathered by the College and University Entrance Examination Center 
of Taiwan's Ministry of Education. 
The birth certificates have detailed information on a variety of personal and demographic 
characteristics including age, date of birth, gender, parent's age at the time of the child's birth, 
parental schooling, and county and town of residence at birth. From the death certificates, we can 
identify not only whether either parent is deceased but also the timing of death, as well as the 
medical diagnosis of the deceased (as coded by the International Classification of Diseases or 
ICD-9). The latter information is crucial for the construction of our cause-of-death classification. 
The CUJEE data provide college or university enrollment information for each student who 
gained admission. The data also allow us to identify whether the students took the entrance exam 
(CUJEE), the scores they obtained in every area tested, and whether they were offered admission 
to attend a private or a public college or university. 
To construct our sample, we restrict children's cohorts to those students who were born 
between 1981 and 1985 to parents that were between 16 and 50 years of age. In other words, we 
only consider students who would have turned 18, the age of taking the CUJEE, in 2000-2003. 
We construct five child cohorts from birth certificates based on both the children's date of birth 
and the official cutoff date for school enrollment.
10
 We use the parents' personal identification 
numbers found in the children's BCR (1981-1985) to merge parents who died to their respective 
DCR (1981-2003). We merge parents to the Government Employee Insurance and Labor and 
Farmer Insurance files to obtain information on the wages of all insured parties. Using this 
                                                 
10
 The cohorts include children who were 18 years old on September 1 of each of the years 2000 through 2003 (i.e. 
children born between September 2, 1981 and September 1, 1985). 
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information, we create a proxy for the aggregate monthly income of the child’s family.11  
In the next step, we merge this sample with the CUJEE (2000-2003) by the students' ID 
and the year in which each cohort was scheduled to take the CUJEE. We then use the personal 
identification number of each child to merge this sample to: (4) the National Military Enrollment 
(NME) records, 1998-2003; (5) the Labor Insurance (LI), Farmer Insurance (FI) and Government 
Employee Insurance (GEI) files, 1998-2003; and (6) the National Marriage Certificate records 
(NMC), 1998-2003. Datasets (4) and (6) are maintained by the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The 
LI and FI files come from the Bureau of Labor Insurance and GEI files are obtained from the 
Central Trust of China.  
1.4.1 Sample Statistics 
Our final sample contains 1,402,196 observations.
12
 Among these, 65,220 (21,886) 
children become paternal (maternal) orphans before taking the CUJEE. 68,363 (22,918) children 
become paternal (maternal) orphans before turning 20 years of age. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the mortality variables found in our final sample. Using the BCR of each 
child we create indicator to control for child-level characteristics including first-born son or 
daughter, gender, whether the child was one of a pair of twins, whether the child was born out of 
wedlock or was abandoned by his/her biological parents, and the child's year of birth. These 
controls help us capture any differences in educational attainment and other outcomes that may 
arise from children's ascribed characteristics. 
                                                 
11
 The uninsured in Taiwan are often low-SES unemployed individuals. Still, it is possible that some high-SES 
individuals simply have opted out of the labor insurance. For this reason, we check whether those who have no 
insurance records also live in the poorest areas. We use the township income-tax data for each of the 359 towns in 
Taiwan. These data are collected by the Financial Data Center of Taiwan's Ministry of Finance. We find that all the 
uninsured individuals live in the lowest income towns (the towns belonging to the lowest income-tax quartile).  
12
 The sample sizes for the death of a mother and the death of a father differ slightly because observations having 
invalid or missing values in any of the variables used in the cause of death classification were dropped from the final 
sample, separately for mothers and fathers. 
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We obtain information on the parents' education from the child's birth certificate. We 
divide parental education into six categories: illiteracy to primary school attainment (0-6 years); 
junior high-school level (7-9 years); high-school level (10-12 years), college level without a 
degree (13-14 years); college and university with a degree (15-16 years), and higher education 
(16+). The illiteracy to primary school was the omitted category in all the regressions. Table 2 
presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. 
We measure children's outcomes using six binary variables and a set of continuous 
variables. First, we look at educational attainment and the quality of education that children 
receive. To measure educational attainment we use an indicator of college or university 
enrollment. To measure the quality of education we rely on an indicator for public college or 
university enrollment, versus enrollment at a less prestigious private college and university, or no 
enrollment at all.
13
 The top panel of Table 1.3 presents the descriptive statistics for all of the 
binary dependent variables corresponding to the educational outcomes, separately for bereaved 
and non-bereaved children. We also analyze whether parental loss affects the probability of 
taking the CUJEE exam and, for the subsample of children who undertook this examination, 
whether bereaved children have a systematically different test performance (measured by 
children's standardized test scores) relative to non-bereaved children in the same cohort. The 
subjects we considered are Chinese, English, Math for Engineers, Math for Social Sciences, 
Chemistry, Physics, Biology and History.
14
  
In addition to educational outcomes, we also analyze three non-educational outcomes 
(see bottom panel of Table 1.3). First, the NMC files allow us to identify children who married 
                                                 
13
 While it would be ideal to focus on a broader range of outcomes, we do not have information on children's 
completed years of schooling. 
14
 Descriptive statistics, as well as regression results, on each test subject are available upon request. 
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and the date of their marriage. Combining this information with the child's year of birth, we can 
construct an indicator variable that equals one if the child got married before turning the age of 
20 (i.e. during the child's teenage years). Second, the LI files contain information on enrollment 
into Labor Insurance, which covers most of the workers in the country's private sector.
15
 Using 
the enrollment date and the child's year of birth, we can proxy the date the job began to construct 
an indicator variable that equals one if the child participated in the labor force before turning the 
age of 20. Finally, the information contained in the NME files allows us to identify the boys who 
decided to enlist in the military, their date of enlistment, and the date of release. We use the date 
of entry into the military, combined with the exam year, to investigate whether bereaved boys are 
more likely to enlist in the military shortly after high-school (within one, two, three, or four years 
following high-school graduation) rather than deferring their enlistment until after obtaining 
higher education (i.e. more than five years after high-school graduation).  
1.5 Empirical Model 
The empirical literature proposes different methods for identifying bereavement effects. 
Some authors treat death as an exogenous shock (Corak 2001; Lang and Zagorsky 2001; 
Ainsworth and Semali 2000; Lloyd and Blanc 1996), ignoring its potential endogeneity at the 
risk of biasing the estimated bereavement effect. Many of the more recent studies that do address 
the endogeneity of death use panel data to control for household or individual level fixed effects 
(Evans and Miguel 2007; Beegle et al. 2006; Case and Ardington 2006; Fronstin et al. 2001). 
However, when using panel data researchers face other important challenges. First, very few 
panels follow children long enough to capture long-term bereavement effects. Second, there is a 
                                                 
15
 Self-employed workers could obtain Labor Insurance if they were members of an occupational union. It is very 
unlikely that teenagers would work for the government sector because government workers who are civil servants 
must pass very demanding examinations. 
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disproportionately higher probability of attrition among the bereaved compared to the non-
bereaved, because families that have recently experienced the death of a mother or father may be 
more likely to relocate and hence to drop out of the survey (Ford and Hosegood 2005). An 
alternative empirical method is to use unexpected deaths, such as accidents, as exogenous causes 
of death (Chen et al. 2009). However, certain unexpected deaths, including those from motor 
vehicle or job related accidents, often are correlated with SES (Beaver 2003; Whitlock et al. 
2003; Baker et al. 1992; Loomis 1991). That is, it is not clear whether this approach is 
satisfactory, given that the ultimate decision to include a particular cause-of-death is determined 
arbitrarily by the researcher. 
We follow the procedure proposed by Espinosa and Evans (2008) to classify causes of 
death as either Informative or Uninformative. First, we re-group the ICD-9s using the Clinical 
Classification Software (CCS) developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ, 2010).
16
 We then use ordinary least squares (OLS) to categorize each of the ICD-9 
groupings according to their degree of correlation with family SES. The linear probability model 
(LPM) we estimate for each COD group is as follows:  
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where       
  is an indicator for parent i who resided in county c and died from cause-of-death d 
in year t;   
  is a constant;   
  and   
  represent county and year of death fixed effects, 
respectively.  (      ) equals one when the family income of parent i  falls in the thk  income 
quartile;  (      ) is an indicator for the educational level k  attained by the deceased parent 
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 The CCS re-grouping allows us to collapse ICD-9s into clinically meaningful diagnosis categories: 181 COD 
groups for deceased fathers and 178 COD groups for deceased mothers. 
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i ,  (       ) is an indicator for the educational level k  attained by the spouse. X includes 
four dummies of age at the time of death and an indicator for urban residence. Finally,     
  is an 
idiosyncratic error term.
 
 We estimate Equation (1) using all the parents who died before their child turned the age 
of 20. We perform the estimations separately for mothers and fathers. The classification of 
causes of death into informative (ICOD) or uninformative (UCOD) rests on testing whether the 
coefficient estimates for the income variables,   
 , the education indicators for the deceased,   
 , 
the education indicators for the spouse of the deceased,   
 , and all three sets, income, own 
education, and spousal education indicators, respectively, are jointly zero. If we reject any of the 
four null hypotheses at the 10 percent confidence level, then the COD is classified as 
informative; otherwise, the COD is considered uninformative. The resulting dichotomous 
variables, ICOD and UCOD, are then used in lieu of parental death.
  
 
While the ICOD indicator identifies individuals who died as the result of a predictable 
cause-of-death, the UCOD indicator identifies individuals who died as a result of a likely random 
cause. Hence, the UCOD indicator constitutes a source of exogenous variation that is orthogonal 
to the socio-economic characteristics of both the child and her/his parents. On the other hand, the 
effect measured by the ICOD is expected to be biased by omitted third variables. A priori, the 
direction of the bias is not evident. For instance, because low-SES children already are exposed 
to various biological and environmental risks, the incremental damage caused by parental loss 
could be smaller for these children. However, children from high-SES families may be better 
prepared to deal with the death financially. In either case, unobservables are likely to cause the 
ICOD coefficient to be biased towards zero relative to the UCOD coefficient.
17
 On the other 
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 An alternative explanation for the attenuation of the bereavement effects is provided by Fortson (2008), who finds 
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hand, low-SES children are both more likely to experience parental loss and more frequently 
exposed to risk factors such as medical illness and family stress. These biological and 
environmental risk factors may interact synergistically leading these children to have worse 
outcomes. In this case, the adverse effect captured by the ICOD indicator will be overestimated.
 
1.5.1 COD Classification  
 Table 1.4 reports the top ten ICODs and UCODs, separately for mothers (top panel) and 
fathers (bottom panel). These CODs are obtained by estimating Equation (1) separately for each 
CCS group found in the mortality sample. Grouping all of the cancer related deaths, we observe 
that cancer is the number one cause-of-death for both mothers and fathers. Given that many of 
the listed cancers are highly preventable and often related to behavioral risk factors, it is not 
surprising to find them primarily under the ICOD group. About 80 percent of fathers' deaths are 
informative. This is greater than the percentage of informative deaths for mothers (63 percent), 
which is consistent with the findings from the epidemiological literature.
18
 For fathers, we find 
that about 72 percent of the informative deaths have a statistically significant income gradient, 
whereas 54 (43) percent have a statistically significant own (spouse’s) education gradient. For 
mothers, only 30 percent of the informative deaths have a statistically significant income 
gradient, whereas 69 (40) percent have a statistically significant own (spouse’s) education 
gradient. That is, while it is income that is the most significant SES-predictor of mortality for 
fathers, it is own education for mothers. 
As for fathers, we find motor vehicle accidents (13.5 percent), other liver diseases (12.4 percent) 
                                                                                                                                                             
that HIV-infection is positively associated with SES in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
18
 Mustard and Etches (2003) systematically review 136 published papers that look at the gender differences in 
mortality risk factors and select 58 studies to be included in their analysis. For 90 percent of the selected studies the 
authors find that, when absolute measures of inequality are used, male mortality is more unequal than female 
mortality across socioeconomic groups. 
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and cancer of liver and intrahepatic bile duct (8.6 percent) to be among the three most common 
ICODs (top left panel of Table 1.4). The three most common UCODs for fathers (top right panel 
of Table 1.4) include acute crushing injury or internal injury (4.2 percent), superficial injury, 
contusion (3.2 percent) and diabetes mellitus (2.5 percent). For mothers, the most common 
ICOD is breast cancer (8.1 percent), while the second and the third most common ICODs are 
acute cerebrovascular disease (4.5 percent) and cancer of the cervix (4.1 percent). The three most 
common UCODs among mothers include motor vehicle accidents (11.5 percent), suicide (6.8 
percent) and respiratory failure (1.4 percent). 
While an in depth analysis of mortality risk factors is beyond the scope of this study, it is 
worth discussing some of the CODs in detail. We consider in turn suicide, congestive heart 
failure and diabetes. The finding that suicide is an ICOD for fathers and a UCOD for mothers 
may be counter-intuitive at first glance; however, several studies echo this finding. For example, 
Cubin et al. (2000) examine the association between education, employment, income, and death 
rates for both men and women. The authors find that while women with low level of educational 
attainment have generally higher death rates relative to women with higher educational 
attainment, suicide is the exception to this rule. Similarly, Lorant et al. (2005) find that while a 
low level of educational attainment for men is a risk factor for suicide in eight out of ten 
countries they examine, the educational inequalities for suicide are overall smaller and less 
consistent for women (see also, Sher 2006 and Lin 2006).  
As for congestive heart failure and diabetes, many studies document a strong negative 
health gradient where those at the bottom of the economic hierarchy have both higher incidence 
rates as well as worse adverse outcomes (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2012, Kaplan and Keil 1993). 
However, several review articles also find that although consistently strong across high-income 
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countries, the corresponding association is less evident for middle and low-income countries.
19
 
One explanation for our seemingly paradoxical finding is that the epidemiology of disease 
depends strongly on a country’s economic development. For example, rheumatic heart disease is 
the major cause of heart failure in Asia, while coronary artery disease is the single most common 
cause of heart failure in western developed countries (Mendez and Cowie 2001). The former has 
a less clear association with socioeconomic status (Steer et al. 2002), whereas the latter has more 
consistent association with unhealthy life styles and socioeconomic status. As developing 
countries undergo the epidemiological transition and socio-economic development, the etiology 
of diseases also becomes increasingly similar to that of western societies. It is the transition to 
western lifestyle and the attendant increase in the risk of chronic diseases like diabetes and heart 
failure, both of which normally occur initially among the more affluent, that may render the 
SES-health gradient in a society ambiguous (Schooling et al. 2010).
20
 
In what follows, a statistically significant UCOD coefficient will be interpreted as 
evidence of a causal relationship between parental loss and educational outcome; a statistically 
significant ICOD coefficient that is different from the corresponding UCOD coefficient will be 
interpreted as simple correlation between parental loss and outcome. 
1.5.2 Parental Loss and Children's Outcomes  
 Empirical research shows that children growing up in single parent families are at a 
higher risk of teenage pregnancy, early marriage, dropping out of school, delinquency, adult 
depression, and other possible negative outcomes (Amato 2005; Kendler et al. 2002; McLanahan 
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 For example, see review articles by Manrique-Garcia et al. (2011) for acute myocardial infarction, Agardh et al. 
(2011) and Chaturvedi (2004) for diabetes, and Mendez and Cowie (2001) and Blair et al. (2002) for heart failure. 
20
 It is important to point out that Taiwan experienced significant socio-economic development during our study 
period (1981-2003). As a result of this and of the attendant epidemiological transition, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish the informative from the uninformative CODs based solely on the existing epidemiological literature. 
This issue highlights the relevance of using statistical methods as we do in this study. 
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and Sandefur 1994). We first study the effects of parental loss on children's educational 
attainment, measured by the enrollment rate in college or university, and the quality of education 
children receive, measured by the type of college or university the child attends (public versus 
private).
 
 
 Entrance to prestigious institutions of higher education is highly competitive in Taiwan, 
and the CUJEE is the most important factor in any admission decision. If losing a parent affects 
children's educational outcomes or the quality of education children's receive, then one of the 
potential channels is through children's performance on the CUJEE. We investigate this 
hypothesis by focusing first on an indicator for whether or not the child has taken the CUJEE as 
the outcome variable. Depending upon how well students perform in the entrance exam, they are 
then assigned to a major in a particular College or University. Hence, for the subsample of test-
takers we explore whether children who have lost a parent perform systematically differently 
from children with living parents when taking the CUJEE. 
 We also study whether the death of a parent significantly affects other dimensions of 
children's lives. Specifically, we consider whether children who have lost a parent before turning 
20 years of age are more likely to marry or to work during their teenage years, both of which are 
potential substitutes for higher education. Military enlistment is also an alternative income 
earning occupation for boys. While military service is compulsory for all boys 19 years of age, if 
a boy chooses to attend college or university the draft can be deferred until after obtaining a 
higher education degree. Hence, we investigate whether bereaved boys are more likely to enlist 
in the military soon after high-school graduation than non-bereaved boys. 
 After the death of a father (mother), boys (girls) may naturally respond to the loss by 
assuming the role of the deceased. To better capture the gender-bereavement gradient, we run all 
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regressions by the gender of the deceased parent and separately for boys and girls. Similarly, the 
bereavement effect may be different depending on the time elapsed between the death and the 
observed outcomes under study. To study the time-bereavement gradient, we construct time-
death interactions that classify the effect of parental loss into three categories: the long-term 
effect, corresponding to more than 9 years between the parent's death and the relevant year
21
; the 
medium-term effect, corresponding to 3-9 years between the parent's death and the relevant date; 
and the short-term effect, corresponding to up to 3 years between the parent's death and the 
relevant year. Finally, the bereavement effect is also likely to depend on the socio-economic 
status of the family. To analyze the SES-bereavement gradient we use the insured income of 
parents as a proxy for family income. Using this proxy, we classify children into four income 
quartiles, with the first quartile corresponding to the lowest income level.  
 The reduced form linear probabilty model (LPM) we estimate is as follows:  
                                                                        ,  (2) 
where the dependent variable      is the outcome of child i who was born in county c and 
belongs to the exam cohort t;    is a constant;    (  ) is the estimated effect of parental death on 
the child's educational outcome given that the cause-of-death is informative (uninformative); 
respectively, iICOD  and iUCOD  defined as in the previous section;      is a vector of all other 
explanatory variables to be included in the estimation, and      is an idiosyncratic error term. 
These include variables related to the socio-economic status of the child's family (family income 
level and five dummies of maternal and paternal education), the type of birth (whether the child 
was abandoned or born out of wedlock), as well as the ascribed characteristics of the child 
(gender, year of birth, birth order, and twin status). In all of our regressions, we also control for 
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 For the educational outcomes, the relevant date is the year the child is due to take the CUJEE. For the non- 
educational outcomes, the relevant date is the year the child turns 20 years of age. 
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county-of-child-birth fixed effect, c , and exam-year fixed effect, t .  
1.6 Results 
1.6.1  Educational Attainment: UCOD versus ICOD 
 In Panel A of Table 1.5, we present the estimated coefficient for the effect of the loss of a 
father (first three columns) and of the loss of a mother (last three columns) on the educational 
attainment of young adults (age 18-19). Both the UCOD and ICOD coefficients are reported. 
Comparing the coefficients for each of the groups (All, Boys, and Girls), we find that the ICOD 
coefficients suffer from attenuation bias, especially for the loss of a mother. The bias makes the 
UCOD and ICOD coefficients statistically different at the 5 percent significance level for all 
three samples (All, Boys, and Girls) after the death of a mother; and marginally significant for all 
children and for boys after the death of a father.
22
 These results have interesting implications. On 
the one hand, the unobserved factors that govern maternal loss are more likely to be negatively 
correlated with children's adverse outcomes. This is not surprising given that maternal education 
is an important predictor of informative maternal loss and is likely to be positively correlated 
with children's educational attainment. For a paternal loss, it is possible that the sources of bias 
either cancel out or that the unobserved factors are not correlated with children’s educational 
outcomes. 
 We pool the mother and father samples and test whether the bereavement effect is 
independent of the gender of the deceased parent. When looking at all children, we find that the 
effect of maternal bereavement has a significantly larger negative impact on the probability of 
acquiring higher education than the paternal effect. However, when testing the difference 
between these coefficients using separate regressions for boys and girls, the difference is no 
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 For brevity, in the remaining panels of Table 1.6, as well as in the following tables, we only report the UCOD 
indicator, which produces the coefficients of interest. 
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longer statistically significant.
23
 This finding provides some support to those of Evans and 
Miguel (2007) and Ainsworth et al. (2005), who suggest that losing a mother has on average a 
more significant effect on scholastic performance of children than losing a father.  
 In Panel B of Table 1.5, we report the coefficient estimates for the short-, medium-, and 
long-term effect of the loss of a father (first three columns) and of the loss of a mother (last three 
columns). For boys, the negative impact from losing a father is robust across time, ranging from 
-0.019 to -0.026. For girls, while we do observe a significant gradient for each of the three time 
interactions, the short-term effect after the death of a father (-0.040) is significantly larger than 
the medium- and long-term effects (-0.014 and -0.015, respectively). For the loss of a mother, the 
coefficient estimates on all three time-bereavement interactions are statistically significant and of 
similar magnitude. Although ranging from -0.022 to -0.036, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the negative effect of losing a mother is the same regardless of when it takes place.  
 In order to ascertain whether the effect of parental loss varies with family income, we 
fully interact the death of a father (mother) with each of the income quartiles. These results are 
reported in Panel C of Table 1.5. We find that the death of a father has a significant negative 
effect on the educational attainment of all children from families falling in the two lowest 
income quartiles (-0.016, -0.038, respectively for boys, and -0.015, -0.032, respectively for girls). 
For the highest income quartile, although the coefficients are only significant for all children and 
marginally for boys, we cannot rule out the possibility that the educational attainment of these 
children may in fact be more negatively affected by a father’s death than that of low-income 
children.
24
 Following the death of a mother, children from families in the three lowest income 
                                                 
23
 The results from these tests are available from the authors upon request. 
24
 In the case of high-income girls, later in the text we verify that the size of their corresponding coefficient is driven 
primarily by the decline in the quality of education these girls receive that results from the death of their father (see 
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quartiles see significant declines in their educational attainment whereas the coefficient 
corresponding to children in the highest income quartiles are not statistically significant. We also 
run separate regressions for the death of a father versus the death of a mother using the four-level 
parental education cut-off described above as an alternative measure of SES (not reported). 
Overall, the results from these regressions are consistent with those from using the income 
measure.  
1.6.2 Quality of Education: UCOD versus ICOD 
 We measure quality with a binary indicator of whether or not the child is enrolled in a 
national college or university. Results are presented in Table 1.6. Both the UCOD and ICOD 
coefficients are reported for the average effect. Comparing the coefficients for each of the groups 
(All, Boys, and Girls), we find that the attenuation bias is generally less evident; however, when 
the difference between the UCOD and ICOD coefficients is statistically significant, the bias 
again causes the ICOD coefficient to underestimate the maternal bereavement effect. 
 The time-bereavement gradients for the quality of education received are reported in 
Panel B of Table 1.6. Boys (girls) experience a negative and significant long-term effect after the 
death of a father (mother). Girls also experience a significant short-term effect after the death of 
either parent, whereas boys only after the death of a mother. In terms of income, the reductions 
in the quality of education received are primarily driven by children from middle- to high-
income level families. This is true for both the income and the parental education interactions. In 
fact, the most detrimental effect is experienced by girls in the highest-income quartiles after the 
death of a father (-0.05), followed by all children in the middle-income quartiles after the death 
of either parent. Overall, these results suggest that a mother's presence is most relevant for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Table 1.6, Panel C, column 3). 
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determining the quality of education received by girls from low- to middle- income families, 
whereas a father's presence for children from middle- to high-income families. 
1.6.3 Avenues for the Bereavement Effect 
 Looking for potential avenues for the bereavement effect, we first investigate whether 
losing a parent causes a change in children's probability of taking the CUJEE (Table 1.7). In 
Panel A, we observe that parental loss significantly reduces the probability of taking the CUJEE, 
regardless of the gender of the deceased parent. We also note that, similar to the college 
enrollment outcome, the bereavement effect is underestimated when measured by the ICOD 
indicator. With the exception of girls after the death of a father, the difference between the 
UCOD and ICOD coefficients is statistically significant for all subsamples. 
 In Panel B, we report the time-bereavement gradients for the probability of taking the 
CUJEE. We find that the bereavement effect is significant regardless of when in the child's life 
the loss of the parent takes place and of the gender of the deceased parent. In terms of the 
magnitude of the bereavement effect, we observe that the death of a father has the most 
deleterious effect in the long-term for boys and in the short-term for girls, respectively, while the 
effect of the death of a mother remains equally large across time and gender of the child. The 
income-bereavement interactions, presented in Panel C, show that the probability of taking the 
CUJEE is particularly affected when children come from the two (three) lowest income quartile 
families after the death of a father (mother). For brevity, the results for the standardized test 
scores are not reported in the tables. These results show that, in general, the loss of a father has 
important negative consequences for the standardized test scores attained by children from third 
and fourth income quartile families, whereas the loss of a mother does so for children from the 
three lowest income quartile families. 
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 Taken together, the regression results for the probability of taking the CUJEE and the 
performance during the exam suggest three different avenues for the income-bereavement effect. 
First, children from lower-income families are less likely to take the CUJEE altogether. Hence, it 
is not surprising to find that they are less likely to attend college or university. Second, following 
the death of a father, children from higher-income families may still take the CUJEE, but 
perform systematically worse than non-bereaved children when taking this exam. Since a child's 
performance in the CUJEE is the most important determinant of the quality of education he/she 
receives, the latter finding also provides a plausible mechanism that explains why bereaved 
children, and in particular those from middle- to high-income families, experience significant 
reductions in the quality of their education following a father’s death. Third, children who have 
lost a mother are both less likely to take the CUJEE and more likely to do worse when taking it. 
The final remark is related to the finding that, for boys, the negative effect of bereavement on the 
probability of taking the CUJEE increases with the average education of parents (not reported in 
the tables). It is possible that following the death of a father, when high-SES families are unable 
to recover financially, boys experience the most significant declines in educational attainment as 
they assume some of the responsibilities of the deceased. 
1.6.4 Teenage Marriage, Teenage Employment, and Military Enrollment 
 Tables 1.8 through 1.10 summarize the results of the analysis of the effect of parental loss 
on teenage marriage, teenage employment, and military enrollment. Table 1.8 shows that while 
the loss of either parent has virtually no effect on the probability of teenage marriage for boys, it 
has a significant positive effect on girls. Moreover, as is evident from Panel B, the increase in the 
likelihood of teenage marriage for girls who experience parental death remains the same 
regardless of when in the girl's life the loss takes place. As for the income-bereavement 
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interaction, we find that the death of either parent has the largest impact on the probability of 
teenage marriage for girls from the two lower-income quartile families or from families with low 
educational attainment. Finally, we also note that when the ICOD and UCOD coefficients are 
statistically different, the ICOD estimates again suffer from attenuation bias. 
 In terms of the probability of working during their teenage years, from Panel A of Table 
1.9 we observe that children who have lost a parent are, on average, more likely to work than 
those with living parents. Similar to the case of educational outcomes, Panel B shows that the 
loss of a father has a larger long-term (short-term) effect for boys (girls), respectively whereas 
following the loss of a mother (and regardless of the gender of the child) both the medium- and 
long-term effects are the most pronounced. Studying the income-bereavement interactions (Panel 
C), we conclude that while virtually all boys and girls from families falling in the two lowest 
income quartiles are more likely to work following the death of either parent, the probability of 
working for children from families that belong to the highest-income quartile is not affected by 
the death of either parent.
25
 Lastly, we note that for the teenage work outcome the estimated 
coefficients corresponding to the UCOD and ICOD indicators are practically the same. 
 The results in Panel A of Table 1.10 show that the likelihood of military enrollment also 
increases after the death of either parent. From Panel B we learn that boys are more likely to 
enlist in the military after either a short-term or a long-term loss of a father, a result that is again 
consistent with the educational outcomes. Note however, that it is only the long-term effect that 
drives the differences between bereaved and non-bereaved boys after the death of a mother. The 
results for the income gradient, reported in Panel C, are similar to those of taking the CUJEE. In 
particular, we see that while boys from families falling in the three lower income quartiles are 
                                                 
25
 We also note that the results are virtually the same when family SES is measured using parental education. 
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more likely to substitute higher education for military enlistment (i.e. a paying occupation), when 
parental education is used as the SES measure (not reported in the Tables), all boys regardless of 
the educational attainment of their parents are more likely to enroll in the military sooner. This 
suggests that the major driver of the decision to join the military is the financial need that follows 
the death of a parent and, in particular, the death of a father. Finally, when looking at the effect 
of parental loss on military enrollment more than five years after high school graduation, the 
UCOD coefficients are all insignificant. 
1.7 Robustness Checks 
As described above, the CCS re-grouping allows us to aggregate ICD-9s into more than 
100 clinically meaningful diagnosis categories (see footnote 17). We check the robustness of our 
findings by employing an alternative COD classification, the ICD-9 72 grouping of the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention. This grouping allows us to collapse ICD-9s into 72 selected 
CODs, as defined by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) for analysis of mortality 
data. Following the same estimation methods decribed in Section 3, the results obtained using 
this alternative COD grouping confirm the robustness of the main results for each of the six 
outcomes (Table 1.11).  
As a second validity check we use the large set of explanatory variables at hand to 
estimate the conditional probability of receiving the treatment (i.e. parental death) or propensity 
score function for each of the subsamples. The estimated propensity score is divided into q 
intervals, with the optimal number of intervals q chosen such that individuals falling in a 
particular interval have on average the same propensity score. For each of the q intervals, the 
difference between the average outcome of the treatment and the control (or ATT) is obtained. 
Finally, the sample ATT is then constructed as the average of the ATTs across all of the q 
33 
 
 
intervals, where the contribution of each interval to the sample ATT is given by the proportion of 
treated units in each block. This alternative method allows us to use a scalar to summarize 
background characteristics that help explain the likelihood of selection into the treatment while 
abstaining from making any distributional assumption about the relationship between the 
treatment and the outcome. The results from this exercise confirm our main findings (Table 
1.12). 
1.8 Discussion 
 The primary aim of our study is to analyze how the loss of a parent affects children's 
wellbeing. The identification strategy that we use shows that ignoring the endogeneity of 
parental death has a clear potential to underestimate the bereavement effect, particularly for 
educational outcomes. This attenuation bias is consistent with the bereavement literature, which 
suggests that families that have experienced the loss of a parent as a result of a foreseen and/or 
predictable death - as opposed to an unforeseen or random death - may be more likely to be 
better prepared to assimilate the loss and, when possible, to have made arrangements to deal with 
it emotionally and financially (Vera 2006; Iserson 2000).
26
 Our results show that losing either 
parent has significant effects on many dimensions of children's lives. Still, we find that maternal 
bereavement negatively affects the educational attainment of children more uniformly across 
both time and income.  
 While highly active in the labor force, women in Taiwan are largely in charge of the 
family chores, of which childrearing is perhaps the most important. As a result, a mother is more 
                                                 
26
 In fact, the inconsistency of findings from studies that analyze the effect of parental bereavement on outcomes of 
children from Sub-Saharan Africa has often been credited to the fact that extended family networks are ubiquitous in 
the region (Kobiané et al. 2005, Foster and Williamson 2000). Given that death from HIV-AIDS is highly foreseen, 
it is likely that as the disease reaches its final stage, relatives would play an important role in mitigating the negative 
effects of the loss by caring for the child and by helping the child to transition to his/her new life without a parent. 
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intertwined with her children's everyday activities and provides their lives with structure. When a 
mother is lost, the surviving father must provide the child with comfort and procure to fill the 
void left by the mother's death. Tremblay and Israel (1998) point out that open communication, 
emotional support, adequate care, and family environment allow the child to greave and to 
successfully adjust to the loss. However, a vast number of studies suggest that such level of 
communication may be particularly difficult for a father who, while besieged with new 
responsibilities, is also trying to cope with the loss of his wife and adapt to the new family 
structure. Additionally, children accustomed to having their mother in charge of dealing with the 
affective life of the family may be less inclined to open-up and to share their feelings with their 
fathers (Silverman et al. 1992). Consequently, it is not surprising to find that the death or absence 
of a mother in the child's life has, in general, a more uniform impact on the child's educational 
attainment than the death of a father. 
 We also find that the effect of bereavement on educational outcomes is persistent across 
time irrespective of the gender of the parent; still, following the loss of a father the short-term 
effect is larger for girls. These results suggest that while time may help to weaken the negative 
impact of paternal loss on girls' educational outcomes, the latter may be particularly affected 
when the loss is more recent. The finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that income 
constrained mothers who are unable to make up for the loss of the main income earner in the 
family would be more likely to choose to invest in their sons' education than in their daughters'. 
This decision may be reinforced by the traditional role that Taiwanese sons play as caregivers for 
their elderly parents.  
 In terms of the SES-bereavement gradients, we find these to be quite heterogeneous. On 
the one hand, the negative father-son SES-bereavement gradient for the educational outcomes is 
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driven by two extremes, the high-SES and the low-SES families, whereas the negative father-
daughter SES-bereavement gradient is driven by relatively lower education and lower income 
families, the low- to middle-SES families. The large negative effect of the loss of a father on the 
educational attainment of boys from the highest-SES families and the finding that the long-term 
effect is particularly large for boys are suggestive of the drastic role changes that a high-income 
family must undergo after the death of a main income earner. For instance, given Taiwan's 
patrilineal tradition, it is possible that boys rather than girls would be expected to assume the role 
of the head of the family following the father's death, causing them to search for a job or to take 
charge of the family business instead of pursuing higher education. On the other hand, the 
negative mother-son and mother-daughter SES-bereavement gradient is driven by the low- to 
middle-SES families. Finally, it is also interesting to note that the avenue for the bereavement 
effect is different for children from the highest-SES families. In particular, while bereavement 
affects most of the outcomes we have analyzed for children from the lower and middle income 
families, the most significant effect for children from the highest income families is the decline 
in the quality of education that they receive and one of the direct reasons appears to be their 
lower performance when taking the CUJEE. 
1.9 Conclusion 
 Our main results suggest that losing a parent can severely curtail human capital 
accumulation for girls and, in particular, girls in the lowest-income quartiles because it not only 
decreases their college or university enrollment ratios, but also makes them more likely to marry 
and to work during their teenage years. Similarly, boys who have lost a parent are more likely to 
be occupied with income earning activities before becoming adults, suggesting that the financial 
pressure felt after the death of a parent causes boys to substitute earning income in place of 
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higher education. The need to earn income and the possibility of early marriage and parenthood 
are expected to introduce new priorities into the child's life, thus limiting the child’s chances of 
continuing her/his education.  
 Our study gives rise to two main policy implications: (1) Policies aimed at protecting the 
educational opportunities of children who have experienced the loss of a parent should help 
alleviate the financial pressure felt, in particular, by children from low- and middle-income 
families who are likely to be affected disproportionately by the loss of either parent. (2) Cost-
benefit analyses undertaken to decide whether to carry out new screening and prevention 
programs, or whether to continue support for promising current efforts to prevent the early loss 
of parents should take into consideration all the potential costs savings from such efforts. These 
include the savings from both the decreased wages and worker productivity due to the lower 
educational attainment of bereaved children, as well as from the possible negative spillover on 
future generations due to both early marriage and lower educational attainment.  
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Table 1.1 
Descriptive Statistics I – Mortality Variables 
Variable Death of a Father  Death of a Mother 
 Mean St. Dev.  Mean St. Dev. 
Deceased and child < 20 0.049 0.216  0.016 0.126 
Deceased before CUJEE 0.047 0.211  0.016 0.124 
Parent’s age when deceased a 43.25 8.290  38.61 7.172 
Child’s age when parent died a 12.26 4.931  12.05 5.050 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for all the mortality related variables. Observations are at the child level. 
a
 
Statistics include all children who have lost a parent before turning 20 years of age. Sample size for the death of a 
father (mother): N = 68,363 (22,918). 
 
 
Table 1.2 
Descriptive Statistics II – Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean St. Dev.  Variable Mean St. Dev. 
    
 Child Variables  Father’s Education 
          
Eldest daughter 0.186 0.389  Junior high-school 0.239 0.426 
Eldest son 0.199 0.399  High-school 0.298 0.457 
Male 0.516 0.499  College without a degree 0.082 0.275 
Twin 0.008 0.094  College with a degree 0.066 0.248 
Out of wedlock 0.005 0.075  More than college education 0.002 0.049 
Abandoned 0.000 0.002   
Birth year 1981 0.092 0.289  Mother’s Education 
Birth year 1982 0.262 0.440     
Birth year 1983 0.251 0.433  Junior high-school 0.246 0.431 
Birth year 1984 0.246 0.430  High-school 0.273 0.445 
Birth year 1985 0.147 0.354  College without a degree 0.045 0.208 
Family Income
a
 32,719 22,422  College with a degree 0.030 0.173 
    More than college education  0.000 0.020 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for all the explanatory variables. N = 1,402,196.  
a
 1994-95 average exchange rate: US$ 1 = NT$ 26.462. 
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Table 1.3 
Descriptive Statistics III – Binary Dependent Variables 
 
 Death of a Father    
(N = 1,397,538) 
Death of a Mother    
(N = 1,402,196) 
Variable 
 
Bereaved 
Non- 
Bereaved 
Diff.
a
 
(p-value)  Bereaved 
Non- 
Bereaved 
Diff.
 a
 
(p-value) 
        
        
  Educational Outcomes
b 
   
Educational Attainment  0.102 0.182 0.079 0.111 0.179 0.068 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Quality of Education  0.031 0.062 0.030 0.036 0.061 0.024 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Take CUJEE  0.153 0.260 0.106 0.165 0.256 0.091 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
        
  
Other Outcomes
c
 
  
Teenage Marriage  0.034 0.015 -0.018 0.032 0.016 -0.015 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Teenage Work  0.252 0.184 -0.067 0.247 0.187 -0.059 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Military Enrollment
d
        
1 year  0.102 0.080 -0.022 0.099 0.080 -0.018 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
2 year  0.251 0.194 -0.057 0.245 0.196 -0.048 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
3 year  0.302 0.236 -0.066 0.293 0.238 -0.054 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
4 year  0.332 0.266 -0.066 0.320 0.269 -0.050 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
+5 year  0.054 0.052 -0.001 0.051 0.053 0.001 
    (0.265)   (0.429) 
 
a 
Difference in outcome means between bereaved and non-bereaved children (p-value). 
b 
Bereaved includes children that have lost a father (mother) before the CUJEE. 
c 
Bereaved includes children that have lost a father (mother) before turning 20 years of age. 
d
 Sample only includes boys: N = 721,304 for the death of a father and N = 723,635 for the death of a mother.  
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Table 1.5 
OLS Estimates of Parental Death on University or College Attendance 
  Death of a Father    Death of a Mother    
 Coefficient All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
        
Panel A U -0.022
a
 -0.025
a
 -0.020
a
 -0.029
a
 -0.030
a
 -0.029
a
 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
 I -0.018
a
 -0.019
a
 -0.016
a
 -0.017
a
 -0.017
a
 -0.017
a
 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
        
F-test U=I 2.917 2.290 0.855 9.230 4.853 4.108 
 
       
        
Panel B U*S -0.029
a
 -0.019
b
 -0.040
a
 -0.036
a
 -0.036
a
 -0.036
a
 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
 U*M -0.020
a
 -0.025
a
 -0.014
b
 -0.031
a
 -0.027
a
 -0.035
a
 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
 U*L -0.021
a
 -0.026
a
 -0.015
b
 -0.026
a
 -0.028
a
 -0.022
a
 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
        
F-test U*S=U*M 1.811 0.396 6.487 0.372 0.549 0.014 
 U*M=U*L 0.021 0.016 0.003 0.511 0.023 1.431 
 U*L=U*S 1.656 0.587 7.005 1.685 0.431 1.411 
 
       
        
Panel C U*1 -0.016
a
 -0.016
a
 -0.015
a
 -0.023
a
 -0.024
a
 -0.022
a
 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
 U*2 -0.035
a
 -0.038
a
 -0.032
a
 -0.036
a
 -0.034
a
 -0.037
a
 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
 U*3 -0.015 -0.025 -0.005 -0.039
a
 -0.041
a
 -0.037
b
 
  (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
 U*4 -0.051
b
 -0.053
c
 -0.048 -0.042 -0.024 -0.062 
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) (0.038) (0.042) 
        
F-test U*1=U*2 11.39 7.687 4.310 2.607 0.903 1.754 
 U*2=U*3 1.934 0.436 1.679 0.079 0.176 0.000 
 U*3=U*4 1.850 0.623 1.147 0.009 0.178 0.322 
 U*1=U*4 2.384 1.440 0.896 0.440 0.000 0.897 
Obs.  1,397,538 721,304 676,234 1,402,196 723,635 678,561 
 
We include five indicators corresponding to the level of parental education of each parent, child's gender, year of 
birth, birth order, type of birth, twin status, family income level, and both county and exam year fixed effects. 
Superscripts 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. U = Uninformative cause of 
death. I = Informative cause of death. t = S, M, L: short-(S), medium-(M), or long-(L) term dummy interaction. n = 
1, 2, 3, 4: n-th income quartile dummy interaction. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 1.6 
OLS Estimates of Parental Death on Quality of Education 
  Death of a Father    Death of a Mother    
 Coefficient All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
        
Panel A U -0.006
a
 -0.006
a
 -0.007
a
 -0.009
a
 -0.007
b
 -0.011
a
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 I -0.007
a
 -0.008
a
 -0.005
a
 -0.005
a
 -0.008
a
 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
        
F-test U=I 0.0564 0.792 0.341 2.068 0.0485 5.432 
        
        
Panel B U*S -0.010
a
 -0.007 -0.015
a
 -0.014
a
 -0.013
b
 -0.015
a
 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
 U*M -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
c
 -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 U*L -0.006
b
 -0.008
b
 -0.003 -0.008
a
 -0.006 -0.011
a
 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
        
F-test U*S=U*M 2.241 0.373 2.602 2.252 0.930 1.363 
 U*M=U*L 0.151 1.104 0.272 0.300 0.00306 0.522 
 U*L=U*S 1.541 0.0625 4.764 1.309 0.988 0.410 
        
        
Panel C U*1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
a
 -0.005 -0.007
b
 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 U*2 -0.012
a
 -0.010
b
 -0.015
a
 -0.007 -0.003 -0.012
b
 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
 U*3 -0.012 -0.024
b
 0.000 -0.018
a
 -0.016
c
 -0.020
b
 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
 U*4 -0.032
b
 -0.018 -0.050
a
 -0.030
c
 -0.029 -0.032 
  (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) 
        
F-test U*1=U*2 11.56 3.255 9.236 0.0355 0.133 0.598 
 U*2=U*3 0.000 1.788 1.294 2.154 1.556 0.614 
 U*3=U*4 1.642 0.082 5.465 0.436 0.252 0.194 
 U*1=U*4 5.409 0.701 8.054 1.831 0.960 0.889 
Obs.  1,397,538 721,304 676,234 1,402,196 723,635 678,561 
 
We include five indicators corresponding to the level of parental education of each parent, child's gender, year of 
birth, birth order, type of birth, twin status, family income level, and both county and exam year fixed effects. 
Superscripts 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. U = Uninformative cause of 
death. I = Informative cause of death. t = S, M, L: short-(S), medium-(M), or long-(L) term dummy interaction. n = 
1, 2, 3, 4: n-th income quartile dummy interaction. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 1.7 
OLS Estimates of Parental Death on the Probability of Taking CUJEE 
  Death of a Father    Death of a Mother    
 Coefficient All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
        
Panel A U -0.034
a
 -0.036
a
 -0.031
a
 -0.041
a
 -0.037
a
 -0.045
a
 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
 I -0.026
a
 -0.028
a
 -0.024
a
 -0.023
a
 -0.024
a
 -0.024
a
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
        
F-test U=I 4.969 3.359 1.801 13.33 4.164 9.530 
        
        
Panel B U*S -0.037
a
 -0.023
b
 -0.051
a
 -0.041
a
 -0.043
a
 -0.038
a
 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
 U*M -0.026
a
 -0.032
a
 -0.021
a
 -0.042
a
 -0.035
a
 -0.049
a
 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
 U*L -0.038
a
 -0.047
a
 -0.028
a
 -0.040
a
 -0.035
a
 -0.045
a
 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
        
F-test U*S=U*M 1.502 0.565 6.259 0.008 0.284 0.502 
 U*M=U*L 2.629 2.459 0.513 0.025 0.000 0.090 
 U*L=U*S 0.018 4.591 4.016 0.001 0.329 0.256 
        
        
Panel C U*1 -0.027
a
 -0.029
a
 -0.026
a
 -0.040
a
 -0.036
a
 -0.045
a
 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
 U*2 -0.049
a
 -0.055
a
 -0.044
a
 -0.042
a
 -0.037
a
 -0.047
a
 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
 U*3 -0.024 -0.031 -0.016 -0.042
a
 -0.043
a
 -0.042
b
 
  (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) 
 U*4 -0.016 -0.003 -0.030 -0.024 -0.013 -0.036 
  (0.026) (0.036) (0.039) (0.031) (0.041) (0.045) 
  
      
F-test U*1=U*2 10.65 8.068 3.269 0.040 0.010 0.029 
 U*2=U*3 2.694 1.290 1.418 0.000 0.084 0.074 
 U*3=U*4 0.057 0.430 0.096 0.324 0.460 0.013 
 U*1=U*4 0.166 0.471 0.011 0.286 0.303 0.036 
Obs.  1,397,538 721,304 676,234 1,402,196 723,635 678,561 
 
We include five indicators corresponding to the level of parental education of each parent, child's gender, year of 
birth, birth order, type of birth, twin status, family income level, and both county and exam year fixed effects. 
Superscripts 
a
 and 
b
 denote the significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. U = Uninformative cause of death. I = 
Informative cause of death. t = S, M, L: short-(S), medium-(M), or long-(L) term dummy interaction. n = 1, 2, 3, 4: 
n-th income quartile dummy interaction. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
Table 1.8 
OLS Estimates of Parental Death on Teenage Marriage 
  Death of a Father    Death of a Mother    
 Coefficient All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
        
Panel A U 0.010
a
 0.001 0.020
a
 0.015
a
 0.001 0.030
a
 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
 I 0.011
a
 0.001
b
 0.021
a
 0.004
a
 -0.000 0.009
a
 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
        
F-test U=I 0.139 0.232 0.0782 18.32 0.214 20.38 
        
        
Panel B U*S 0.010
a
 -0.001 0.022
a
 0.016
a
 0.004 0.029
a
 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
 U*M 0.008
a
 -0.001 0.017
a
 0.009
a
 -0.000 0.021
a
 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) 
 U*L 0.012
a
 0.002 0.022
a
 0.018
a
 -0.000 0.037
a
 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
        
F-test U*S=U*M 0.190 0.000 0.310 1.308 1.145 0.534 
 U*M=U*L 0.927 0.782 0.520 3.148 0.001 2.897 
 U*L=U*S 0.211 0.735 0.008 0.184 1.371 0.668 
        
        
Panel C U*1 0.014
a
 0.002 0.027
a
 0.019
a
 0.002 0.037
a
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
 U*2 0.004 -0.003
c
 0.011
b
 0.013
a
 -0.000 0.027
a
 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
 U*3 0.009
c
 0.003 0.016
c
 0.006
c
 0.000 0.013
c
 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
 U*4 0.014
c
 0.006 0.021 0.011 -0.004
a
 0.027 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.000) (0.019) 
        
F-test U*1=U*2 7.849 3.458 5.438 1.273 0.279 1.006 
 U*2=U*3 0.912 1.802 0.194 1.464 0.019 1.770 
 U*3=U*4 0.208 0.128 0.084 0.175 2.781 0.438 
 U*1=U*4 0.000 0.387 0.112 0.688 6.951 0.290 
Obs.  1,397,538 721,304 676,234 1,402,196 723,635 678,561 
We include five indicators corresponding to the level of parental education of each parent, child's gender, year of 
birth, birth order, type of birth, twin status, family income level, and both county and exam year fixed effects. 
Superscripts 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. U = Uninformative cause of 
death. I = Informative cause of death. t = S, M, L: short-(S), medium-(M), or long-(L) term dummy interaction. n = 
1, 2, 3, 4: n-th income quartile dummy interaction. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 1.9 
OLS Estimates of Parental Death on Teenage Employment 
  Death of a Father    Death of a Mother    
 Coefficient All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
        
Panel A U 0.035
a
 0.036
a
 0.034
a
 0.037
a
 0.037
a
 0.037
a
 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
 I 0.036
a
 0.040
a
 0.032
a
 0.035
a
 0.036
a
 0.034
a
 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
F-test U=I 0.0178 0.374 0.244 0.124 0.008 0.163 
        
        
Panel B U*S 0.040
a
 0.025
b
 0.057
a
 0.018
b
 0.021
c
 0.015 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
 U*M 0.032
a
 0.032
a
 0.031
a
 0.044
a
 0.045
a
 0.043
a
 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
 U*L 0.035
a
 0.047
a
 0.023
a
 0.043
a
 0.041
a
 0.046
a
 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
        
F-test U*S=U*M 0.636 0.258 3.046 4.392 1.773 2.579 
 U*M=U*L 0.152 1.331 0.452 0.004 0.063 0.029 
 U*L=U*S 0.231 2.686 6.024 4.961 1.439 3.760 
        
        
Panel C U*1 0.035
a
 0.038
a
 0.031
a
 0.041
a
 0.039
a
 0.043
a
 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
 U*2 0.039
a
 0.039
a
 0.041
a
 0.042
a
 0.037
a
 0.048
a
 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
 U*3 0.028
b
 0.025 0.031
c
 0.021
b
 0.034
b
 0.008 
  (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
 U*4 0.024 0.006 0.046 0.024 0.018 0.030 
  (0.020) (0.027) (0.031) (0.024) (0.035) (0.033) 
        
F-test U*1=U*2 0.269 0.000 0.595 0.010 0.027 0.090 
 U*2=U*3 0.593 0.388 0.194 2.187 0.025 4.044 
 U*3=U*4 0.032 0.339 0.176 0.007 0.157 0.365 
 U*1=U*4 0.291 1.305 0.235 0.495 0.340 0.147 
Obs.  1,397,538 721,304 676,234 1,402,196 723,635 678,561 
 
We include five indicators corresponding to the level of parental education of each parent, child's gender, year of 
birth, birth order, type of birth, twin status, family income level, and both county and exam year fixed effects. 
Superscripts 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. U = Uninformative cause of 
death. I = Informative cause of death. t = S, M, L: short-(S), medium-(M), or long-(L) term dummy interaction. n = 
1, 2, 3, 4: n-th income quartile dummy interaction. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
46 
 
Table 1.11 
OLS Estimates of Parental Death on All Outcomes under Alternative Cause of 
Death Grouping (ICD9-72) 
  
  Death of a Father 
 
Attendance Quality Take CUJEE Marriage Work Military (1yr.) 
              
UCOD -0.024
a
 -0.008
a
 -0.030
a
 0.011
a
 0.041
a
 0.014a 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
ICOD -0.018
a
 -0.006
a
 -0.027
a
 0.011
a
 0.035
a
 0.011
a
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Obs. 1,397,538 1,397,538 1,397,538 1,397,538 1,397,538 721,304 
UCOD=ICOD 4.636 0.820 0.507 0.004 1.700 0.745 
  Death of a Mother 
 
Attendance Quality Take CUJEE Marriage Work Military (1yr.) 
              
UCOD -0.028
a
 -0.008
a
 -0.037
a
 0.014
a
 0.042
a
 0.012
a
 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
ICOD -0.017
a
 -0.005
a
 -0.025
a
 0.004
a
 0.032
a
 0.006
c
 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Obs. 1,402,196 1,402,196 1,402,196 1,402,196 1,402,196 723,635 
UCOD=ICOD 7.679 1.532 5.737 17.270 3.327 1.288 
 
We include five indicators corresponding to the level of parental education of each parent, child's 
gender, year of birth, birth order, type of birth, twin status, family income level, and both county and 
exam year fixed effects. Superscripts 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. U = Uninformative cause of death. I = Informative cause of death. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table 1.12 
Propensity Score Matching Estimates of Parental Death on All Outcomes 
 
ATT Standard error
1
 T-Statistic 
 
 Death of a Father 
Attendance -0.025 0.003 -8.992 
Take CUJEE -0.035 0.003 -11.257 
Quality 0.006 0.011 0.578 
Work  0.033 0.004 8.672 
Marriage 0.009 0.002 5.363 
Military (1yr.) 0.013 0.004 3.267 
 
 Death of a Mother 
Attendance -0.033 0.003 -10.653 
Take CUJEE -0.045 0.003 -12.966 
Quality -0.015 0.013 -1.184 
Work 0.037 0.005 7.950 
Marriage  0.016 0.002 7.435 
Military (1yr.) 0.013 0.006 2.286 
 
The propensity score model includes five indicators corresponding to the level of parental education of each parent, 
child's gender, year of birth, birth order, type of birth, twin status, family income level, and both county and exam 
year fixed effects. ATT = stratified propensity score matching estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated. 
1 
Bootstrapped standard errors.  
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Anthropometric Outcomes:  
Can Intra-Household Allocation Help Us Explain 
Them? 
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Abstract 
 
The United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that there are 925 
million people who do not have enough to eat (FAO 2010). At the same time, the latest report 
from the World Health Organization (WHO 2011) describes an equally grim parallel 
development: by 2015, approximately 2.3 billion adults will be overweight and more than 700 
million will be obese. This chapter analyzes the effects of pecuniary shocks on the 
anthropometric outcomes of mothers and children. The collective model of intra-household 
allocation in the presence of a public good is used as a starting point of the analysis. This model 
permits analyzing the resource allocation decisions made by parents within a structural 
framework that captures the household bargaining mechanism governing the intra-household 
allocation of resources. The data used in this chapter comes from the evaluation of the 
Colombian conditional cash transfer (CCT) program Familias en Acción (FA).  
This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: Do CCTs, inasmuch as they 
represent an exogenous increase in female held income, increase a mother’s bargaining power? If 
so, does this power shift matter for the nutritional outcomes of mothers and children? Are the 
nutritional outcomes of mothers and children Pareto efficient? Consistent with the predictions of 
the collective model, the income pooling hypothesis is rejected and the null hypothesis that intra-
household allocations are Pareto optimal cannot be rejected. The empirical results suggest that 
CCTs increase the bargaining power of mothers. This power revision results in a reallocation of 
resources that indirectly improves children’s anthropometric outcomes without having a negative 
effect on mothers’ BMIs. Interestingly, we find that CCTs also have a direct effect on 
anthropometric outcomes, suggesting perhaps that participation in the CCT program has a 
behavioral effect on the treated households. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The millennium development goal 1.c. (MDG1C): “Reduce by half the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger” is falling short of expectations. The United Nation’s Food and 
Agriculture Organization estimates there are 925 million people who do not have enough to eat 
(FAO 2010). At the same time, the latest report from the World Health Organization (WHO 
2011) talks of an equally grim parallel development: by 2015, approximately 2.3 billion adults 
will be overweight and more than 700 million will be obese. While these numbers are shocking, 
more troublesome is the fact that underweight and overweight people may dwell in the same 
areas, or even in the same households. At the micro level, households that fit this profile are 
sometimes referred to as ”dual-burden” (DB) households, a term which rightly alludes to the 
dual challenge that such phenomenon poses to public health systems.
27
 The concomitance of 
these two trends is well documented in both the epidemiology and nutrition literatures (Barquera 
et al., 2007; FAO 2006; Doak et al., 2005; Garret and Ruel, 2005; Khor and Sharif, 2003; de 
Menezes et al., 2001). The presence of a large number of individuals in the tails of the body mass 
index (BMI) distribution has been dubbed the nutrition transition (Popkin, 1994), and it is 
associated with changes in diet, technology driven changes in physical activity, and economic 
development (Popkin, 2002; Popkin, 2003).  
Developing countries undergoing the nutrition transition need to develop creative ways to 
fight the two faces of malnutrition: hunger and obesity.
28
 While the economics literature that 
focuses on the health and nutritional outcomes of children in developing countries is vast 
(Attanazio et al. 2009; Djebbari 2005; Duflo 2000; Glewwe 1999; Thomas et al. 1997; Thomas 
                                                 
27
 We will use this term, coined by Doak et al. (2005), when referring to such households. 
28 
Hunger is defined as the result of chronic under-consumption of food and/or nutritious food products (Lenhart 
and Read 1989). Similarly, obesity is defined as abnormal or excessive fat accumulation that may impair health 
(WHO, 2006). BMI > 30 for adults or BMI > 95% of gender- and age-specific BMI growth chart for children. 
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1990; Wolfe and Behrman 1987), little is known about the mechanisms that drive the 
anthropometric outcomes of families and, in particular, of mothers and children. This piece of 
the puzzle is essential for the design and implementation of successful nutrition and health 
policies. Well-designed policies can help fight malnutrition and lessen the burden on health 
systems stressed by the cost of the clash of two battle fronts: the old war against communicable 
diseases and the new war against non-communicable chronic diseases related to obesity (FAO 
2006). 
The present chapter aims to fill this gap. We use the collective model of intra-household 
allocation in the presence of a public good (Blundell et al. 2005) as a starting point. The 
framework develop by these authors is the first to provide the theoretical foundations for testing 
the effectiveness of targeting transfers to mothers, for example, as opposed to fathers. It allows 
us to analyze the consumption decisions made by parents within a structural framework that 
captures the household bargaining mechanism governing the intra-household allocation of 
resources. Hence, it serves as the basis for the empirical model that we use to analyze the impact 
of changes in income distribution on the anthropometric outcomes of mothers and their children. 
By doing so, we seek to answer the following questions: Do CCTs, inasmuch as they represent 
an exogenous increase in female held income, increase a mother’s bargaining power? If so, does 
this power shift affect the nutritional outcomes of mothers and children? Are the nutritional 
outcomes of mothers and children Pareto efficient? And finally, what role do CCTs play in 
determining nutritional outcomes of mothers and children?  
To answer these questions, we use quasi-experimental data from the evaluation of the 
Colombian conditional cash transfer (CCT) program Familias en Acción (FA).
29
 FA provides 
                                                 
29
 This is a publicly available dataset. It can be found at: http://www.dnp.gov.co/PortalWeb/Programas/Sinergia/  
EvaluacionesEstrat%C3%A9gicas/Evaluaci%C3%B3ndeImpactoProgramaFamiliasenAcci%C3%B3n/tabid/712/Def
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two types of conditional grants: health-nutrition grants and education grants. To receive the 
former, mothers must attend training courses on nutrition, hygiene and contraception and 
children must undergo regular medical check-ups. To be eligible for the latter, the children must 
be enrolled in school and attend at least eighty percent of classes during the school year. Like 
most CCT programs, the FA grants are given to the mother. As a result and under the assumption 
that receiving the cash transfer is as good as random, these grants generate an exogenous 
variation in women’s income, and are a potential source of variation for the sharing rule within 
the households. 
The CCT grants facilitate testing of the restrictions placed on the unitary model (Becker 
1991) under the hypothesis that mothers and fathers are the only decision makers in the 
household (Attanasio and Lechene 2002). By testing these, we can determine whether targeting 
transfers toward mothers plays an important role in the determination of anthropometric 
outcomes of mothers and children in the Colombian context. In particular, if targeting transfers 
toward mothers shifts the balance of power within the household, we should observe that the 
cash transfers received by mothers increase the demand for goods consumed by mothers. Under 
this framework, we can also test whether “mothers care more for children” than fathers. That is, 
we can check whether a shift in bargaining towards mothers results in either an increase in the 
demand for nutritional items consumed by children or in an improvement in the anthropometric 
outcomes of children (i.e. we can test whether mothers’ willingness to pay for children’s health 
is more responsive to changes in income than that of fathers’). 
The design of Familias en Acción program also allows us to test whether the 
anthropometric outcomes of mothers and children resulting from the intra-household resource 
allocation mechanisms are Pareto optimal. The test entails verifying whether households’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
ault.aspx. 
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allocation decisions respond proportionally to exogenous changes in the distribution factors; that 
is, to shocks affecting the bargaining position of decision makers in the family but having no 
effect either on their preferences or their joint budget set (Chiappori et al. 2001). In particular, 
we test whether the ratio of the distribution factor effects is the same for all goods both privately 
and publicly consumed. To perform this test we exploit the availability of two distributional 
factors: FA grants and rainfall information at the department level.
30
 While the former affects 
mother’s bargaining power by exogenously increasing mother’s income, the latter affects total 
household income as most households in our sample reside in rural areas and so their income is 
directly dependent on the overall rainfall. This empirical approach to testing Pareto optimality 
was first proposed by Bobonis (2009). 
Our study is unique in that we not only look at the factors affecting adult women and 
children’s outcomes separately, but we also analyze the factors determining their joint outcomes. 
We find that the CCTs shift bargaining power in favor of mothers. This power revision results in 
a reallocation of resources that improves children’s anthropometric outcomes without having a 
negative effect on mothers’ BMIs. In particular, we find that families receiving the CCTs 
allocate more money towards corn/flour and meat/protein products and that the latter is 
associated with higher body mass index. Interestingly, we find that the CCTs also have a direct 
effect on anthropometric outcomes, suggesting perhaps that participation in the FA program has 
a behavioral effect on the treated households. The income pooling hypothesis implied by the 
unitary household model is rejected. Also in line with the predictions of the collective model, the 
null hypothesis of Pareto optimality cannot be rejected. Overall, our results suggest that mothers’ 
willingness to pay for the inputs in the production of the public good is higher than that of 
fathers’; as a result, targeting CCTs to mothers has positive effects on both intra-household 
                                                 
30
 Colombia is divided into 34 administrative departments that are sub-divided into 1,123 municipalities.  
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allocation and distribution of resources. In particular, we conclude that the FA program has had a 
positive effect on children’s health outcomes without leading to higher obesity among mothers. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide an overview of the 
nutrition transition in developing countries and present a brief summary of the related literature. 
In Section 2.3, we follow with the description of the Familias en Acción conditional cash-
transfer program, whereas in Section 2.4, we describe the FA evaluation data and the data sample 
used in the empirical part of the chapter. In Section 2.5, we describe the theoretical framework 
and the associated empirical specification. The empirical results are presented in Section 2.6, 
followed by the robustness checks in Section 2.7. Finally, Section 2.8 provides discussion of our 
results, and Section 2.9 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 The Nutrition Transition in Developing Countries 
Popkin (2003) defines the nutrition transition using three stages: receding famine, 
degenerative disease, and behavioral change. In the receding famine stage, significant amounts 
of energy are spent in the rudimentary production of food (i.e. manual planting and harvesting) 
and fruits and vegetables constitute the primary sources of nutrition. In the degenerative disease 
stage, diets are drastically changed by the introduction of foods that are rich in fat, calories and 
sugar. Food comes from new sources (i.e. animals), and new ways of production that require less 
time and effort (i.e., physical activity is decreased mainly due to technological improvements and 
specialization in food production). Finally, in the behavioral change stage, the ingestion of high 
calorie fat-rich foods is decreased. This stage is characterized by an increase in the consumption 
of fiber-rich foods, a decrease in the ingestion of saturated fat, and the re-introduction of physical 
activity that is unrelated to food production (FAO, 2006). 
Because the nutrition transition is tied to economic development, it is reasonable to 
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observe that the major nutrition problem that women and children face in low-income and 
middle-income countries is undernutrition (Deribew et al. 2010; Black et al. 2008; Popkin 2001; 
Mason et al. 1999). Undernutrition is the underlying cause of 53 percent of all deaths in children 
younger than 5 years of age (Bryce et al. 2005). Similarly, undernutrition in utero or during 
childhood has strong repercussions on health and SES later in life.
31
 For example, after 
presenting evidence that the prevalence of early childhood stunting and of people living in 
absolute poverty are strong predictors of poor cognitive and educational performance in children, 
Grantham-McGregor et al. (2007) estimate that the attendant human capital losses result in a 20 
percent deficit in adult income. The literature linking child anthropometric outcomes to cognitive 
abilities is vast (see, e.g., Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007; Bryan et al., 2004; Daniels and 
Adair, 2004). Similarly, research shows that women who are chronically undernourished during 
childhood grow up to be undernourished mothers and are more likely to have low birth weight 
babies (Allen and Gillespie 2001). In turn, low birth weight is a strong predictor of both infant 
underweight (Mason et al. 1999) and low birth weight in future generations (Currie and Moretti 
2007).  
To complicate matters, obesity is quickly penetrating low and middle-income nations 
worldwide, affecting first the urban middle-aged adults, but increasingly spreading to semi-urban 
and rural areas, and to younger age groups (Prentice 2006). Sahn (2009) examines BMI trends of 
women to quantify the prevalence of obesity for this group. He examines the entire BMI 
distribution to determine whether the rising BMIs observed in the population are in fact 
happening evenly across the distribution. The estimated BMI growth curves, indicating the 
percent increase in BMI at each point along the distribution, suggest that there has been an 
increase in inequality in BMIs. In particular, individuals located in the upper tail of the BMI 
                                                 
31
 See, e.g., Black et al. (2008); Barker et al. (1993). 
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distribution are experiencing larger increases in BMI than the remainder of the population. 
Similarly, in some areas, the prevalence of overweight among children is higher than the 
prevalence of underweight (or stunting); see e.g., FAO (2006) for the case of Egypt. According 
to FAO (2006), increasing rates of overweight and obesity in children signal a very alarming 
trend. For example, research shows that half of the children who are obese at the age of six go on 
to become obese adults (Center on an Aging Society, 2002). Obesity is also a risk factor for a 
range of chronic health problems, including coronary heart disease, type II diabetes, stroke and 
some types of cancer (WHO, 2000), and the early onset of obesity is associated with higher risk 
of developing obesity-related chronic diseases (Eckhardt 2006; FAO 2006). 
What are the implications of the overlap of these two macro-trends? The relationship 
between the nutrition transition and the simultaneous presence of underweight and overweight 
members in the same household is examined by Doak et al. (2000). Using data from national 
surveys, these authors find that the prevalence of dual burden households ranges from eight 
percent in China and Russia to eleven percent in Brazil. For all three countries the authors note 
that the most common form of the DB household consists of an underweight child coexisting 
with an overweight non-elderly adult. While DB households are more likely to reside in urban 
areas, they find no particular relationship between DB and income. Analyzing the 1993 China 
Health and Nutrition Survey, Doak et al. (2002) find that DB households are more likely to 
reside in urban areas, have higher income and, after controlling for socio-economic status (SES), 
are more likely to own durable assets. Interestingly, while the diet in these households is higher 
in fat and protein compared with “underweight only” and normal weight households, it is 
statistically indistinguishable from the diet of “overweight only” households. 
Garrett and Ruel (2003) collect data on the socio-economic background and food intake 
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frequencies of 54 underweight child/overweight mother pairs and compare them to normal 
weight mothers and children. They note that overweight mothers are less educated, are more 
likely to be unemployed, and are more likely to have lower incomes than normal weight mothers. 
However, these differences are not statistically significant, perhaps due to their small sample 
size. Interestingly, the dietary, illness, and energy consumption patterns of these two groups are 
also found to be very similar. In a more recent study, Doak et al. (2005) analyze national surveys 
from seven countries to document the prevalence of the DB phenomenon. This time, the authors 
find that the DB households are becoming more common: in six of the seven countries studied 
22 to 66 percent of households have at least one underweight and one overweight member. 
Garret and Ruel (2005) use Demographic and Health Surveys from Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America to look at the same phenomenon but focus on pairs of stunted children and overweight 
mothers. They find that this disturbing outcome is more prevalent in Latin America than in 
Africa, yet not necessarily more prevalent in urban than in rural areas. 
2.3 Familias en Acción Program 
2.3.1 Overview of Familias en Acción Program 
The Familias en Acción conditional transfer program was introduced in December 2000 
as part of a wider response by the Colombian government to mitigate the adverse effects of a 
series of macroeconomic shocks that affected Colombia towards the end of the 1990s. These 
shocks had a particularly pronounced impact on poorer families (Attanasio et al., 2004), as 
evidenced by declining levels of school attendance and nutritional intake among the members of 
poorer households. The program was initially designed to provide targeted cash transfers to 
340,000 households (about 4.6% of the country population), conditional on school attendance 
and the use of basic health care. Following the pilot stage of the program, which ended in March 
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2001, and two initial expansions during the following year, the program reached the planned 
number of households from 631 Colombian municipalities (of the total of 1,060) by March 2002. 
By 2005, the program covered approximately 400,000 households in 700 municipalities 
(Overseas Development Institute, 2006). More recently, it has expanded to poor urban areas and, 
as of the end of 2008, reached more than 1.5 million households (Attanasio et al., 2009). 
The Familias en Acción program provides two types of grants: health-nutrition grants and 
education grants. The health-nutrition grants consist of cash transfers to all beneficiary families 
with children younger than seven years. These monetary supplements are granted to qualifying 
families contingent on children’s participation in regular medical checkups (including 
vaccinations and growth and development checks) as well as on their mother’s attendance at 
courses on nutrition, hygiene and contraception (Attanasio, et al. 2008). If the conditions are not 
met, the monetary supplements to the beneficiary family are suspended. The value of the 
supplement is 46,500 pesos (≈ US$ 18.6) and is independent of the number of children in the 
household.
32
 The education grants are available to families with children between seven and 
eighteen years and range from 14,000 pesos (≈ US$ 5.60) for each child attending primary 
school (2nd to 5th grade) to 28,000 pesos (≈ US$ 11.2) for each child attending secondary school 
(6th to 11th grade). The grants are conditional on children being enrolled at school and attending 
at least eighty percent of classes during the school year.
33
 The types of grants as well as the 
relevant conditions are also summarized in Table 2.1. 
The municipalities participating in the program were selected based on several eligibility 
criteria. It was necessary for the municipality to have access to basic education and health 
                                                 
32
 Here, as later in the text, the US$ equivalents are calculated based on the average historical exchange rate 
corresponding to January 1, 2002 to January 1, 2003 period: US$ 1 ≈ COP 2,500 (COP: Colombian pesos). 
33
 As discussed in Attanasio et al. (2008), making the grant conditional on school attendance effectively decreases 
the relative price of education, at least for those households for which increased schooling comes at the expense of 
reductions in income generation activities. 
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infrastructure; to have at least one bank; to have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants; to not be the 
capital of a regional district; and to not be in the coffee region that received special help as a 
consequence of the 1995 earthquake. In addition, the local authority had to register the 
municipality to the program and provide a number of documents, including the lists of SISBEN 
level 1 beneficiaries (Attanasio et al. 2004). A basic welfare indicator collected for all families in 
Colombia, SISBEN (System for Identifying and Selecting Beneficiaries)
34
 is used to divide 
Colombian households into categories based on their estimated level of income. SISBEN level 1, 
which represents more or less the lowest quintile of the Colombian households income 
distribution, was used to determine the eligibility of a household for either grant. Attanasio et al. 
(2005) report that take-up of the program was about 90 percent among eligible households.  
2.4 Familias en Acción Evaluation Data 
The data used in this study were collected as part of a large scale initiative by the 
Colombian government to evaluate the program and its effects. While the original intention was 
to implement the program randomly across municipalities, this was not possible for political 
reasons when the program started; consequently, a quasi-experimental approach based on a 
comparison of representative stratified samples of treatment and control municipalities was 
adopted, with the first group randomly selected from among those eligible for the program and 
the latter group chosen from among those excluded from the program. 
 Treatment municipalities are a stratified random sample of municipalities where the 
program is operating. The stratification was performed as follows. First, the municipalities were 
grouped according to the number of eligible families into so called Primary Sampling Units 
(PSU).
35
 The PSU’s were in turn divided into 25 strata based on a number of demographical and 
                                                 
34
 More information on the SISBEN index, including its scope and coverage, can be found in Vélez et al. (1998). 
35
 See Attanasio et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the stratification procedure. 
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health/infrastructure characteristics, including the region of the stratum, the number of eligible 
households, the level of urbanization, the health and education infrastructure, and the quality of 
life index. The strata were used as a basis for selecting the control municipalities according to 
their similarity to the treatment municipalities (found in the same stratum) in terms of the 
population, size, as well as the other characteristics just mentioned.
36
 Attanasio et al. (2005) 
report that, while most of the control municipalities would have qualified in terms of health and 
education infrastructure, many of them were excluded from the program because they lacked a 
bank. Finally, a random draw of 10 (3 urban and 7 rural) geographical clusters was performed 
within each municipality and, within each cluster, 20 SISBEN level 1 households were selected. 
In its final form, the evaluation sample contains approximately 11,500 households 
corresponding to 122 (57 treated and 65 control) municipalities that were interviewed between 
June and October 2002. Of these, 10,742 households were re-contacted during the second wave 
of interviews between July and October 2003. Given the timing of the first stages of the program, 
about a half of the families belonging to the treatment group were interviewed before the 
program started (these families are referred to as “treated without payment”), whereas the other 
half were interviewed when the program was already well under way in their area (these families 
are referred to as “treatment with payment”).  
2.4.1 The Sample 
We pool the 2002 and 2003 samples and restrict observations to include children that (1) 
were less than 6 years old in the first round of the survey; (2) were from families with more than 
one adult member; (3) had non-missing consumption and anthropometric information; and (5) 
                                                 
36
 The question of how similar the two treatment and control groups were is worth pursuing further. Indeed, the 
control municipalities often failed to satisfy basic criteria applied to the treatment group (e.g., the presence of a 
bank). Still, Attanasio et al. (2008) provide evidence that the treatment and control areas are very similar for a broad 
range of observable household and municipal characteristics. 
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were either treated with payment or in the control group.
37
 Our final sample is composed of 
10,285 observations.
38
 There are 4,981 (5,304) children in the treatment (control) group.
39
 Tables 
2.2.A and 2.2.B present the descriptive statistics for the whole sample.  
On average, there are 3.86 minors (under 18 years of age) and 2.31 adults in each 
household. About 4 (3) percent of the adult women (men) have “high-education” (i.e. have 
graduated from secondary school) and 7 (61) percent of the adult women (men) are wage 
laborers. The sample is divided into three groups according to the population density of the area: 
46 (45) percent of the sample resides in “cabecera” (“centro poblado”) areas whereas less than 
10 percent reside in “rural disperso” areas.40 While electricity coverage is widespread, covering 
84 percent of the sample, access to other basic services such as water pipe, sewer, trash 
collection and gas is less common.  
We identify two woman-specific assignable goods: adult women clothing and adult 
women shoes; and four man-specific assignable goods: adult men clothing, adult men shoes, 
tobacco, and alcohol. We also identify five types of child-specific goods; these include: clothing, 
shoes, hygiene goods for child consumption, school allowances and toys. Finally, the household 
goods include: bus tickets, cleaning supplies for the home, combustible, entertainment, books, 
and health related goods, including medicine, doctors and hospital expenses, expenses on 
glasses, health exams and insurance. Table 2.2.A presents the means of the levels of these 
variables and of their shares in the total expenditure budget. 
To capture each child’s health we use two measures of morbidity: the incidence of 
                                                 
37
 If the “treated without payment” households are included in the analysis, this would result in the underestimation 
of the program effects. 
38
 The details pertaining to the derivation of our final sample are included in Appendix 2.2. 
39
 The treatment group includes children in families receiving FA grants. 
40
 The sample is collected only from rural areas. “Cabecera” refers to the most densely populated parts of rural areas 
and “rural disperso” to the least densely populated parts.  
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diarrhea and the flu over the last 15 days. To capture each child’s anthropometric characteristics, 
we use the weight and height of each child in each round to compute two z-score measures: 
height for age (ZHFA) and weight for age (ZWFH). The z-scores are computed using age and 
gender specific anthropometric measures using WHO’s child growth standards (WHO, 2010).41 
Using the ZWFA, we also classify children into three categories of nutritional status: 
underweight (ZWFA < –1.64), overweight (ZWFA > 1.64), and normal weight (|ZWFA| < 1.64). 
We use weight and height measures to compute female BMI. Women are classified into three 
groups according to their nutritional status: underweight (BMI < 18.5); normal weight (18.5 ≤ 
BMI < 25); and overweight or obese (25 ≤ BMI). Mother/child pairs are also classified into five 
different groups according to their joint weight status. Table 2.2.B reports the descriptive 
statistics for these measures. 
The sample is merged with monthly rainfall data covering the years 2001-2004, obtained 
from the IRI/LDEO Climate Data Library.
42
 Rainfall is measured at the department level. Using 
an average yearly rainfall measure, we compute the mean and standard deviation for the four-
year period. Whenever the yearly rainfall was one standard deviation below the mean in the year 
prior to the data collection, the variable rain-shock takes the value of one indicating a below 
average rainfall record for that year (this is true for 34 percent of the sample); it is zero 
otherwise.   
2.5 Framework 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the anthropometric outcomes of mothers and 
children living in the context of a middle income country undergoing the nutrition transition. We 
first describe the collective model of intra-household allocation decisions, which will serve as the 
                                                 
41
 For more information, see http://www.who.int/childgrowth/en. 
42
 The data is freely available at: http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/. Special thanks go to Remi Cousin for helping us 
navigate this website. 
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basis for our empirical analysis. Our starting point is the framework developed by Blundell et al. 
(2005). Blundell et al. (2005) extend Chiappori’s (1992) labor supply collective model with two 
decision makers by introducing public good consumption and household production. 
Consider a household composed of one father (f) and one mother (m), which consumes 
two types of commodities: a private and assignable commodity Qi, i = {f, m}, a collective 
consumption good Fk and a commodity good Qk (k is the subscript used to represent collective 
consumption). In our setting, Fk represents different food types, which are not assignable and are 
to be consumed by the household. We interpret Fk as inputs in the production of anthropometric 
outcomes of mothers and children. The utility function of parent i is a function of family welfare, 
Vk, which is in turn a function of health, Hk. Parent i derives direct utility from her own 
consumption of the private good (Qi). Parents do not derive utility from their spouse’s private 
consumption. Still, each parent cares for, and derives direct utility from, the overall family 
welfare as measured by the anthropometric outcomes of mothers and children and indirect utility 
from the consumption of the collective good (Qk). In other words, parents are egoistic with 
respect to private consumption and altruistic with respect to the collective goods, and their 
preferences can be represented by the following utility function: 
   (     (   (  )   )      ( )  )                 (2.1) 
where x(∙) is a vector of exogenous parameters and ζ is a vector of child level heterogeneity.  
Following the health and nutrition literatures (see e.g., Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988), 
we assume that the anthropometric outcome of mothers and children, or family welfare in our 
set-up, is a function of health and a vector of parental characteristics and environmental 
parameters (e.g., parental education, genetic make-up, access to potable water, and sewage), µk. 
While health is in turn a function of nutritional intake, N (Fk; ξ). Family welfare can be 
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represented as: Vk  = V (H (N(Fk) ); µk). The family nutritional intake, N (Fk ; ξ), is a linear 
function of food consumption (non-food consumption carrying zero weight), and of parental and 
environmental characteristics, represented by vector ξ, which are likely to impact the usage and 
quality of nutrient intake. 
Parents decide how to allocate their resources among the different consumption goods, 
both public and private. According to the standard literature on collective models of intra-
household allocation in the presence of public goods (Blundell et al. 2005; Bourguignon et al. 
2009), the decisions made by the household are assumed to be Pareto efficient. This assumption 
implies that household decisions are the solution to the following maximization problem: 
           ∑      (     (   (  )   )      ( )  ) , 
subject to the full income constraint 
  ∑            ∑           (     )          ,  
and the Pareto weight 
    (                            ( )  )          (2.2) 
where time endowment and the price of the composite good are each normalized to one yi is the 
unearned income of parent i, i = {f, m}, and yk is the joint income of f and m; λi is the Pareto 
weight of parent i, and (λm + λf) = 1, as in Chiappori (1988). The Pareto weight measures the 
relative decision making power of parent i and is a function of wages (wm and wf), non-labor 
income y, and distribution factors z. Pareto efficiency of intra-household allocation decisions is 
the main testable hypothesis of the collective household model.  
It follows from the second welfare theorem of economics that the household 
maximization problem can be split into a two-stage process. In the first stage, parents decide how 
to use their resources for the production of the public good. The first order conditions of this 
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two-stage process imply that parents use their resources to produce the public good up to the 
point where the marginal rate of technical substitution between any two production inputs 
just equals the ratio of their respective costs (i.e., productive efficiency). In the first stage, 
parents also agree (or bargain) on how to split the residual non-labor income; the result of this 
agreement is known as the sharing rule. In the second stage, each parent separately maximizes 
his (her) own utility conditional on the sharing rule. 
The solutions to (2.2) are functions of prices, wages, income, total household resources 
(r), and the Pareto weight: 
    (                           ( )   ( )  )   
for    {                }.               (2.3) 
 Using this framework, we can also test whether targeting CCT benefits to mothers results 
in additional welfare improvements. In particular, Blundell et al. (2005) show that increasing the 
bargaining power of one decision maker increases the consumption of the public good if and 
only if this decision maker’s willingness to pay for the public good is more sensitive to income 
changes than that of the other decision maker. Hence, if the CCT affects the intra-household 
bargaining and mothers care for children more than fathers (i.e. mothers derive more utility from 
children’s welfare than fathers), the cash given to mothers should increase the consumption of 
children specific goods (i.e. of goods consumed by children or of goods that improve children’s 
outcomes).  
2.6 Empirical Approach 
 We are interested in analyzing the role of income in the hands of mothers, as opposed to 
income in the hands of fathers or of joint income, on the determination of anthropometric 
outcomes of mothers and children. To undertake this analysis, we use the framework proposed 
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by Blundell et al. (2005). The framework develop by these authors is the first to provide the 
theoretical foundations for testing the effectiveness of targeting transfers to mothers, for 
example, as opposed to fathers. In particular, this framework allows us to verify whether 
variations in distribution factors
43
 that affect the relative intra-household bargaining power of 
household members result in changes in the intra-household decision process. By doing so, it 
also allows us to understand the implications of such changes.  
Adapting this framework to our empirical question, we can test whether targeting CCTs 
towards mothers has an effect on intra-household bargaining (or the sharing rule). In particular, 
Blundell et al. (2005) show that if mothers’ bargaining power increases as a result of their higher 
income, we should observe an increase in the household demand for the goods consumed by 
mothers (i.e. those goods from which mothers derive the most utility). Furthermore, we can alto 
test whether “mothers care for children more than fathers”. For instance, the authors show that if 
bargaining power is shifted towards mothers and mothers’ willingness to pay for children’s 
health or wellbeing is more responsive to changes in income than that of fathers’, we should see 
an increase in the demand for inputs used in the production of children’s welfare, e.g. children 
specific goods.
44
 
As noted earlier, while FA’s CCT is specifically targeted towards mothers, selection into 
the program was only pseudo-randomized in our sample. Because testing these hypotheses 
demands and exogenous variation in mothers’ specific income, we instrument program 
participation with a binary variable that equals one whenever there is at least one bank in the 
municipality. As discussed in Section 3, due to the design of both the program and the evaluation 
                                                 
43
 Blundell et al. (2005) define distribution factors as “variables that can affect group behavior only through their 
impact on the decision process”.  
44
 Moreover, if bargaining power is shifted towards mothers, we may also observe a reduction in fathers’ specific 
expenditures. 
67 
 
survey, the presence of a bank is likely to affect the probability of selection into the program. 
The conditional moment restriction that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term is 
impossible to check in the just identified case.
45
 Yet, because control municipalities within each 
stratum were chosen so as to be as similar as possible to the treatment municipalities,
46
 there is 
no a priori reason to believe that the presence of a bank should be directly linked to the 
anthropometric outcomes and expenditures of households.
47
  
Using this framework, we can also test income pooling hypothesis, assumed under the 
unitary household model, as well as Pareto optimality, the underlying assumption of the 
collective model. Put simply, income pooling assumption implies that, conditional on total 
household resources all household income is pooled and, as a result, income in the hands of the 
mother is the same as income in the hands of the father. Empirically, this implies that, after 
controlling for overall household resources, the coefficient estimates on individual specific 
income (e.g. mother and/or father specific income) should all equal zero. Under Pareto 
optimality (sometime referred to as “collective rationality”), and conditional on overall 
household resources, we should observe that changes in distribution factors result in changes in 
consumption of each of the goods that are equally proportional to the distribution factors effect 
in the intra-household bargaining power.
48
 
                                                 
45
 In Section 2.7, we revisit the validity if the instrument using an alternative specification. 
46
 As reported in Attanasio et al. (2005), the control municipalities were chosen so as to be as similar as possible to 
the treatment municipalities in terms of population size, percentage of urbanization and an index of quality of life. 
47
 While the presence of a bank in the municipality is likely to increase access to financial services and thus affect 
the wellbeing of borrowers, research shows that this is unlikely to be the case for the rural poor. For example, even 
when banks are present, the poor often refrain from using formal financial services because they lack information 
about the availability and purpose of such services (Ramji 2009). Similarly, because they are often the ones lacking 
the pledge-able collateral required for banks to extend credit to them, the poor are less likely to benefit from bank 
financing.  
48 
More explicitly, Pareto optimality requires that the ratio of the change in the Pareto weight corresponding to 
mothers (or change in the relative bargaining power of mothers) resulting from the increase in women specific 
income to the change in the Pareto weight corresponding to mothers (or change in the relative bargaining power of 
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To test these hypotheses, we estimate both reduced form demand functions and structural 
demand systems for a set of 10 consumption goods.
49
 Each demand equation is given by: 
                                                                 for     (2.4) 
where      is the budget share (or expenditure share) corresponding to good j of the household of 
child i; where     is the effect of the rain-shock faced by child i residing in municipality m on the 
budget share of good j of the household of child i;     is the effect of the CCT, received by the 
mother of child i, on household consumption;     represent total household resources;     is a 
vector of child specific characteristics (gender) as well as characteristics of the child’s family 
(number of minors and adults living in the household, whether the child’s mother is married, 
parental educational attainment of each parent, whether the mother and/or the father is a wage 
laborer) and household (whether the household has any of the following amenities: electricity, 
gas, water pipe, sewage system, municipal trash collection service); and G is a vector of 
geographic fixed effects (cabecera, centro poblado, and four regional dummies).  
In order to test the collective model assumption of Pareto optimality, we follow the 
empirical strategy proposed by Bobonis (2009). In particular, we use our constructed measure of 
localized rain-shocks as a second source of exogenous variation in total household resources. 
Having instrumented program participation with the presence of a bank, the CCT represents a 
distribution factor that affects the intra-household bargaining power of women by affecting their 
                                                                                                                                                             
mothers) resulting from the change in overall household income should be equal to the ratio of changes in the 
demand of each of the goods j (nine in our case) resulting from the increase in women specific income to the change 
in the demand of each of the goods j (there are nine in our case) resulting from the change in overall household 
income (Bourguignon et al., 2009). Using the notation from equation 2.3, this implies that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality are: 
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   for all goods j = 1,…,9. 
 
49
 The excluded demand is the “Household” group. 
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woman-specific income. Similarly, the rain-shock is a distribution factor that affects the overall 
household income. Hence, under Pareto optimality, we should find that the coefficient estimates 
corresponding to the rain-shock and the treatment variables from all of the 9 demand equations 
are jointly zero: 
   
   
 
   
   
 , for         . 
In other words, the ratio of the coefficients corresponding to the treatment and the rain-shock 
variables should be equal across all the goods in our system.
50
  
Finally, to test for the direct impact of exogenous changes in household resources on the 
health outcomes of mothers and children, we estimate the following reduce form equation for 
each of our health measures:  
                                                            
for    (2.4-b) 
where       is the health outcome h of child i who resides in municipality m;     is the effect 
of the rainfall shock faced by child i residing in municipality m on the health outcome h of child 
i;     is the direct effect of the CCT on health;   is a vector of food budget shares corresponding 
to 6 food groups (meat/protein, milk/dairy, corn/flour, vegetables, fats, and other-foods);   is a 
vector of child health indicators (incidence of diarrhea and flu);     represents total household 
resources;     is a vector of child-specific characteristics (gender, age) and health endowments 
(linear and quadratic controls for mother’s BMI) as well as characteristics of the child’s family 
(number of minors and adults living in the household, whether the child’s mother is married, 
                                                 
50
 The treatment (rain-shock) increasing milk/dairy consumption by 20 (60) percentage points and decreasing 
vegetables consumption by 15 (30) violates Pareto optimality because the marginal rates of substitution across the 
two goods is not equal; - in other words, the utility of the household could be increased further while making no 
household member worse off. 
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parental educational attainment of each parent, whether the mother and/or the father is a wage 
laborer) and the child’s household (whether the household has any of the following amenities: 
electricity, gas, water pipe, sewage system, municipal trash collection service); and G is a vector 
of geographic fixed effects (cabecera, centro poblado, and four regional dummies).  
 We run similar regressions for all the anthropometric outcomes h of the mother of child i 
as well as for the joint anthropometric outcomes h of mothers and children. For these two sets of 
outcomes, the linear and quadratic controls for mother’s BMI are omitted. Similarly, the vector 
  (child health indicators) is omitted from the regressions corresponding to all outcomes h of the 
mother of child i. 
2.6.1.  Rain-shocks and Total Household Income 
The rationale for using rain-shocks as a source of exogenous changes in household 
income is that, because households in our sample reside in rural areas, extreme weather 
conditions are likely to have a significant negative impact on total household income. To provide 
support for this assertion, we control for the average precipitation in the department, multiple 
household level determinants of income
51
 and geographic fixed effects,
52
 and regress total 
household income on the rain-shock measure. The results from this regression are presented in 
Table 2.3.A. The rain-shock has a negative and statistically significant effect on total household 
expenditures equivalent to -14,661 COP.  
We also use a t-test to check whether the average both raw and predicted total household 
income of households living in the areas affected by a rain-shock is significantly different from 
that of households living in non-shock areas. The results from these tests suggest that both the 
                                                 
51
 These include: mother and father hours at work and at home, whether either parent is a wage laborer, the 
educational attainment of each parent, the number of adults and minors in the household, and whether the mother is 
married. 
52
 Among these are two indicators for “cabecera” and “centro poblado” areas and four regional dummies. 
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raw and the conditional mean differences are statistically significant. Individuals living in rain-
shock affected areas suffer a statistically significant decline in their monthly incomes (~14,000 
COP).
 53, 54
    
2.6.2 CCTs and Household Expenditures 
We first explore the impact of the CCT on household expenditures.
55
 The two-stage least 
square (2SLS) estimates for the effect of the CCT on total household expenditures are presented 
in Table 2.3.B. We find that receiving the CCT results in a significant increase in household 
expenditures equivalent to approximately COP 168,118 (approximately US$ 67).
56
 Under-
identification is strongly rejected (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic = 39.562). Similarly, the 
value of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic for the power of the instrument is 280.701, 
significantly exceeding the benchmark proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). The null hypothesis 
that participation in the program can be treated as exogenous to total expenditures is also 
strongly rejected (all the test statistics are reported in the top panel of Table R 2.4). Overall, these 
results provide some support to the validity of the instrument.  
2.6.3 The Effect of CCTs and Rain-shocks on the Intra-household Resource Allocation 
The results from the reduced form equations are presented in Tables 2.4.A and 2.4.B.
57
 
Tables 2.4.A and 2.4.B show the coefficients for the consumption goods in budget shares and in 
                                                 
53
 Note that this income loss is equivalent in magnitude to the CCT grant given to mothers with children attending 
primary school. 
54
 We also check whether participation in the program is exogenous to total household income. The null hypothesis 
that participation in the program can be treated as exogenous to total household income cannot be rejected. The 
result of this test is reported in the top panel of Table 2.10. 
55
 Household expenditures as defined in the present analysis include a subset of total household expenditures.  
56
 The result is robust to using nonparametric bootstrap to compute the standard errors. Please refer to Table R 2.3.C 
in Appendix 2.1. 
57
 The results corresponding to the validity of the instrument for each of the estimated reduced form demand 
equation are presented in Table R 2.4.C in Appendix 2.1. Under-identification and weak identification is strongly 
rejected for all the specifications. The exogeneity of program participation is rejected for all the food groups and for 
the household good. 
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levels, respectively. The treatment decreases the shares of vegetables and fats and increases the 
shares of children’s goods, meat/protein and corn/flour foods. In levels, we also observe 
statistically significant increases in the expenditures on children’s goods (COB 11,192), 
meat/protein (COB 20,142), and a large increase in the expenditures on corn/flour foods (COB 
131,001). Finally, while we do find a decrease in the relative shares of vegetables and fats, the 
absolute decrease is only statistically significant for vegetables (– COB 12,005).  
The results from estimating the SUR system of 9 equations are presented in Table 2.5. 
The results are similar to those obtained after running the reduced form regressions. They tell us 
that the treatment is linked to an increase in the budget share of children’s goods and 
meat/protein. Similarly, the budget shares of the treated households corresponding to vegetables 
are also significantly reduced. These results suggest that households reassess their purchase 
decisions and reallocate resources towards children-specific goods and relatively more luxurious 
foods (protein and corn based food). 
 Moreover, the χ2 (8) test statistics corresponding to null of Pareto optimality, or the 
equality of the 16 marginal rate of substitution ratios, is 4.42 (p-value = 0.817) implying that 
Pareto optimality cannot be rejected. On the other hand, the test of the income pooling 
hypothesis, which equates all of the 18 coefficients belonging to the two distribution factors to 
zero, is rejected (χ2 (18) = 82.97, p-value = 0.000).  
Because the consumption of certain groups is zero for a large number of households,
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the linear regression coefficients are likely to be biased, thus likely to invalidate the post-
estimations tests. With this concern in mind, we estimate a seemingly unrelated regression 
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 Specifically, 12, 14 and 67 percent of the households demand adult man goods, adult woman goods and children’s 
goods, respectively. The demand for all the other goods is around 85 percent or higher. 
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system for fully recursive mixed processes.
59
 In particular, we estimate a system of 3 IV-Tobit 
regressions (corresponding to the Adult man, Adult woman and Children goods) and 6 linear IV-
regressions (corresponding to the six food groups). The results are presented in Table 2.6. The 
results are consistent with our previous findings. As before, in line with the collective model 
assumptions, Pareto optimality cannot be rejected (χ2 (8) = 4.30, p-value = 0.828) and the income 
pooling hypothesis is strongly rejected (χ2 (18) = 81.42, p-value = 0.000). 
2.6.4 The Effect of CCTs on Anthropometric Outcomes  
As a next step in the analysis, we study whether the CCT has a direct effect on the 
anthropometric outcomes of children and their mothers.
60
 First, we explore whether the CCT is 
directly linked to changes in z-scores and/or in the incidence of diarrhea or the flu among 
children. The results for children’s outcomes are presented in Table 2.7. We observe that the 
program has no effect on the height for age z-scores (ZHFA), yet it has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the weight for age z-scores (ZWFA). In particular, receiving the 
CCT is associated with a 0.128 increase in ZWFA (or 1/8 of a standard deviation). Similarly, the 
probability of having a normal-weight child increases by 4.3 percentage points, whereas the 
probability of having an under-weight child decreases by 3.8 percentage points.    
We see no direct impact of the program on other measures of child health, yet we note 
that while the incidence of diarrhea and flu episodes is negatively associated with children’s 
health, the consumption of meat/protein, milk/dairy, corn/flour and vegetables are all positively 
associated with children’s health, with both the meat/protein and corn/flour items having the 
largest statistically significant negative effect. In particular, a child having diarrhea over the past 
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 This system is estimated using simulated likelihood methods. For more details, see Roodman (2011).  
60
 The results corresponding to the validity of the instrument for each of the estimated reduced form outcome 
equation are presented in Table R 2.4.C in Appendix 2.1. Under-identification and weak identification is strongly 
rejected for all the specifications. With the exception of diarrhea and the joint outcome of “BMI-Mother >18.5, 
Under-weight child”, the exogeneity of program participation cannot be rejected for all the remaining outcomes. 
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15 days increases the probability of her being underweight by about 4.4 percentage points and 
decreases the probability of her being normal weight by 4.2 percentage points. Diarrhea is also 
negatively associated with ZHFA and ZWFA. On the other hand, an increase in the household 
consumption of corn/flour and vegetables is negatively associated with anthropometric 
outcomes. 
 Interestingly, while the rain-shock had no statistically significant effect on household 
expenditures, it has a negative effect on ZWFA and increases the underweight incidence for 
children. 
The results for mothers are presented in Table 2.8. The results suggest that mothers 
receiving the treatment experience no statistically significant change in their BMI. On the other 
hand, the rain-shock has a negative and statistically significant impact on both mothers’ BMI (-
0.610). Moreover, the rain-shock increases the probability of a mother being underweight by 2.6 
percentage points (a 57 percent increase). We also find that while increases in the consumption 
of meat/protein, milk/dairy, and corn/flour are negatively associated with mothers’ BMI, they are 
also associated with an increase in the probability of a mother being of normal weight, although 
the coefficient corresponding to the meat/protein goods is imprecisely estimated.  
Interestingly, an increase in the household consumption of meat/protein goods is also 
associated with a 12.6 percentage point decline in the probability of a mother being overweight 
(a 40 percent decrease in the probability of having an overweight mother), and while an increase 
in the consumption of milk/dairy and vegetables is associated with a decline in the mother’s 
probability of being overweight, the opposite is true for the “fats” group.   
The results for mother/child pair outcomes are reported in Table 2.9. Being treated increases the 
likelihood of being a “normal pair”, i.e. the probability of having both mother and child falling in 
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the normal BMI range for their anthropometric group, by 7 percentage points (or 16 percent). 
The treatment also decreases the probability of both “dual burden” (BMI-Mother > 25 and under-
weight child) and single burden (BMI-Mother > 18.5 and under-weight child) and has no 
statistically significant impact on the remaining joint outcomes. Finally, we also note that an 
increase in the household consumption of milk/dairy products and fats is positively associated 
with being a “normal pair”. 
2.7   Robustness Checks 
The conditional moment restriction that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term 
is impossible to check in the just identified case. In order to compute the Hansen test for 
overidentying restrictions, we make use of a constructed variable, the rural sex ratio by age 
group, which is available for a subset (N = 8,823) of our final sample.
61, 62
 This variable varies by 
department and by mothers’ age group (seven 5-year interval age groups in total). For each age 
group, the ratio measures the number of males per female. For a given age group, a sex ratio 
higher than 1 would indicate that there are more males per females in the population at that 
particular age group.  
A high sex ratio is indicative of women higher bargaining power in the marriage market; 
in particular, the larger the pool of potential husbands, the more likely a woman is to find a 
“good” mate63 and hence less likely to participate in the program. While testing this claim is 
beyond the scope of this paper, using a natural experiment, Angrist (2002) provides evidence in 
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 We are unable to merge this instrument to every mother in the sample because the age information was missing 
for some mothers. Nevertheless, because the single IV-specification is more powerful than the over-identified 
specification, it remains our preferred specification. In either case, while the results are not reported here, the second 
stage results from using this alternative specification are also consistent with our reported findings. 
62
 The population estimates by age and gender are available from Colombia’s national statistical department 
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE). These estimates can be found at: 
http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=238&Itemid=121. 
63
 Here “good” should be understood as representing positive attributes in a mate (for example, higher income 
earning ability, higher education, better looks, better health, et cetera). 
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its favor. In particular, he finds that high sex ratios, as defined by the number of males per 
females, had a large positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage, and a large negative 
effect on female labor force participation. Moreover, the author also finds that higher sex ratios 
raised male earnings and the incomes of parents with young children. A priori we expect that 
higher sex ratios would decrease the probability of participation in the program.        
We estimate 16 equations, corresponding to total household income, total household 
expenditures, the six food items (in budget shares and in levels) and the “household” good. The 
first stage coefficient estimates corresponding to the presence of a bank and to the sex ratio are 
reported in the top panel of Table 2.10. The results are consistent with our expectations. A higher 
sex ratio significantly decreases the probability of program participation. Using this instrument, 
the null hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments cannot be rejected for 
any of the equations at the 1 percent level. At 5 (10) percent level of significance, 1 (2) test(s) 
reject the null, respectively (see bottom panels of Table 2.10).  
2.8  Discussion 
Attanasio et al. (2005) and Attanasio and Mesnard (2006) evaluate the effects of the 
Familias en Acción CCT program on the food consumption of the participant families. Both 
studies provide evidence of higher energy consumption in CCT receiving households compared 
with families not receiving benefits. In particular, consistent with our findings, both studies find 
that participation in the program results in a considerable increase in the consumption of protein-
rich food (meat, chicken and milk) whereas it has no significant effect on the consumption of 
tobacco and alcohol (components of the “adult male” good in our setting).  
The analysis of the effects of Familias en Acción’s cousin, Mexican CCT program 
Oportunidades (previously known as PROGRESA), showed similar results (Fernald et al. 2008a, 
77 
 
2008b, Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004). Studying the short-term impact of Oportunidades, 
Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) find that families participating in the program were spending 
70% of the cash transfer on better quality energy sources, including meat, fruits, and vegetables.  
Focusing on health outcomes, Fernald et al. (2008c) evaluate the effect of Oportunidades 
on BMI, overweight, obesity, blood pressure, hypertension, and self-reported health fitness.
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Having first defined an intervention group as a group of low-income (below the 20th percentile 
of income, nationally), rural, Mexican adults aged 30-65 years who received conditional cash 
transfers for the period of 3.5 to 5 years, and a comparison group as a group of newly recruited 
adults who had never been enrolled, the authors find that age- and sex-adjusted BMI, obesity, 
and overweight were all significantly lower in the intervention group relative to the comparison 
group. While these results are consistent with ours, they may be driven by measurement error. In 
particular, the authors note that while baseline information was available for all the individuals in 
the treatment group, they were forced to use self-reported retrospective for individual in the 
control group which, of course, represents a major limitation of their study. 
Fernald et al. (2008a) use treatment and control groups from Oportunidades to analyze 
the effect of the program on adult health outcomes. They divide the sample into “early” and 
“late”65 treatment groups and show that the doubling of cumulative cash transfers to the 
household is associated with higher BMI, overweight, and obesity in adult participants from the 
late treatment group. The authors speculate that access to increased economic resources may 
allow people to purchase and consume more high energy beverages or snack foods, which can 
then contribute to weight gain (ibid., p. 2251). To support their argument, they refer to the study 
of Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) who indeed find that beneficiary families in the Oportunidades 
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 In this case, obesity (overweight) was defined as BMI ≥ 30.0 (25) kg/m2, respectively. 
65
 The adults in the “early” treatment groups were enrolled and participated in the program for an additional 18 
months relative to adults in the “late” treatment group. 
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program consume a greater amount of energy than non-beneficiary families. Yet, the same study 
finds that an additional 18 months of participation in Oportunidades is associated with better 
health outcomes and both a “non-significant trend for increased program participation to be 
associated with lower prevalence of grade II obesity among man and women”, and a “non-
significant trend for increased program participation to be associated with lower BMI among 
women”. Although the authors report these trends as “non-significant” and highlight the findings 
that the doubling of cumulative cash transfers to the household is associated with higher BMI, 
overweight, and obesity in adult participants, the trends suggesting that longer participation in 
Oportunidades is associated with lower BMI and obesity are in fact significant at the 10 percent 
level (each has a p-value of 0.06).    
Like the present study, Fernald et al. (2008b) find that CCTs are positively associated 
with children’s health and development. In particular, focusing on child growth, health, and 
development outcomes, these authors find that the doubling of cash transfers is associated with 
lower prevalence of stunting, lower body-mass index for age percentile, and lower prevalence of 
being overweight.   
2.9  Conclusion 
Using the Blundell et al. (2005) collective model framework of intra-household allocation 
we set out to understand the effects of CCTs targeted towards mothers on the determination of 
anthropometric outcomes of mothers and their children. Our study is unique in that we not only 
look at the factors affecting adult women and children’s outcomes separately, but we also 
analyze the factors determining their joint outcomes. In particular, we analyze how a windfall of 
income affects the allocation of household resources across a diverse set of food items consumed 
by the household. We also test whether such resource reallocation has positive impacts on the 
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individual and joint anthropometric outcomes of mothers and children as well as in the health 
outcomes of children. 
First, we find that CCTs affect children’s anthropometric outcomes directly and 
indirectly. The direct effect causes an increase in children’s WFA z-score, a 22 percent decrease 
in the probability of being underweight and a 5 percent increase in the probability of having 
normal-weight. The indirect effect works via a reallocation of resources towards meat/protein 
and corn/flour goods which are both negatively associated with the prevalence of diarrhea and 
the flu, both of which have a negative impact in children’s health.  
Second, we find that mothers receiving CCTs experience no change in their BMI. 
Moreover, while we find that increases in the consumption of meat/protein, milk/dairy, and 
corn/flour are negatively associated with mothers’ BMI, the latter three are also positively 
associated with the probability of a mother being of normal weight. Finally, an increase in the 
household consumption of meat/protein goods is also associated with 40 percent decrease in the 
probability of having an overweight mother  
Third, when looking at the joint anthropometric outcomes of mothers and children, we 
find that those from CCT-receiving households are 16 percent more likely to be “normal-
weight”, 37 percent less likely to be “dual-burden”, and 27 percent less likely to be “single-
burden”. 
Lastly, in line with the predictions of the collective household model, the income pooling 
hypothesis is rejected whereas the hypothesis of Pareto optimality cannot be rejected, suggesting 
that households’ decisions are in fact optimal and subject to bargaining mechanisms.  
Overall, our findings suggest that CCTs shift the bargaining power in favor of mothers. 
This power revision results in a reallocation of resources that indirectly improves children’s 
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anthropometric outcomes without having a negative effect on mothers’ BMIs. Interestingly, we 
find that CCTs also have a direct effect on anthropometric outcomes, suggesting perhaps that 
participation in the CCT program has a behavioral effect on the treated households.  
A plausible hypothesis is that the observed improvements in child anthropometrics 
associated with the treatment (or direct effect) are a result of the program conditionalities rather 
than of the CCT transfer. For instance, because treated households are mandated to both attend 
nutrition and health related training sessions and to take their children to regular health checkups, 
the observed improvement in anthropometric outcomes may be the result of either their learning, 
of their better health care, or both. Of course, the validity of these hypotheses remains to be 
tested empirically. Nevertheless, our results suggest that mothers’ willingness to pay for the 
inputs in the production of the public good is higher than that of fathers’; as a result, targeting 
CCTs to mothers has overall positive effects on both intra-household allocation and distribution 
of resources. In particular, we conclude that the FA program has had a positive effect on 
children’s health outcomes without leading to higher obesity among mothers. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of CCT Conditions 
 
Health-Nutrition Transfers 
 
Target Group Beneficiary families with children between 0 and 6 years 
 
 
Monetary Value 46,500 pesos/month (2002)* 
 
Condition(s) children: vaccination and growth and development checks 
 mothers: courses on nutrition, hygiene and contraception 
 
Education Transfers 
 
Target Group Beneficiary families with children between 7 and 17 years 
 
 
Monetary Value      Primary school children:  14,000 pesos/month (2002)* 
       Secondary school children:  28,000 pesos/month (2002)* 
 
 
Condition(s) both primary and secondary school children attending at least 80% of school classes during the school 
year. 
 
*) The monetary value of the both health-nutrition and education transfers change over time. For example, in 
2001 the value of education transfers to beneficiary families with primary (secondary) school children was set at 
12,000 (24,000) pesos/month for the families with primary (secondary) school children, resp. 
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Table 2.2.A Descriptive Statistics - Household Expenditures and Characteristics 
 
Expenditures Characteristics 
 
Mean-
Levels 
Std. Dev. 
Mean-
Shares 
Std. 
Dev.  
Mean Std. Dev. 
  
Total 
 
376,086 
 
637,352 
 
1.00 
 
– 
Male 0.51 0.50 
Number of Minors 3.86 1.70 
 
Assignable goods Number of Adults 2.31 0.75 
Adult-Woman 1,955 6,337 0.01 0.03 Married 0.83 0.37 
Adult-Man 1,357 4,756 0.01 0.02 Mother-High Education 0.04 0.19 
  Public goods Father-High Education 0.03 0.18 
Children 13,505 17,224 0.06 0.08 Mother-Wage Laborer 0.07 0.26 
Household 37,833 41,462 0.16 0.15 Father-Wage Laborer 0.61 0.49 
 
Food Cabecera 0.46 0.50 
Meat/Protein 35,050 70,394 0.12 0.11 Centro Poblado 0.45 0.50 
Milk/Dairy 75,569 322,832 0.13 0.17 Gas  0.06 0.23 
Corn/Flour 135,757 467,678 0.21 0.21 Electricity 0.84 0.37 
Vegetables 42,805 50,340 0.18 0.18 Sewer 0.21 0.41 
Fats 21,345 38,935 0.08 0.09 Water Pipe 0.57 0.50 
Other-foods 10,675 9,514 0.05 0.05 Trash Collection 0.28 0.45 
     Sickness 0.12 0.33 
     Income 170,633.1 193,416.2 
Note: there are 10,285 child level observations in the sample.       
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Table 2.2.B 
 
Anthropometric and Health Outcomes (N = 10,285) 
 
 Mean    Std. Dev. 
Child Anthropometrics & Health 
Height-for-age -1.371 1.086 
Weight-for-age -0.736 0.989 
BMI-for-age 0.205 0.961 
Under-weight 0.170 0.375 
Normal-weight 0.818 0.386 
Over-weight 0.013 0.112 
Diarrhea 0.121 0.326 
Flu 0.362 0.480 
Mother Anthropometrics and Health 
BMI-Mother 24.77 4.58 
BMI-Mother <18.5 0.045 0.208 
18.5< BMI-Mother <25 0.533 0.499 
25< BMI-Mother  0.422 0.494 
Mother/Child Anthropometrics  
BMI-Mother <18.5, Under-weight child 0.016 0.127 
Normal Pair 0.425 0.494 
Over-weight pair 0.008 0.089 
BMI-Mother >25, Under-weight child (Dual Burden) 0.048 0.214 
BMI-Mother >18.5, Under-weight child 0.153 0.360 
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Table 2.3.A - The Effect of a Rain-Shock on Household Income 
 Controls Income 
Rain-shock -14,661** 
 
(6,056) 
Mean precipitation -17* 
 
(9) 
Hours at home – Father -3,356 
 
(2,282) 
Hours at home – Mother 1,516 
 
(1,952) 
Hours at work – Father 2,322** 
 
(1,119) 
Hours at work – Mother 2,848** 
 
(1,180) 
Mother-High Education 28,764** 
 
(14,426) 
Father-High Education 35,914** 
 
(15,392) 
Mother-Wage Laborer 59,088*** 
 
(12,884) 
Father-Wage Laborer 7,181 
 
(8,595) 
Cabecera 32,574** 
 
(13,654) 
Centro Poblado -6,495 
 
(13,571) 
Male child 9,047 
 
(5,506) 
Minors 2,826* 
 
(1,658) 
Adults -4,964 
 
(4,068) 
Married 33,799*** 
 
(7,347) 
Constant 108,341*** 
 
(29,492) 
Observations 8,310 
 
 
 
 
 
H0: Income (Rain-shock=1) = Income (Rain-shock=0) 
 
Income (N = 10,285) 
Group Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
No shock 173,427.5 2,519.9 208,536.2 
Rain-shock 165,105.6 2,706.0 159,221 
Difference 8,321.8   
T-test Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0 
P-value 0.9805 0.0391 0.0195 
 
H0: Predicted Income (Rain-shock=1) = Income (Rain-shock=0) 
 
Predicted Income (N = 8,310) 
Group Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
No shock 183,237 553 40,956.0 
Rain-shock 170,117.9 761.6 40,490 
Difference 13,119.1   
T-test Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0 
P-value          1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
The table shows the IV regression results for the effect of the treatment on total household expenditures. Other controls: 
regional fixed effect. Municipality clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.3.B - The Effect of the Treatment on Total Expenditures – 2SLS 
 
1st Stage     2nd Stage 
Banks 0.682  
 
0.041  
Treated  168,118.092** 
 
 (76,008.701) 
Rain-shock -0.034 -20,385.467 
 
0.033 (34,594.283) 
Electricity 0.045 -97,179.319** 
 
0.039 (39,117.114) 
Gas -0.100 36,532.381 
 
0.083 (90,707.131) 
Water pipe 0.076 -19,832.202 
 
0.033 (40,761.570) 
Sewer -0.044 99,441.886** 
 
0.047 (48,687.275) 
Trash collection -0.093 43,786.518 
 
0.039 (46,566.531) 
Mother-High Education 0.013 91,947.279** 
 
0.045 (46,150.316) 
Father-High Education -0.064 33,729.824 
 
0.039 (44,878.985) 
Mother-Wage Laborer -0.028 -48,867.684 
 
0.036 (36,081.559) 
Father-Wage Laborer 0.029 -68,609.188* 
 
0.023 (35,714.252) 
Cabecera -0.015 71,619.502 
 
0.048 (43,966.335) 
Centro Poblado 0.075 89,996.675** 
 
0.048 (43,986.060) 
Male 0.015 -13,832.350 
 
0.011 (14,106.220) 
Minors -0.003 20,279.275** 
 
0.005 (7,885.385) 
Adults -0.001 21,437.209 
 
0.008 (15,956.296) 
Married 0.042 -22,306.658 
 
0.021 (25,512.196) 
Observations 10,285 
The table shows the IV regression results for the effect of the treatment on total household expenditures. Other 
controls: regional fixed effect. Municipality clustered standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.05 and * p < 0.1. 
Summary results for first-stage regressions 
Instrument: presence of at least one bank (mean: 0.72, std. dev.: 0.45) in the municipality 
       (there are 120 municipalities in the sample). 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic: F (1) = 280.71 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for single endogenous regressor: 
      10% maximal IV size = 16.38, 15% maximal IV size = 8.96 
      20% maximal IV size =   6.66, 25% maximal IV size = 5.53  
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors: χ2 (1) = 5.219, p-val = 0.0223 
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Table 2.8 - The Effect of Treatment on the Anthropometric Outcomes of Mothers – 2SLS 
  Treated 
BMI-
Mother 
BMI- 
Mother  
< 18.5 
18.5< 
BMI-
Mother 
<25 
25<  
BMI-
Mother  
<30 
25<  
BMI-
Mother 
       
Bank 0.685      
 0.039      
Treated -0.040 -0.393 0.003 0.040 -0.024 -0.018 
 
0.032 (0.376) (0.014) (0.035) (0.033) (0.020) 
Rain shock -0.202 -0.610*** 0.026*** 0.017 -0.019 -0.024*** 
 
0.108 (0.145) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) 
Meat/Protein -0.041 -1.701*** 0.055* 0.095 -0.126* -0.025 
 
0.084 (0.637) (0.033) (0.067) (0.065) (0.039) 
Milk/Dairy -0.231 -1.630*** 0.030 0.162*** -0.097* -0.096*** 
 
0.102 (0.490) (0.024) (0.056) (0.052) (0.033) 
Corn/Flour -0.174 -0.872* -0.010 0.112** -0.063 -0.040 
 
0.071 (0.509) (0.019) (0.052) (0.044) (0.039) 
Vegetables -0.373 -1.358** 0.030 0.121** -0.094* -0.057* 
 
0.121 (0.562) (0.035) (0.056) (0.053) (0.031) 
Fats 0.304 -1.056 0.026 0.170* -0.205** 0.009 
 
0.183 (0.867) (0.035) (0.093) (0.086) (0.044) 
Other-foods 0.000 1.761 -0.104* 0.014 0.064 0.027 
 
0.000 (1.292) (0.059) (0.168) (0.141) (0.093) 
Total Expenditures -0.021 0.000** -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 
0.021 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sickness 0.027 -0.040 0.006 -0.022 0.016 0.000 
 
0.037 (0.177) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (0.012) 
Gas -0.122 0.111 -0.008 0.020 -0.012 0.001 
 
0.078 (0.252) (0.013) (0.025) (0.021) (0.015) 
Electricity 0.071 -0.122 -0.018 0.050* -0.028 -0.003 
 
0.031 (0.295) (0.014) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) 
Sewer -0.036 -0.046 -0.008 0.028 -0.016 -0.003 
 
0.047 (0.203) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) 
Water pipe -0.092 0.584* -0.022** -0.020 -0.001 0.043** 
 
0.037 (0.303) (0.010) (0.029) (0.029) (0.022) 
Trash collection 0.016 0.506* -0.010 -0.072*** 0.068*** 0.014 
 
0.043 (0.261) (0.011) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) 
Mother-High Education -0.068 -0.553* 0.006 0.031 0.027 -0.064*** 
 
0.038 (0.311) (0.018) (0.038) (0.039) (0.018) 
Father-High Education -0.030 -0.011 -0.017 0.014 0.003 -0.001 
 
0.035 (0.356) (0.013) (0.038) (0.037) (0.023) 
Mother-Wage Laborer 0.024 0.310 -0.011 -0.028 0.037 0.002 
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0.021 (0.257) (0.012) (0.030) (0.029) (0.019) 
Father-Wage Laborer -0.009 -0.311* 0.008 0.026 -0.021 -0.012 
 
0.045 (0.161) (0.007) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) 
Cabecera 0.084 0.004 0.003 0.031 -0.063** 0.029 
 
0.045 (0.330) (0.014) (0.037) (0.029) (0.018) 
Centro Poblado 0.015 0.036 -0.029** 0.034 -0.005 -0.001 
 
0.011 (0.305) (0.013) (0.038) (0.030) (0.016) 
Male 0.001 -0.052 -0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.007 
 
0.005 (0.119) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) 
Minors -0.002 -0.046 0.003 0.004 -0.009* 0.002 
 
0.008 (0.047) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Adults 0.035 0.258*** -0.004 -0.017 0.001 0.020*** 
 
0.020 (0.092) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
Married 0.685 0.277 -0.018 -0.029 0.031 0.016 
 
0.039 (0.240) (0.013) (0.020) (0.023) (0.012) 
Observations 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 
The table shows the 2SLS-regression results for the anthropometric outcomes of mothers. Municipality clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. Other controls: region fixed effect. 
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Table 2.9 - The Effect of Treatment on the Anthropometric Outcomes  
of Mother/Child Pairs – 2SLS 
  Treated 
BMI-Mother 
<18.5, 
Under-
weight child 
Normal 
Pair 
 
Over-
weight  
Pair 
BMI-Mother 
>25, Under-
weight child 
(dual 
burden) 
BMI-Mother 
>18.5, 
Under-weight 
child (single 
burden) 
       
Bank 0.685      
 0.038      
Treated -0.040 0.008 0.070** 0.001 -0.018* -0.042** 
 
0.031 (0.007) (0.031) (0.003) (0.010) (0.020) 
Rain-shock -0.216 0.014*** 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.014 
 
0.109 (0.004) (0.015) (0.001) (0.005) (0.010) 
Meat/Protein -0.050 0.043** 0.045 -0.011 -0.020 0.044 
 
0.084 (0.019) (0.063) (0.010) (0.027) (0.045) 
Milk/Dairy -0.244 0.022 0.130** 0.004 -0.020 0.012 
 
0.101 (0.015) (0.051) (0.009) (0.020) (0.036) 
Corn/Flour -0.183 0.017 0.035 -0.008 0.000 0.079** 
 
0.071 (0.011) (0.042) (0.007) (0.019) (0.032) 
Vegetables -0.366 0.039** 0.055 -0.009 -0.020 0.046 
 
0.119 (0.019) (0.050) (0.008) (0.015) (0.032) 
Fats 0.294 0.006 0.163* -0.004 -0.044 -0.024 
 
0.184 (0.016) (0.086) (0.010) (0.028) (0.043) 
Other-foods 0.000 -0.028 -0.084 -0.011 0.013 0.101 
 
0.000 (0.031) (0.135) (0.024) (0.053) (0.105) 
Total HH expenditures -0.045 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 
0.017 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diarrhea -0.037 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.013* 0.030** 
 
0.016 (0.005) (0.017) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) 
Flu -0.015 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 
0.021 (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) 
Sickness 0.026 0.007 -0.033 0.006* 0.005 0.012 
 
0.036 (0.005) (0.020) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) 
Electricity -0.123 -0.005 0.016 -0.004* -0.004 0.007 
 
0.078 (0.007) (0.020) (0.003) (0.008) (0.013) 
Gas 0.071 -0.012** 0.058* 0.007 -0.003 -0.015 
 
0.031 (0.006) (0.033) (0.007) (0.012) (0.021) 
Water pipe -0.037 0.005 0.020 0.003 0.007 0.016 
 
0.047 (0.004) (0.020) (0.002) (0.008) (0.013) 
Sewer -0.091 -0.000 0.013 -0.000 0.005 -0.028* 
 
0.037 (0.006) (0.027) (0.005) (0.010) (0.017) 
Trash collection 0.011 -0.010 -0.040* 0.003 0.003 -0.026 
 
0.044 (0.007) (0.023) (0.004) (0.009) (0.016) 
Mother-High Education -0.069 -0.012*** 0.033 0.002 -0.024** -0.036* 
 
0.039 (0.003) (0.040) (0.006) (0.010) (0.020) 
Father-High Education -0.033 0.000 0.033 0.008 -0.018 -0.031 
 
0.035 (0.006) (0.037) (0.010) (0.013) (0.023) 
Mother-Wage Laborer 0.022 -0.007 -0.031 0.004 -0.015* -0.010 
 
0.021 (0.006) (0.025) (0.005) (0.009) (0.018) 
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Father-Wage Laborer -0.011 -0.000 0.034* -0.002 -0.006 -0.015 
 
0.045 (0.004) (0.018) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012) 
Cabecera 0.081 0.004 0.017 -0.001 -0.012 0.006 
 
0.045 (0.008) (0.036) (0.004) (0.013) (0.020) 
Centro Poblado 0.016 -0.006 0.041 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010 
 
0.011 (0.007) (0.036) (0.004) (0.014) (0.019) 
Male 0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 0.008 0.017** 
 
0.005 (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) 
Minors -0.003 0.002* -0.009* -0.001* 0.007*** 0.021*** 
 
0.008 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Adults 0.033 -0.003* -0.008 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 
 
0.020 (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) 
Married 0.685 -0.009 -0.012 0.002 0.011 -0.006 
 
0.038 (0.008) (0.019) (0.002) (0.007) (0.013) 
Observations 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 10,285 
The table shows the 2SLS-regression results for the anthropometric outcomes of mothers and mothers and 
children. Municipality clustered standard errors in parentheses. HH = household.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. Other controls: region fixed effect. 
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Appendix 2.1 
 
Table R 2.3.C - The Effect of the Treatment on Total Expenditures: 
2SLS (Bootstrapped-SEs) 
 
 
1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Banks 0.682 168,118.092** 
 
0.041 (84,176.161) 
Treated  -20,385.467 
 
 (38,697.981) 
Rain-shock -0.034 -97,179.319** 
 
0.033 (46,819.601) 
Electricity 0.045 36,532.381 
 
0.039 (94,297.282) 
Gas -0.100 -19,832.202 
 
0.083 (39,952.431) 
Water pipe 0.076 99,441.886** 
 
0.033 (46,544.952) 
Sewer -0.044 43,786.518 
 
0.047 (47,060.557) 
Trash collection -0.093 91,947.279** 
 
0.039 (43,192.509) 
Mother-High Education 0.013 33,729.824 
 
0.045 (46,516.033) 
Father-High Education -0.064 -48,867.684 
 
0.039 (32,484.362) 
Mother-Wage Laborer -0.028 -68,609.188** 
 
0.036 (32,984.886) 
Father-Wage Laborer 0.029 71,619.502 
 
0.023 (45,493.876) 
Cabecera -0.015 89,996.675* 
 
0.048 (49,167.525) 
Centro Poblado 0.075 -13,832.350 
 
0.048 (14,986.610) 
Male 0.015 20,279.275*** 
 
0.011 (7,213.978) 
Minors -0.003 21,437.209 
 
0.005 (16,652.898) 
Adults -0.001 -22,306.658 
 
0.008 (28,764.637) 
Married 0.042 168,118.092** 
 
0.021 (84,176.161) 
Observations 10,285 
The table shows the IV regression results for the effect of the treatment on total household expenditures. Other 
controls: regional fixed effect. Municipality clustered bootstrapped std errors in par. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,    
and * p < 0.1. 
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Table R 2.4.C - Testing the Validity of the Instrument: Bank 
 
  
Underidentification 
test: 
 Kleibergen-Paap rk  
LM statistic    
p-val 
Weak identification 
test:  
Kleibergen-Paap rk  
Wald F statistic 
Endogeneity 
test of 
endogenous 
regressors 
 χ2(1) 
 p-val  
  Income (not reported) 
39.562 0.000 280.706 0.583 0.445 
  Expenditures (Table 2.3 B) 39.562 0.000 280.706 5.219 0.022 
Food - Budget Shares  
  (Table 2.7 A)     
  Meat/Protein  39.562 0.000 280.706 8.723 0.003 
  Milk/Dairy 39.562 0.000 280.706 0.071 0.790 
  Corn/Flour 39.562 0.000 280.706 6.433 0.011 
  Vegetables 39.562 0.000 280.706 9.051 0.003 
  Fats 39.562 0.000 280.706 1.755 0.185 
  Other-foods 39.562 0.000 280.706 6.287 0.012 
Food – Expenditures 
  (Table 2.7 B) 
    
  Meat/Protein 39.562 0.000 280.706 0.780 0.377 
  Milk/Dairy 39.562 0.000 280.706 6.373 0.012 
  Corn/Flour 39.562 0.000 280.706 2.169 0.141 
  Vegetables 39.562 0.000 280.706 3.136 0.077 
  Fats 39.562 0.000 280.706 0.880 0.348 
  Other-foods 39.562 0.000 280.706 1.908 0.167 
Goods - Budget Shares 
  (Table 2.7 A)     
  Household-good 39.562 0.000 280.706 6.410 0.011 
  Adult-woman NA NA NA 0.000 0.982 
  Adult-man NA NA NA 0.500 0.479 
  Children NA NA NA 0.940 0.331 
Goods - Budget Expenditures 
  (Table 2.7 B)     
  Household-good 39.562 0.000 280.706 0.024 0.876 
  Adult-woman NA NA NA 0.000 0.978 
  Adult-man NA NA NA 0.340 0.559 
  Children NA NA NA 0.170 0.682 
Mother Anthropometrics 
  (Table 2.5)     
  BMI 41.071 0.000 311.048 0.591 0.442 
  Under-weight  41.071 0.000 311.048 0.433 0.510 
  Normal-weight 41.071 0.000 311.048 0.337 0.561 
  Over-weight 41.071 0.000 311.048 0.393 0.531 
  Obese 41.071 0.000 311.048 0.250 0.617 
  Obese or overweight 41.071 0.000 311.048 0.675 0.411 
Child Anthropometrics 
  (Table 2.4) 
    
  Height-for-age 41.226 0.000 317.346 2.693 0.101 
  Weight-for-age 41.279 0.000 317.362 2.056 0.152 
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  Under-weight 41.324 0.000 318.078 1.186 0.276 
  Normal-weight 41.324 0.000 318.078 2.017 0.156 
  Over-weight 41.324 0.000 318.078 1.572 0.210 
  Diarrhea 41.203 0.000 313.254 6.314 0.012 
  Flu 41.203 0.000 313.254 1.353 0.245 
Mother/Child Anthropometrics 
  (Table 2.7) 
    
  Under-weight 41.210 0.000 316.884 2.293 0.130 
  Normal-weight 41.210 0.000 316.884 1.676 0.195 
  Over-weight 41.210 0.000 316.884 0.002 0.964 
  Dual-burden 41.210 0.000 316.884 1.930 0.165 
  Single-burden 41.210 0.000 316.884 2.739 0.098 
  
104 
 
Appendix 2.2: Sample Selection & Construction of Main Variables 
 
In 2002 (2003), the evaluation survey for the Familias en Acción Program collected the 
anthropometric information for all the children living in the household who were less than 7 (8) 
years of age at the time of the survey. There were 10,734 (10,873) such children interviewed in 
2002 (2003). The following table summarizes the availability of the key anthropometric 
information for these children: 
 
   2002 (N = 10,734)   2003 (N = 10,873)   Both (N=9,615) 
 weight & 
height 
 weight & 
height 
weight & height 
Weight of the child 10,024 9,006 9,865 8,741 8,260 
(children) 
6,317 
(children & 
mothers) 
Height of the child 10,026   9,876 
Weight of the mother   9,265    8,245  
Height of the mother   9,279   8,263 
Imputation 
We imputed the anthropometric information of the mothers of children interviewed in 
both rounds by using 2002 measures to replace the missing 2003 measures and vice versa. This 
exercise gave us 14,446 child level observations (in both 2002 and 2003) with anthropometric 
information for both mother and child. 
Calculation 
The z-scores were computed using age and gender specific anthropometric measures 
using WHO’s child growth standards. For children up to 5 years of age, we used the freely 
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available software “WHO Anthro for personal computers”.1 For children older than 5 years of 
age, we used the STATA macro for computing z-scores based on WHO Child Growth Standards. 
This macro is freely available from WHO.
2
  
Consumption variables and Prices 
Food consumption 
The evaluation survey collected information on households’ food consumption (7-day recall) 
for 94 different food items.
3
 Respondents specified i) whether they have consumed the specific 
item in the last 7 days and if so, whether the item was (1) purchased or (2) obtained otherwise. In 
both cases, they also report i) the amount consumed, ii) the unit of measure, and when the item 
was purchased, iii) the amount paid. The survey also collected the municipality level market 
price per standard unit for each of the food items.  
To construct the consumption expenditure measures we took the following steps: 
1. (i.) The amount consumed, (ii.) the unit of measure, and (iii.) the amount paid were set to 
zero if missing or if negative, and were counted as zeros if no information was available. 
If some information was available and was valid, we replaced the missing values with the 
sample average.   
2. Whenever the units of measure reported by the municipality for the “market price” and 
the “food obtained” were the same, the “market price” was used to price the food 
“obtained otherwise”. If the units of measure differed, the “market price” was converted 
                                                 
1
 For more information, refer to: http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/. 
2
 For more information, refer to: http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/readme_stata.pdf.  
3
 These include: beef with bone, minced beef, pork no bone, pork with bone, goat sheep meat, other poultry, canned 
meat, cold cut, other parts meat, fish, sea food, tuna, sardine, milk, powder milk, cheese, dairy, orange, lemon, 
mandarin, banana, melon, mango, guava, blackberry, passion fruit, pineapple, coconut, other fruit, green bean, 
carrot, lima beans, tomato, green onion, onion, cob, peas, lettuce, bean-2, spinach, chard, cabbage, garlic, pepper, 
other vegetables, chickpeas, dried peas, dried beans, lentils, other grains, platano, harton, platano other, potato, 
potato creole, arracacia, yam; yucca; other vegetable-2, condiments, tomato sauce; soup concentrate; coffee, 
chocolate; aromatic herbs salt, sugar, cinnamon; vegetable oil; vegetable butter; butter; margarine; lard; soda, 
packed juice, powder juice, bottled water, other food. 
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into price per pound using standard conversions (e.g. 1 kilo = 2.2 pounds) and the 
“amount consumed” of the “food obtained” was converted to pounds. A few of the 
obtained purchases were reported in unusual units (e.g. “bundle”, “package”). In such 
cases, the mean price and quantity were used to generate the total price paid. This 
procedure was used until all the valid “amount consumed” entries corresponding to the 
“obtained otherwise” food were assigned a reasonable value. 
3. A “value” variable was generated by adding up values of the “purchased” and “obtained 
otherwise” foods.  
4. After computing the value for each of the 94 food items, these were divided into six food 
expenditure groups (see the list below), and their respective budget shares were computed 
using total expenditures. 
Group List Total Budget 
Share 
Items Included 
Meat/Protein 35,050 0.12 cow bone, chicken giblets, chicken, beef with bone, minced 
beef, pork no bone, pork with bone, goat sheep meat, other 
poultry, canned meat, cold cut, other parts meat, fish, sea, 
food, tuna, sardine.  
Milk/Dairy 75,569 0.13 milk, powder milk, cheese, dairy 
Corn/Flour 135,757 0.21 rice, bread, cookies, other bread, pasta, pearl barley, 
traditional barley, traditional corn, traditional wheat, corn 
flour, pre-cooked wheat flour, corn, wheat flour, cereals for 
children. 
Vegetables 42,805 0.18 orange, lemon, mandarin, banana, melon, mango, guava, 
blackberry, passion fruit, pineapple, coconut, other fruit, 
green bean, carrot, lima beans, tomato, green onion, onion, 
cob, peas, lettuce, bean-2, spinach, chard, cabbage, garlic, 
pepper, other vegetables, chickpeas, dried peas, dried beans, 
lentils, other grains, platano, harton, platano other, potato, 
potato creole, arracacia, yam, yucca, other vegetable-2. 
Fats 21,345 0.08 vegetable oil, vegetable butter, butter, margarine, lard. 
Other-foods 10,675 0.05 condiments, tomato sauce, soup concentrate, coffee, 
chocolate, aromatic herbs salt, sugar, cinnamon, soda, 
packed juice, powder juice, bottled water, other food. 
 
The same procedure described in steps 1-4 was followed for both the 2002 and the 2003 rounds. 
In 2003, however, some of the market prices were missing for 41 of the 94 items. To generate 
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market prices for these items, we used the market prices reported in 2002 adjusted for the 11-
month inflation. The yearly inflation (excluding December) was 3.4 percent.
4
  
Other consumption items 
The computation of the non-food consumption was straightforward, as only total 
expenditures were reported in the survey.  
Periodicity 
Whenever the (food or non-food) items were not reported in terms of monthly 
expenditures, the expenditures for such items were converted to monthly expenditures. For 
example, 3-month expenditures were divided by 3; weekly expenditures were multiplied by 4. 
Restricted sample 
We restrict the sample to include children that belong to either the “treated with 
payment” group or the “control” group. In other words, the children that belonged to the 
treatment without payment in the first round are excluded from the sample (approx. 2,137 
children). Similarly, children living in families with only one adult are also excluded from the 
sample (approx. 1,348 children). Related to this, we note that not all of the 7,723 observations 
having anthropometric outcomes for mothers and children are ”complete”, in the sense that only 
part of this sample is successfully merged to both mothers’ and fathers’ (or adult male) 
information.  
 Finally, children with missing or invalid consumption information are also excluded from 
the sample (approx. 1,794 children). 
The final sample consists of 10,285 child level observations, of which 40.72 percent are from 
2002. 
                                                 
4
 From January to December: J: 1.23; F: 0.65; M: 0.95; A: 2.14; M: 0.61; J: -1.06; J: -0.78; A: 0.00; S: -0.19; O: -
0.14; N: 0.57; D: 1.25 = 3.41. Source: http://www.businesscol.com/economia/precios2.htm . 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Conflict, Access to Services and Wellbeing: 
The Afghan Experience 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
The World Development Report (WDR 2011) reports that there are more than 1.5 billion people 
living in conflict countries. This chapter examines the existing links between wellbeing and both 
security and conflict in the context of Afghanistan. The analysis presented in this chapter 
combines data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08 
household level survey, the first nationally representative dataset available in Afghanistan, with 
confidential geo-coded data on violent incidents from the United Nations Department of Safety 
and Security. The empirical evidence uncovers an important two-directional causal pathway 
between conflict and access to basic services. This two-directional pathway, in which conflict 
(or the ensuing destruction) fuels more conflict and woe, is found to represent a significant 
barrier to donor assistance delivery. The results from this chapter highlight the importance of 
helping conflict affected countries like Afghanistan develop their basic infrastructure while 
making its access more widespread. Such efforts are well known to have positive effects on 
wellbeing, but in conflict affected countries they are also likely to have positive spillovers on 
conflict prevention. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The World Development Report (WDR 2011) reports that there are more than 1.5 billion 
people living in conflict countries. The conflict has far reaching consequences, as it affects 
individuals both directly – by disrupting their everyday activities, sources of livelihood, health 
and education, and indirectly, through the loss of physical capital and capacity of health and 
education systems to meet the needs of the population.
5
 When high levels of conflict are frequent 
or become the norm, the effect of conflict is likely to have severe lifelong impacts on wellbeing
6
 
and to be particularly deleterious to the more vulnerable.
7
 Finally, the conflict itself may lead – 
via destruction of capital and infrastructure - to future conflict and proliferation of conflict 
related activities. 
In this study, we aim to examine how wellbeing links to both security and conflict in the 
context of Afghanistan. Our goal is to inform policy makers on the dimensions in which 
insecurity at the local level affects household wellbeing and the ability of households to access 
community services. First, using a multivariate regression approach, we examine the 
relationships between security and children’s educational and health outcomes, as measured by 
literacy and school enrollment rates, immunization rates and the probability of receiving 
micronutrients supplementation. Next, we use both multivariate and instrumental variable 
                                                 
5
 Studies that find that conflict has significant long-term negative effect on educational outcomes include Rodríguez 
and Sánchez (2012), Justino et al. (2011), Shemyakina (2011), Akbulut-Yuksel (2009), Akresh and de Walque 
(2008), Dueñas and Sánchez (2007), Barrera and Ibañez (2004), and Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004), among 
others. All these studies are based on micro-level data. Similarly, studies that find that conflict has a significant 
effect on health include Akresh at al. (2012), Akresh et al. (2011), Akbulut-Yuksel (2009), Bundervoet et al. (2009), 
Guerrero-Serdán (2009), and Alderman et al. (2006), among others. Ibáñez and Moya (2009), Verwimp and 
Bundervoet (2008), and Justino and Verwimp (2006) provide further empirical evidence on the welfare of 
populations in conflict-affect areas in general. 
6
 UNESCO (2011a) reports that conflict has had a significant negative impact on the national education systems of 
25 conflict affected countries, resulting in significant declines in the proportion of the population with formal 
education, the average years of education attained, and the literacy rate. 
7
 DFID (2009) estimates that the conflict-affected countries are home to about half of the children who die before 
they reach their fifth birthday and half of the children who are not in primary school. 
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frameworks to analyze the relationship between access to services and conflict. The aim of the 
latter analysis is to disentangle the link between regional conflict and community level access to 
basic services such as electricity, safe water, improved sanitation and basic health facilities. Our 
analysis makes use of a unique set of data that combines information from the National Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08 household level survey, the first nationally 
representative dataset available in Afghanistan with confidential geo-coded data on violent 
incidents from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. 
Overall, we find security and conflict to be important predictors of wellbeing. The results 
from the individual level empirical analysis reveal that higher levels of security are associated 
both with better educational outcomes and better health outcomes of children. In particular, we 
find that higher levels of security could help eliminate a significant part of the gap in educational 
outcomes that currently exists between boys and girls and across regions. With regard to health 
outcomes for children five years old and younger, our results show that independently of gender, 
higher levels of security are linked to higher levels of both immunization rates and access to 
micronutrients. The community level results suggest a more intricate relationship between 
conflict and access to basics services. In particular, higher levels of lagged conflict have a 
negative impact on access to electricity, sanitation, and health infrastructure. Similarly, current 
levels of access to services, particularly access to electricity, have a negative impact on conflict 
and a positive impact on security. 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter uncovers an important two-directional 
causal pathway between conflict and access to basic services. This two-directional pathway, in 
which conflict (or the ensuing destruction) fuels more conflict and woe, represents a significant 
barrier for donor assistance delivery. The results highlight the importance of helping conflict 
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affected countries like Afghanistan develop their basic infrastructure and make the access to 
such infrastructure more widespread. Such efforts are well known to have positive effects on 
wellbeing yet in conflict affected countries they are likely to also have positive spillovers on 
conflict prevention. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a general background to 
recent developments in Afghanistan and the challenges the country continues to face. We also 
discuss the issue of identification of the causal effect of conflict on wellbeing. In Section 3.3, we 
describe the data and the construction of the measures of access to services, conflict, and 
security. In Section 3.4, we describe the empirical framework. The empirical results are 
presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter by summarizing the main findings. 
3.2 The Context 
Afghanistan has been undergoing large social and economic changes during an extended 
period of conflict and insecurity. The Afghan economy has grown strongly since 2002, with an 
average annual growth rate of more than 10 percent. Policy actions of the government of Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) have focused on the rebuilding of the infrastructure lost to war 
and conflict with an emphasis on basic schooling and institutions of higher education. 
Concurrent to this, there have been large inflows of donor funds. Since 2002, donors have 
contributed US$3 billion to USAID’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) which 
supports more than a fourth of GoIRA’s development expenditure. USAID, which provides the 
largest bilateral civilian assistance to Afghanistan, has disbursed a total of 7.9 billion dollars 
since 2002; of this, USAID allocated $343 million to education, $422 million to health, $1,438 
million to roads, $626 million to power, and $53 million in electricity.
8
  
                                                 
8
 USAID estimates can be found at http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/frequently_asked_questions, EU estimates 
at EUCS (2006), and the JICA estimates at MFA (2007). 
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Without a doubt, the large flow of resources directed to the reconstruction of the country 
helped Afghans experience improvements in their education and health outcomes following the 
fall of the Taliban in 2001. According to the WDI (2011) figures, in 2001 there were 773,623 
students enrolled in primary school of which 70 percent were boys. In 2010, the number of 
enrolled children increased almost sevenfold to 5,279,326, of which 60 percent were boys. The 
same source reports similarly significant improvements in certain health outcomes, such as 
children immunization rates, which doubled for DPT and increased by more than 67 percent for 
measles (Figure 3.1).  
Despite these successes, widespread poverty and non-decreasing levels of conflict continue 
to characterize the life of an ordinary Afghan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization figures 
indicate that between 2007 and 2008 violence in Afghanistan increased by more than 30 
percent.
9
 Similarly, the number of security incidents as recorded by United Nations Department 
of Safety and Security increased from less than 200 per month in 2005, to more than 500 per 
month in 2007, to 900 per month during the first seven months of 2009.
10
  
That is, while the signs of improvement must be underscored, the reality is that a 
combination of decades of conflict and discriminatory policies enacted by the Taliban regime 
(UNESCO 2011a) has had severe negative implications for the educational and health outcomes 
of all Afghans. Moreover, it must be emphasized that because the baseline levels
11
 of 
enrollment, literacy, and immunizations were dismally low, the dramatic improvements 
observed may lead observers to overstate the real improvements and understate the potential 
challenges ahead. 
One such challenge is the obliteration of infrastructure resulting from the past and ongoing 
                                                 
9
 See Burke (2009). 
10
 See UN (2007) and HSRG (2010) for 2009 estimate. 
11
 Here 2001 is taken as the baseline year. 
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conflict. Self-assessment evidence from the NRVA 2007/08 survey suggests that the lack of 
infrastructure is viewed as a central challenge to better outcomes. For instance, when families 
were asked to name the top reasons for not sending the children to school, the most frequent 
answer among the respondents (53 percent of 11,344 households) was that there was no school 
available in their community or that the school was too far. Dividing responses into 4 groups 
according to the district security levels,
12
 there is a clear negative correlation between the district 
security level and the probability of citing the lack of educational infrastructure as the top reason 
for forgoing education: 72 percent of the respondents in low security districts (group 1) cited 
lack of infrastructure as the top reason behind their decision versus only 50 percent of the 
respondents in high security districts (group 4). Security concerns were also a top cited reason 
for forgoing children’s education (13 percent at the national level, 32 percent among families 
living in high conflict areas). Similarly, when asked about reasons for not seeking medical care, 
49 percent of the respondents said either that the health center was too far or that the care was of 
bad quality.  
As the observed improvements took place parallel to both large inflows of donor funds and 
serious and ongoing security and conflict events, the appropriate inquiry to be made is: How 
much better would Afghans be in the absence of conflict? Answering this question, which rests 
on identifying the causal effect of conflict on wellbeing, is complicated for at least two reasons.  
On the one hand, it is well known that conflict is likely to have both direct and indirect 
effects on individuals’ wellbeing. The direct effect may be in the form of higher exposure to 
different forms of violence, such as displacement, forced recruitment, homicides and 
                                                 
12
 Household are placed in one of four bins according to the security level of their district, the four bins are simple 
equidistant cutoffs points corresponding to different security levels: less than or equal to 25, more than 25 (50) and 
less than or equal to 50 (75), and more than 75. Security is measured using the civil servant access score, constructed 
by United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). For more details on this measure, please see 
Section III.3.2. 
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kidnappings (UNAMI 2005), all of which are likely to prevent individual from performing their 
ordinary everyday activities. The indirect effect acts through the loss of both physical capital 
(UNESCO 2011b) and capacity of health and education systems to serve and respond to the 
needs of the population.
13
 Similarly, the indirect effect also materializes via the deterioration of 
drinking water and sewage systems, unstable electricity supply, and/or lack of adequate food 
(UNAMI 2005).  
Similarly, the literature shows that when high levels of conflict are frequent or become the 
norm, conflict is likely to have severe lifelong impacts on wellbeing and be particularly 
deleterious to children. For example, Rodríguez and Sánchez (2012) find that among Colombian 
children between the ages 6 and 17, conflict induces children older than 11 to drop out of school 
and enter the labor market too early. Similarly, studying the long-term effects of Allied bombing 
in Germany during the Second World War on the education, health and labor outcomes of 
individuals who were at school-age during the war, Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) finds that these 
individuals had on average fewer years of schooling in adulthood.
14
  
 On the other hand, there are several confounders which are likely to bias the effect of 
conflict on wellbeing when using contemporaneous measures of conflict. In particular, conflict 
itself may be the result of other detrimental factors, such as poverty, lack of access to services 
and infrastructure. For example, the destruction of infrastructure and capital resulting from years 
of war may lead to future conflict and the proliferation of conflict related activities. Supporting 
this hypothesis, Lind et al. (2009) find that the destruction of infrastructure brought about by 
conflict distorts farmers’ incentives by making the cultivation and production of opium more 
                                                 
13
 In Afghanistan, the lack of access to services – a direct result of the decades of conflict and instability – has been 
the major factor behind the country’s high maternal mortality, the second highest in the world (UNICEF 2008). 
14
 See also Ichino and Winter-Ebner (2004) who show that Austrian and German children who were ten years old 
during the Second World War lost on average around 20 percent of a year of schooling. 
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profitable relative to other crops. In this case, referred to by Pugh et al. (2004) as “The Coping 
Economy”, the destruction resulting from violent conflict fuels the cultivation of high-yield illicit 
crops (war → destruction → conflict and illicit activities). More importantly, however, under 
this scenario the effect of conflict is likely to be overestimated.  
Alternatively, the negative relationship between conflict and wellbeing may be attenuated by 
the attendant high-reward economic opportunities.
15
 An example scenario is given by what Pugh 
et al. (2004) refer to as “The Shadow Economy”. In such economic arrangements, drug lords and 
drug cartels promote violent uprisings as a way to protect their activities and wealth (high-
reward illicit activities → conflict → wellbeing & infrastructure but also high rewards → 
wellbeing & infrastructure). Under this scenario, the effect of conflict is underestimated.  
Furthermore, in the absence of alternative sources of sustainable income, farmers in “The 
Coping Economy” would choose to carry on the cultivations of opium leading perhaps to the rise 
of the “Shadow Economy”. Once again, higher yields resulting from the sustainment of illicit 
activities allow farmers to avert poverty and to have more resources to allocate among the 
members of their family where the latter is, of course, likely to translate into better outcomes 
(high-rewards → wellbeing).16 Here, the effect of conflict is underestimated. 
Finally, a third scenario is given by the fact that insurgent groups often resort to high-rewards 
illicit activities, such as drug production, to finance their belligerent activities (Collier et al. 
2003, Rubin 2000). This later scenario, in which the illicit activity is initiated as a way to finance 
violence (insurgency → high reward illicit activities → wellbeing and infrastructure as well as 
                                                 
15
 In support to this hypothesis, the latest poverty Assessment for Afghanistan finds that poverty is relatively lower 
in the Sothern part of Afghanistan (World Bank 2010), a region that is also known to host high levels of income, 
opium cultivation (UNODC 2007) as well as conflict (see figure 3.2).  
16
 This scenario suggests that, in the absence of alternative sources of sustainable income, farmers would choose to 
carry on the cultivations of opium
16
 and this is likely to lead to rise of the “shadow economy” (see next paragraph 
for an example of the “shadow economy”). 
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high reward illicit activities → conflict), is described as “The Combat Economy” by Pugh et al. 
(2004). Under this scenario, the direction of the bias is unclear.  
Hence, irrespectively of whether conflict was originally a cause or an effect of another 
unfavorable event, a common feature of the above described scenarios is a hypothesized 
tendency of conflict to generate a self-propelling vicious cycle. Consequently, using the first 
nationally representative household survey available in Afghanistan, this chapter aims both to 
understand the link between conflict and wellbeing as well as to test this hypothesis empirically. 
3.3 The Data 
3.3.1 Main Data Sources 
 The empirical analysis presented in this chapter combines the National Risk and 
Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08 household and individual level data with 
confidential geo-coded data on violent incidents from the United Nations Department of Safety 
and Security. The effective sample size for the household (primary sampling unit) level analysis 
is 20,543 households (2,568 PSUs) from 394 districts and 34 provinces. The effective sample 
size for the individual level analysis varies depending on the outcome under study (sample sizes 
are indicated at the end of the corresponding tables). In addition, our analysis makes use of two 
data sources on security in Afghanistan: (1) the security incidence database maintained by 
Security Information and Operation Centre (SIOC) of UNDSS and (2) the Civil Servants 
Accessibility at district level maintained by UNAMA (Figure 3.2).  
The UNSIOC dataset is comprised of confidential data on multiple measures of security 
incidents at the district level for each month during the survey years. The unique feature of the 
NRVA data is its complete coverage—the data were collected from all provinces of Afghanistan, 
including areas where conflict incidents were frequently experienced. Thus, the merge of the 
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NRVA 2007/08 with the security data is well suited for gaining a better understanding of how 
conflict affects the national and sub-national level outcomes of the Afghan population.  
3.3.2 Measure of Security and Conflict 
 Two indicators of security are used in the current analysis: the average civil servants 
accessibility score at the district level (henceforth refer to as average CSAS) and the grand total 
number of individuals killed per thousand people at the district level (henceforth refer to as 
killings or lagged killings, depending on whether they occurred before or after the period 
covered by the NRVA survey). The CSAS indicator constructed by the UNAMA provides an 
assessment of the outreach capacity of Afghan civilian government servants. This assessment 
can be used to evaluate impact of security conditions on development and governance outreach. 
In particular, in order to study and monitor violent conflict and insurgency, UNAMA assesses 
areas where the government can operate independently from military assistance by expressing 
the areas that can be accessed by government civil servants as a percentage of each 
administrative unit (district). The range of this assessment variable is between 1 and 100. The 
average CSAS is the average of three CSAS measurements corresponding to 2007 (for the month 
of June, September and December) and two CSAS measurements corresponding to 2008 (for the 
months of June and September). There are two different measures of killings: “lagged” killings 
and “current” killings. Lagged killings are those that took place between January 2006 and 
August 2007, whereas the current killings are those that took place between August 2007 and 
August 2008.  
3.3.3 Measure of Access to Services 
 The analysis of the relationship between access to basic services and conflict exploits the 
tremendous amount of variation in access to services that exists across provinces (see Figure 
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3.3). Access to electricity refers to the percentage of households that have access to electricity at 
any time either from the government, community or private sources (e.g. electric grid, 
government generator, personal generator, community generator, solar, wind, or battery). Access 
to safe drinking water refers to the percentage of households whose main source of drinking 
water is one of the following: hand pump (in-compound, public); bored well (hand pump or 
motorized); protected spring; pipe scheme (gravity or motorized); and piped water provided by 
the municipality. Access to sanitary toilet refers to the percentage of households that use an 
improved sanitation facility – a flush latrine or any other improved latrine.  
3.3.4 Controls 
 Variables included as controls in the analysis of educational outcomes include: indicators 
for the gender of the child, the child’s age and age squared, district level infrastructure (whether 
there is a girls only, boys only and/or coed primary/middle/high school in community, and a 
continuous control for the distance to the closest girl school that is in a separate building), 
household level characteristics (whether the household head is literate, and whether the child 
belongs to a Kuchi family, household size, dependency ratio, the per-capita price adjusted 
monthly total consumption, household’s head years of schooling, and the age of the household 
head), province level indicators (the province level literacy rate of the female and male youth – 
20 to 40 year old individuals). All the regressions control for measures of cultural diversity using 
two variables, one that indicates whether the women always wear the burka outside compound 
and one for the number of days women spend outside of the compound. The regressions also 
include seven regional (South, East, Northeast, North, West, Southwest, West Central) and three 
seasonal indicators (second to fourth quarters). In the analysis of health outcomes, the variables 
related to education infrastructure are replaced with indicators for the presence of basic public 
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health services (BPHS) by donor (European Union, Ministry of Public Health, World Bank, and 
United States Agency for International Development). Descriptive statistics are reported in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Variables included as controls in the analysis of access to services include: an urban 
indicator, an indicator of whether the road is impassable all year long, district level density, 9 
indicators for the type of terrain at the district level (baseline terrain is mid-altitude plains, 
controlled terrain types are: high-altitude plains, platforms, low plateaus, mid-altitude plateaus, 
high plateaus, low mountains, mid-altitude mountains, high mountains, very high mountains, see 
Meybeck et al. 2001), 8 regional indicators (South, East, Northeast, North, West, Southwest, and 
West Central; the baseline region is Central), and 3 indicators for the relief roughness category. 
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Empirical Model: Educational and Health Outcomes 
 To capture the relationship between security and conflict and different dimensions of 
wellbeing, the analysis exploits the existing variation in conflict across regions. To control for 
possible confounding factors the analysis resorts to a multivariate regression approach (probit 
regression). The focus is on two educational outcomes: literacy and school enrollment rates; and 
three health related outcomes: the probability of having a fully immunized child,
17
 the 
probability of having a child lacking all required immunization, and the probability of receiving 
micronutrients supplementation. The regressions corresponding to educational outcomes are run 
separately for two age cohorts: children 7-12 years of age and children 13-18 years of age. 
 The model includes a base effect of security/conflict level in the district (Con) and an 
interaction term that allows the relationship between security/conflict level and the outcome to 
vary by the gender of the child. The specification is as follows: 
                                                 
17
 Fully immunize refers to children who have received complete vaccines for BCG, DPT3, OPV3, and measles. 
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                                                             ,      (1) 
where i denotes child, and d denotes district. Oi is the outcome of child i as described in the text; 
Con is district level security or conflict, where security is measured by the civil servant access 
score and conflict is measured by the numbers of killings per 1K of the population; Inf represents 
a vector of district level infrastructure; HH represents a vector of child i's household 
characteristics; Reg is a vector of regional controls; Q is a vector of seasonal controls; and   is a 
child level idiosyncratic error term. The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, where the latter 
represents the additional security/conflict correlation (in addition to β1) that is related to the 
gender of the child. 
3.4.2 Empirical Model: Conflict, Security and Access to Basic Services 
We also investigate potential channels (or indirect effect) of conflict on wellbeing by 
analyzing how significant a barrier is conflict for individuals to access infrastructure that is 
crucial for the production of health and human capital. In terms of basic infrastructure, the 
analysis focuses on the effect of past and current conflict on access to electricity, safe drinking 
water, and improved sanitation facilities at the province level. In terms of health infrastructure, 
the analysis assesses the effect of past and current conflict on district level infrastructure related 
to basic public health services (BPHS) by provider. In order to control for the reverse causality 
that may exist between access to services and conflict (please see discussion above), we make 
use of lagged measures of conflict (to capture the effect of conflict on access to services) and the 
instrumental variable approach (to capture the effect of access to services on conflict).  
 The model for the effect of conflict on community level access to basic services includes 
a base effect of conflict at the district level. The specification is as follows: 
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                                                                            (2) 
where d denotes district, and  p denotes province. Ap is the basic service access level measured at 
the province level;     is a district level measure of conflict, Area is a vector of district level 
controls; Reg is a vector of regional controls;   is a vector of seasonal controls, and   is a l-level 
idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient of interest, β3, represents the effect of conflict on 
community level access to services. Regressions are run at the PSU (i.e. district) level. 
The model for the effect of access on conflict and security at the district level is specified 
as follows: 
                                                                              (3) 
where Cond is the level of security or conflict at the district-level;    is the coefficient of interest, 
capturing the effect of community level access to services on security or conflict; and all the 
other variables are as specified above. Given the previous discussion on the possibility of reverse 
causality between conflict and access, a causal interpretation of a linear probability model may 
be problematic. In order to overcome the possible endogeneity of access to services, we 
instrument access to services with the 2006-rainfall deviation from a 4-year province-level 
average (2006-09) and two rain-shock indicators (+1 and +2 standard deviations, respectively). 
 The justification for the validity of the instrument is based on the fact that the economic 
activity of Afghanistan is primarily rain-fed agriculture that neither has an extensive irrigation 
system nor a developed industrialized sector; as a result, weather is an important determinant of 
the economic performance of households and regions.
18
 The two rain-shock indicators are used 
to capture possible nonlinearities in the relationship between rain and regional economic activity.  
                                                 
18
 For example, Miguel et al. (2004) use rainfall variation as an instrumental variable for economic growth to assess 
the impact of growth on conflict in 41 African countries that rely on rain-fed agriculture for their subsistence.  
123 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Educational Outcomes 
The multivariate probit regression results for the educational outcomes are presented in 
Tables 3.3 to 3.8. Perhaps not surprisingly, for both cohorts (i.e. children 7-12 and children 13-
18) the results show a positive and statistically significant correlation between the average civil 
servant access score (CSAS) and each of the educational outcomes used in the analysis. It is 
important to note, however, that this gradient is steeper for girls and, for the 13-18 cohort, it is 
primarily driven by the outcomes of girls. Figure 3.4a plots the simulated likelihood of being 
literate by gender and age cohort at 9 equidistant CSAS levels. This figure highlights how the 
educational outcomes of all children are significantly ameliorated at higher CSAS levels. The 
figure also shows a significant narrowing of the educational gap between boys and girls at higher 
levels of CSAS.  
Figure 3.4b plots the simulated likelihood of being enrolled in either primary or 
secondary school by gender and age cohort at 9 equidistant CSAS levels. The patterns observed 
for the enrollment outcome are analogous to those for the literacy outcome. In particular, the 
primary school enrollment rates for all children and for girls in particular increase significantly at 
higher CSAS levels. Similarly, higher security levels are positively correlated with the secondary 
school enrolment rates of girls. This is not the case for boys, whose secondary school enrolment 
rates remain relatively unaffected by security. Finally, the figure also shows a significant 
narrowing of the educational gap between boys and girls at higher levels of CSAS, this being 
particularly striking for the younger cohort. 
The same educational outcomes are regressed on the proxy of current conflict (i.e., 
current killings). Not surprisingly, the results show that there is a strong and statistically 
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significant negative relationship between current levels of conflict and both literacy and 
attendance. Similarly to security (as proxied by CSAS), the relationship between current conflict 
and outcomes is gender dependent. In particular, while conflict negatively correlates with the 
educational attainment of boys and girls, the gradient of this relationship is significantly 
augmented by gender. Unlike current conflict, lagged conflict is positively correlated with 
current levels of literacy and school enrolment. This gradient, however, is very small and often 
not statistically significant (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). 
Overall, these findings suggest that conflict is an important barrier to children’s 
educational attainment. The observed gender gradient between conflict and educational 
attainment suggests that the opportunity cost of girls, for whom the risk of violence-related harm 
is perceived as higher (Justino 2010), may increase disproportionately with conflict, leading 
households to invest relatively more in the education of boys. Similarly, faced with scarcity of 
resources (inputs in the production of human capital) or job opportunities (return to investments 
in human capital), families may decide to spend their resources on the investments that are more 
likely to yield higher returns (Chamarbagwala and Morán, 2011; Shemyakina 2011). Finally, it is 
important to note that, even if our results deal only with short term outcomes, the persistency of 
conflict in Afghanistan implies that the negative link is likely to translate into long-lasting 
implications for children’s welfare. 
3.5.2 Health Outcomes  
 The multivariate probit regression results for the selected health outcomes are presented 
in Table 3.9. The results show a statistically significant correlation between the average civil 
servant access score (CSAS) and all the health outcomes of children 5 years old or younger. 
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Unlike the educational outcomes, however, this gradient is not gender dependent.
19
 Figure 3.5 
plots the predicted likelihood of full vaccination for children between 2 and 5 years of age, of no 
vaccination for children between 6 months and 5 years of age, and of receiving vitamin A 
supplementation for all children up to five years old, by gender and at 9 different CSAS levels. 
This figure highlights significant improvements in the health outcomes of all children if they 
reside in low conflict areas (i.e. those areas with higher CSAS levels). Unlike the educational 
outcomes, there does not appear to be a significant gender gap for any of these three outcomes. 
3.5.3 The Effect of Access to Basic Services on Security and Conflict 
 The results from the first stage regression corresponding to the analysis of the effect of 
community level access to services on security and conflict are presented in Table A 3.1. Note 
first that although the power of the instruments is not high enough for access to improved 
sanitation, and the under-identification test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the model is not 
identified for neither safe water nor improved sanitation, the p-value corresponding to the null 
hypothesis that community level access to electricity is exogenous to conflict cannot be rejected.  
The linear probability regression (OLS) results (Table 3.10) suggest that there is a 
positive and statistically significant correlation between access to basic services and CSAS, with 
improved sanitation having a significantly larger estimated coefficient. The correlation between 
conflict (current killings) and access to services is not precisely estimated under either the IV or 
OLS models. Relative to the OLS results, the IV results suggest that the relationships between 
access to services and CASS are larger in magnitude.   
 
                                                 
19
 We note that the interaction term between PIR and the female dummy is negative, yet the estimated coefficient for 
this interaction is very small and not highly significant.  
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3.5.4 The Effect of Security and Conflict on Access to Basic Services 
 In this section, we summarize the results from the analysis of the effect of security and 
conflict on community level access to services. Given the results from the previous section 
(Table 3.10), it is not surprising to find a positive correlation between access to basic services 
and security (Table 3.11, top panel). The opposite relationship is found between conflict and 
access to electricity, whereas the relationship between the former and access to water and 
sanitation is not statistically significant (Table 3.11, middle panel). In this section, however, our 
interest is in the possible existence of a causal link between conflict and access to services. For 
instance, while killings and the CASS index may be contemporaneously correlated with access to 
services, the assumption is that the current level of access to services at the province level has no 
feedback effect on lagged levels of conflict. The results for the relationship between lagged 
conflict and access to basic services are presented in the third panel of Table 3.11. The 
occurrence of lagged conflict is negatively associated with all three types of access to basic 
services. These results suggest that conflict results in a significant decrease in the current level of 
community access to basic infrastructure.  
Finally, we also investigate whether security and conflict affect a community’s likelihood of 
having a basic public health services (BPHS) facility. The results, based on the regressions run 
separately for each health facility provider, are presented in Table 3.12. We observe that the 
current security level is negatively (positively) correlated with the presence of both EU and 
World Bank (MoPH and USAID) ran BPHSs. While current conflict does not have a statistically 
significant relationship with the likelihood of having a BPHS in the community, past conflict is 
found to significantly affect the probability of the presence of donor- and GoIRA- run facilities; 
in particular, past conflict decreases the probability of the presence of donor-run facilities and it 
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increases the probability of the presence of GoIRA-run facilities. These estimates present an 
interesting pattern which suggests that government run facilities are more likely to locate or to 
linger in conflict prone areas, whereas the opposite is true for donors run facilities. This also 
suggests that conflict is a significant barrier  
3.6  Discussion 
 We examine the relationships between security, conflict and children’s educational and 
health outcomes using a multivariate regression approach. The results suggest that conflict and 
security are significant predictors of children’s educational outcomes. Higher (lower) levels of 
security (conflict) are positively (negatively) associated with literacy rates and school enrollment 
for all children (ages 7-12 and 13-18). While the effect is significant for all children, there is an 
important interaction between the female gender and both security and conflict. In particular, 
girls educational attainments are found to be disproportionally better (worse) in high security 
(conflict) areas. The results suggest that higher levels of security could help mitigate a significant 
share of the gap in educational outcomes that exists between boys and girls and across regions.  
The second part of the analysis focuses on individual level health outcomes. In particular, 
the analysis examines the relationship between security and both immunization and vitamin A 
supplementation
20
 (i.e. outcomes that are likely to both be affected by current level of conflict 
and to have long-lasting implications for individual’s wellbeing). Regardless of gender, the 
results suggest that higher levels of security are linked with higher levels of full immunization 
                                                 
20
 The effects of vitamin A deficiency are well known. For example, Villamor and Wafaie (2005) find that, among 
children, vitamin A deficiency results in increased risks of mortality and morbidity from measles and diarrheal 
infections, blindness, and anemia, while among women it is likely to be associated with high mortality related to 
pregnancy. 
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rates and lower (higher) likelihood of receiving no-immunization (micronutrients 
supplementation). 
Finally, using both multivariate and instrumental variable approaches we analyze the 
relationships between access to services and conflict. The aim of the latter analysis is to 
disentangle the link between regional conflict and community level access to basic services such 
as electricity, safe water, improved sanitation, and the presence of basic health facilities. The 
community level results suggest an intricate relationship between conflict and access to basics 
services. In particular, higher levels of lagged conflict have a negative impact on access to 
electricity, improved sanitation, and health infrastructure. Similarly, current levels of access to 
electricity have a positive impact on security levels. 
The analysis emphasizes the existing link between wellbeing and both security and conflict. 
The empirical evidence presented also uncovers an important two-directional causal pathway 
between conflict and access to basic services. This two-directional pathway, in which conflict 
(or the ensuing destruction) fuels more conflict and woe, represents a significant barrier for 
donor assistance delivery. The results highlight the importance of helping conflict affected 
countries like Afghanistan develop their basic infrastructure and make the access to such 
infrastructure more widespread. Such efforts are well known to have positive effects on 
wellbeing yet in conflict affected countries they are likely to also have positive spillovers on 
conflict prevention. 
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Figure 3.1  
Trends in Selected Educational and Health Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
          Source: WDI 2011 
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Figure 3.2  
 
Map of Civil Servants Accessibility 
 
 
 
 
  Source: APU, UNAMA 
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Figure 3.3 
 
Access to Basic Services by Province 
 
 
 
 
Source: NRVA 2007/08 
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Figure 3.4a 
 
Educational Outcomes I 
        Literacy 7-12       Literacy 13-18 
 
 
Source: Authors own calculations based on NRVA 2007/08 data. 
 
Figure 3.4b 
 
Educational Outcomes II 
        Enrollment-Primary       Enrollment-Secondary 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on NRVA 2007/08 data. 
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Figure 3.5 
 
Health Outcomes 
 
Full immunization rate                 No-immunization rate 
 
  
         Vitamin A supplementation 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on NRVA 2007/08 data. 
Note: Underlying regressions control for NRVA survey desing. 
134 
 
 
Table 3.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics - Educational Outcomes 
 7-12 years old 13-18 years old 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Enrollment (primary school) 51.074 49.989   
Enrollment (secondary school)   0.250 0.433 
Literacy rate 31.889 46.605 47.815 49.953 
Average civil servant access score (CSAS) 83.185 25.425 86.802 23.160 
Female 0.476 0.499 0.473 0.499 
Girl primary school in village 0.249 0.432   
Closest girl school in separate bldg. 0.200 0.400   
Boy primary school in village 0.273 0.445   
Girl middle school available in the community   0.142 0.349 
Boy middle school available in the community   0.205 0.403 
Coed middle available in the community   0.082 0.274 
Girl high school available in the community   0.136 0.343 
Boy high school available in the community   0.237 0.425 
Household size 8.894 3.276 9.019 3.262 
Dependency ratio 0.614 0.506 0.390 0.399 
Age 9.411 1.748 15.455 1.728 
Age squared 91.614 33.416 241.846 53.857 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 1,533 901 1,681 1,037 
Household head is literate 0.312 0.463 0.347 0.476 
Household head's years of schooling 2.466 4.471 2.931 4.885 
Age of household head 44.302 12.164 47.874 13.055 
Rural 0.776 0.417 0.707 0.455 
Kuchi 0.056 0.230 0.053 0.225 
Literacy rate: Female Youth 7.699 10.897 10.209 12.533 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 35.405 20.101 38.341 20.126 
Females always wearing burka (%) 49.596 25.111 50.311 23.503 
Days spent outside compound (women)  9.266 5.081 9.177 4.742 
South 0.116 0.320 0.093 0.290 
East 0.110 0.313 0.099 0.299 
Northeast 0.160 0.367 0.144 0.351 
North 0.128 0.334 0.146 0.353 
West 0.094 0.292 0.117 0.322 
Southwest 0.110 0.313 0.074 0.261 
West Central 0.063 0.243 0.054 0.227 
Second quarter 0.270 0.444 0.261 0.439 
Third quarter 0.245 0.430 0.238 0.426 
Fourth quarter 0.271 0.445 0.285 0.452 
Observations 27,343  20,080  
 
Source: NRVA 07/08 and UNAMA.  
Note: the reported means are weighted by the household weight. 
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Table 3.2 
 
Descriptive Statistics - Health Outcomes 
 5 years old 6 months- 
5 years old 
2-5 years old 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Full immunization 0.350 0.477 0.382 0.486 0.403 0.491 
No immunization 0.153 0.360 0.128 0.334 0.121 0.327 
Vitamin A intake 0.672 0.470 0.703 0.457 0.706 0.456 
Average civil servant access score (CSAS) 84.85 24.84 84.30 25.33 83.59 25.78 
Female 0.497 0.500 0.497 0.500 0.499 0.500 
European Union 0.248 0.432 0.244 0.430 0.248 0.432 
Ministry of Public Health 0.044 0.206 0.044 0.206 0.042 0.200 
World Bank 0.180 0.384 0.188 0.390 0.196 0.397 
USAID 0.528 0.499 0.524 0.499 0.514 0.500 
Household size 8.674 3.753 8.612 3.734 8.604 3.743 
Dependency ratio 0.905 0.502 0.896 0.496 0.896 0.494 
Age 2.349 1.402 2.524 1.236 3.084 0.903 
Age squared 7.484 6.613 7.901 6.184 10.324 5.815 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 1,588 993 1,586 977 1,584 978 
Household head is literate 0.309 0.462 0.306 0.461 0.307 0.461 
Household head's years of schooling 2.372 4.410 2.332 4.376 2.335 4.389 
Age of household head 41.375 13.245 41.290 13.114 41.238 12.957 
Rural 0.767 0.423 0.770 0.421 0.771 0.420 
Kuchi 0.064 0.245 0.063 0.243 0.065 0.247 
Literacy rate: Female Youth 7.981 11.102 7.889 11.059 7.732 10.927 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 35.019 19.664 34.786 19.725 34.667 19.724 
Females always wearing burka (%) 49.640 25.061 49.895 25.172 49.805 25.181 
Days spent outside compound (women)  9.144 4.952 9.089 4.973 9.100 5.013 
South 0.113 0.316 0.113 0.316 0.117 0.321 
East 0.128 0.334 0.123 0.329 0.129 0.335 
Northeast 0.153 0.360 0.151 0.358 0.145 0.352 
North 0.137 0.344 0.138 0.345 0.138 0.344 
West 0.109 0.312 0.109 0.312 0.111 0.314 
Southwest 0.101 0.301 0.107 0.309 0.109 0.312 
West Central 0.071 0.258 0.070 0.255 0.068 0.251 
Second quarter 0.271 0.445 0.271 0.445 0.268 0.443 
Third quarter 0.239 0.427 0.239 0.426 0.236 0.425 
Fourth quarter 0.263 0.441 0.260 0.439 0.265 0.441 
Full immunization 0.350 0.477 0.382 0.486 0.403 0.491 
No immunization 0.153 0.360 0.128 0.334 0.121 0.327 
Observations 24,064 21,440 17,205 
Source: NRVA 07/08 and UNAMA. 
    Note: the reported means are weighted by the household weight. 
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Table 3.3 
 
Educational Outcome 1 - Literacy and CSAS 
 
Literacy Literacy 
 
Age 7-12 Age 13-18 
Explanatory variables dy/dx SE P>z dy/dx SE P>z 
 
            
Average civil servant access score (CSAS) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Female -0.136 0.006 0.000 -0.281 0.007 0.000 
Girl primary school in village 0.006 0.016 0.714 
   Closest girl school in separate bldg. 0.066 0.013 0.000 
   Boy primary school in village 0.042 0.015 0.005 
   Girl middle school available in the community 
   
-0.024 0.019 0.195 
Boy middle school available in the community 
   
0.013 0.016 0.396 
Coed middle available in the community 
   
0.014 0.017 0.416 
Girl high school available in the community 
   
-0.006 0.018 0.756 
Boy high school available in the community 
   
0.016 0.015 0.258 
Household size -0.001 0.001 0.522 0.004 0.001 0.007 
Dependency ratio -0.006 0.007 0.368 -0.019 0.010 0.056 
Age 0.237 0.019 0.000 0.121 0.036 0.001 
Age squared -0.009 0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.000 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household head is literate 0.090 0.011 0.000 0.127 0.013 0.000 
Household head's years of schooling 0.000 0.001 0.928 0.010 0.001 0.000 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.329 0.001 0.000 0.047 
Rural 0.030 0.018 0.104 -0.060 0.018 0.001 
Kuchi -0.179 0.032 0.000 -0.322 0.032 0.000 
Literacy rate: Female Youth -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.459 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Females always wearing burka (%) 0.000 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.734 
Days spent outside compound (women)  0.002 0.001 0.135 0.003 0.001 0.015 
South 0.057 0.019 0.003 0.120 0.022 0.000 
East -0.063 0.017 0.000 -0.022 0.018 0.221 
Northeast -0.019 0.017 0.262 0.054 0.018 0.002 
North 0.147 0.022 0.000 0.084 0.021 0.000 
West 0.021 0.021 0.316 0.063 0.020 0.001 
Southwest -0.084 0.026 0.001 -0.149 0.030 0.000 
West Central 0.102 0.024 0.000 0.097 0.026 0.000 
Second quarter -0.019 0.015 0.180 -0.007 0.015 0.646 
Third quarter -0.020 0.014 0.152 -0.007 0.014 0.631 
Fourth quarter -0.014 0.014 0.303 0.026 0.013 0.054 
Observations  27,343       20,080      
Note: This tables presents the marginal effect obtained using the delta method. 
Note: Regressions control for the NRVA survey design. PSU clustered standard errors. 
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Table 3.4 
 
Educational Outcome 2 - Enrollment and CSAS 
 
Primary School Secondary School 
 
Age 7-12 Age 13-18 
Explanatory variables dy/dx SE P>z dy/dx SE P>z 
 
  
     Average civil servant access score (CSAS) 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Female -0.192 0.007 0.000 -0.180 0.006 0.000 
Girl primary school in village 0.049 0.016 0.002 
   Closest girl school in separate bldg. 0.068 0.014 0.000 
   Boy primary school in village 0.014 0.015 0.362 
   Girl middle school available in the community 
   
-0.007 0.017 0.659 
Boy middle school available in the community 
   
0.008 0.015 0.583 
Coed middle available in the community 
   
0.008 0.015 0.599 
Girl high school available in the community 
   
0.000 0.016 0.988 
Boy high school available in the community 
   
-0.003 0.012 0.795 
Household size 0.001 0.001 0.592 0.001 0.001 0.320 
Dependency ratio -0.003 0.007 0.705 -0.019 0.009 0.033 
Age 0.384 0.019 0.000 0.468 0.034 0.000 
Age squared -0.019 0.001 0.000 -0.015 0.001 0.000 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household head is literate 0.026 0.012 0.032 0.050 0.012 0.000 
Household head's years of schooling 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.601 0.001 0.000 0.007 
Rural -0.048 0.018 0.008 -0.052 0.016 0.001 
Kuchi -0.327 0.036 0.000 -0.204 0.034 0.000 
Literacy rate: Female Youth 0.000 0.001 0.769 -0.002 0.001 0.016 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Females always wearing burka (%) -0.001 0.000 0.050 0.001 0.000 0.043 
Days spent outside compound (women)  0.002 0.001 0.070 0.005 0.001 0.000 
South 0.017 0.021 0.412 0.062 0.019 0.001 
East 0.026 0.019 0.171 -0.047 0.015 0.001 
Northeast 0.097 0.019 0.000 0.007 0.015 0.618 
North 0.024 0.023 0.299 0.000 0.018 0.992 
West 0.022 0.021 0.284 -0.063 0.015 0.000 
Southwest -0.294 0.031 0.000 -0.132 0.024 0.000 
West Central 0.058 0.029 0.049 0.004 0.026 0.861 
Second quarter 0.025 0.015 0.109 0.021 0.013 0.113 
Third quarter 0.052 0.015 0.000 0.041 0.012 0.001 
Fourth quarter 0.073 0.014 0.000 0.061 0.011 0.000 
Observations  27,343       20,080      
Note: This tables presents the marginal effect obtained using the delta method. 
Note: Regressions control for the NRVA survey design. PSU clustered standard errors. 
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Table 3.5 
 
Outcome 1 - Literacy and Current Conflict 
 
Literacy Literacy 
 
Age 7-12 Age 13-18 
Explanatory variables dy/dx SE P>z dy/dx SE P>z 
 
            
Current conflict (Killings per 1K population) -0.023 0.006 0.000 -0.036 0.005 0.000 
Female -0.136 0.006 0.000 -0.279 0.008 0.000 
Girl primary school in village 0.007 0.016 0.647 
   Closest girl school in separate bldg. 0.064 0.013 0.000 
   Boy primary school in village 0.030 0.015 0.041 
   Girl middle school available in the community 
   
-0.020 0.019 0.294 
Boy middle school available in the community 
   
0.012 0.016 0.437 
Coed middle available in the community 
   
0.019 0.017 0.264 
Girl high school available in the community 
   
-0.005 0.019 0.776 
Boy high school available in the community 
   
0.016 0.015 0.284 
Household size 0.000 0.001 0.983 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Dependency ratio -0.002 0.007 0.746 -0.013 0.010 0.191 
Age 0.236 0.020 0.000 0.121 0.036 0.001 
Age squared -0.009 0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.000 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household head is literate 0.087 0.011 0.000 0.126 0.013 0.000 
Household head's years of schooling 0.000 0.001 0.998 0.010 0.001 0.000 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.197 0.001 0.000 0.044 
Rural 0.040 0.019 0.032 -0.051 0.018 0.006 
Kuchi -0.175 0.031 0.000 -0.311 0.032 0.000 
Literacy rate: Female Youth -0.002 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.001 0.081 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Females always wearing burka (%) 0.001 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.351 
Days spent outside compound (women)  0.002 0.001 0.042 0.003 0.001 0.003 
South 0.067 0.019 0.001 0.120 0.022 0.000 
East -0.034 0.016 0.037 0.001 0.018 0.953 
Northeast 0.014 0.016 0.391 0.085 0.017 0.000 
North 0.182 0.021 0.000 0.111 0.021 0.000 
West 0.021 0.021 0.312 0.062 0.020 0.002 
Southwest -0.046 0.029 0.115 -0.111 0.031 0.000 
West Central 0.148 0.023 0.000 0.133 0.026 0.000 
Second quarter -0.021 0.014 0.147 -0.005 0.016 0.725 
Third quarter -0.023 0.014 0.097 -0.004 0.014 0.765 
Fourth quarter -0.016 0.014 0.247 0.027 0.014 0.048 
Observations  27,343       20,080      
Note: Regressions control for the NRVA survey design. PSU clustered standard errors. 
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Table 3.6 
 
Outcome 2 - Enrollment and Current Conflict 
 
Primary School Secondary School 
 
Age 7-12 Age 13-18 
Explanatory variables dy/dx SE P>z dy/dx SE P>z 
 
  
     Current conflict (Killings per 1K population) -0.044 0.006 0.000 -0.041 0.007 0.000 
Female -0.192 0.007 0.000 -0.179 0.006 0.000 
Girl primary school in village 0.052 0.015 0.001 
   Closest girl school in separate bldg. 0.064 0.014 0.000 
   Boy primary school in village -0.002 0.015 0.866 
   Girl middle school available in the community 
   
-0.004 0.017 0.826 
Boy middle school available in the community 
   
0.008 0.015 0.605 
Coed middle available in the community 
   
0.011 0.015 0.476 
Girl high school available in the community 
   
0.000 0.016 0.982 
Boy high school available in the community 
   
-0.004 0.012 0.716 
Household size 0.002 0.001 0.152 0.001 0.001 0.228 
Dependency ratio 0.003 0.007 0.702 -0.016 0.009 0.072 
Age 0.386 0.019 0.000 0.467 0.034 0.000 
Age squared -0.019 0.001 0.000 -0.015 0.001 0.000 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household head is literate 0.022 0.012 0.074 0.050 0.012 0.000 
Household head's years of schooling 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.001 0.000 0.009 
Rural -0.031 0.018 0.090 -0.045 0.016 0.006 
Kuchi -0.315 0.035 0.000 -0.195 0.035 0.000 
Literacy rate: Female Youth 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.383 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Females always wearing burka (%) 0.000 0.000 0.510 0.001 0.000 0.023 
Days spent outside compound (women)  0.003 0.001 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.000 
South 0.042 0.021 0.050 0.073 0.019 0.000 
East 0.072 0.018 0.000 -0.030 0.015 0.044 
Northeast 0.146 0.018 0.000 0.022 0.015 0.126 
North 0.074 0.023 0.001 0.011 0.018 0.543 
West 0.026 0.021 0.219 -0.061 0.015 0.000 
Southwest -0.221 0.035 0.000 -0.088 0.026 0.001 
West Central 0.126 0.027 0.000 0.019 0.025 0.437 
Second quarter 0.024 0.015 0.116 0.022 0.013 0.099 
Third quarter 0.049 0.015 0.001 0.042 0.012 0.001 
Fourth quarter 0.070 0.014 0.000 0.061 0.011 0.000 
Observations  27,343       20,080      
Note: This tables presents the marginal effect obtained using the delta method. Regressions control for the NRVA 
survey design. PSU clustered standard errors. 
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Table 3.7 
 
Outcome 1 - Literacy and Past Conflict 
 
 
Primary School Secondary School 
 
Age 7-12 Age 13-18 
Explanatory variables dy/dx SE P > z dy/dx SE P > z 
 
            
Lagged conflict (Killings per 10K population) 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.653 
Female -0.136 0.006 0.000 -0.278 0.008 0.000 
Girl primary school in village 0.011 0.016 0.471 
   Closest girl school in separate bldg. 0.065 0.013 0.000 
   Boy primary school in village 0.028 0.015 0.054 
   Girl middle school available in the community 
   
-0.023 0.019 0.232 
Boy middle school available in the community 
   
0.011 0.016 0.503 
Coed middle available in the community 
   
0.018 0.017 0.291 
Girl high school available in the community 
   
-0.006 0.019 0.750 
Boy high school available in the community 
   
0.016 0.015 0.277 
Household size 0.000 0.001 0.922 0.004 0.001 0.001 
Dependency ratio -0.002 0.007 0.782 -0.011 0.010 0.268 
Age 0.233 0.020 0.000 0.127 0.036 0.000 
Age squared -0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.000 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household head is literate 0.083 0.011 0.000 0.121 0.013 0.000 
Household head's years of schooling 0.000 0.001 0.738 0.010 0.001 0.000 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.156 0.001 0.000 0.039 
Rural 0.028 0.019 0.149 -0.057 0.019 0.002 
Kuchi -0.187 0.032 0.000 -0.317 0.033 0.000 
Literacy rate: Female Youth -0.002 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.046 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Females always wearing burka (%) 0.000 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.243 
Days spent outside compound (women)  0.002 0.001 0.062 0.004 0.001 0.002 
South 0.045 0.019 0.018 0.090 0.021 0.000 
East -0.039 0.017 0.019 -0.014 0.018 0.430 
Northeast 0.025 0.016 0.132 0.092 0.018 0.000 
North 0.194 0.021 0.000 0.117 0.021 0.000 
West 0.018 0.021 0.402 0.058 0.020 0.004 
Southwest -0.110 0.026 0.000 -0.177 0.028 0.000 
West Central 0.158 0.023 0.000 0.145 0.026 0.000 
Second quarter -0.022 0.015 0.135 -0.005 0.016 0.747 
Third quarter -0.023 0.014 0.104 -0.003 0.015 0.815 
Fourth quarter -0.017 0.014 0.224 0.027 0.014 0.049 
Observations  27,343       20,080      
Note: This tables presents the marginal effect obtained using the delta method. 
Regressions control for the NRVA survey design. PSU clustered standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Table 3.8 
 
Outcome 2 - Enrollment and Past Conflict 
 
 
Primary School Secondary School 
 
Age 7-12 Age 13-18 
Explanatory variables dy/dx SE P > z dy/dx SE P > z 
 
  
     Lagged conflict (Killings per 10K population) 0.000 0.000 0.956 0.000 0.000 0.012 
Female -0.192 0.007 0.000 -0.179 0.007 0.000 
Girl primary school in village 0.060 0.016 0.000 
   Closest girl school in separate bldg. 0.063 0.014 0.000 
   Boy primary school in village -0.008 0.015 0.595 
   Girl middle school available in the community 
   
-0.005 0.017 0.748 
Boy middle school available in the community 
   
0.007 0.015 0.654 
Coed middle available in the community 
   
0.010 0.015 0.494 
Girl high school available in the community 
   
-0.001 0.016 0.964 
Boy high school available in the community 
   
-0.004 0.012 0.715 
Household size 0.002 0.001 0.158 0.001 0.001 0.174 
Dependency ratio 0.004 0.007 0.573 -0.014 0.009 0.109 
Age 0.381 0.020 0.000 0.470 0.034 0.000 
Age squared -0.019 0.001 0.000 -0.015 0.001 0.000 
Per-capita monthly total consumption 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household head is literate 0.017 0.012 0.164 0.048 0.012 0.000 
Household head's years of schooling 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.961 0.001 0.000 0.006 
Rural -0.048 0.019 0.012 -0.050 0.016 0.002 
Kuchi -0.332 0.036 0.000 -0.201 0.035 0.000 
Literacy rate: Female Youth 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.506 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Females always wearing burka (%) 0.000 0.000 0.501 0.001 0.000 0.015 
Days spent outside compound (women)  0.003 0.001 0.016 0.006 0.001 0.000 
South 0.001 0.021 0.960 0.042 0.018 0.018 
East 0.056 0.018 0.002 -0.046 0.015 0.002 
Northeast 0.161 0.018 0.000 0.024 0.015 0.104 
North 0.089 0.023 0.000 0.013 0.018 0.449 
West 0.012 0.022 0.577 -0.068 0.015 0.000 
Southwest -0.323 0.031 0.000 -0.143 0.023 0.000 
West Central 0.140 0.027 0.000 0.023 0.025 0.358 
Second quarter 0.021 0.016 0.178 0.023 0.013 0.094 
Third quarter 0.048 0.015 0.001 0.043 0.012 0.001 
Fourth quarter 0.069 0.014 0.000 0.062 0.011 0.000 
Observations  27,343       20,080      
 
           Note: This tables presents the marginal effect obtained using the delta method. 
           Regressions control for the NRVA survey design. PSU clustered standard errors. 
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Table 3.9 
 
Health Outcomes - Access to Immunization and Vitamin A Supplementation 
 
          Fully Immunized        Not immunized Vitamin A 
       2Y ≤ Age ≤ 5Y       6M ≤ Age ≤ 5Y Age ≤ 5Y 
Explanatory variables  dy/dx SE P>z dy/dx SE P>z dy/dx SE  P>z 
                   
Avg civil servant access score 
(CSAS) 
0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Female -0.012 0.007 0.095 0.004 0.005 0.402 0.009 0.006 0.132 
European Union -0.001 0.001 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.232 0.083 0.054 0.121 
MPH 0.004 0.002 0.094 0.002 0.001 0.101 -0.778 0.179 0.000 
USAID 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
   
World Bank 0.392 0.070 0.000 0.108 0.032 0.001 -0.140 0.052 0.007 
European Union*CSAS -0.460 0.230 0.045 -0.088 0.136 0.518 -0.003 0.001 0.000 
MPH*CSAS 0.316 0.062 0.000 0.116 0.032 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.063 
USAID*CSAS    
   
-0.003 0.001 0.000 
Household size 0.000 0.002 0.793 -0.001 0.001 0.435 0.003 0.001 0.022 
Dependency ratio -0.011 0.009 0.250 0.022 0.007 0.002 -0.012 0.008 0.150 
Age 0.142 0.028 0.000 -0.044 0.006 0.000 0.169 0.006 0.000 
Age squared -0.022 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.028 0.001 0.000 
Per-capita MTC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.578 
HH head is literate -0.017 0.015 0.270 -0.014 0.010 0.137 -0.040 0.013 0.002 
HH head's years of schooling 0.010 0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.060 0.008 0.001 0.000 
Age of household head 0.000 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.525 
Rural -0.013 0.024 0.583 0.040 0.014 0.004 0.008 0.022 0.711 
Kuchi -0.290 0.041 0.000 0.161 0.019 0.000 -0.060 0.036 0.093 
Literacy rate: Female Youth 0.001 0.001 0.414 0.000 0.001 0.964 0.000 0.001 0.905 
Literacy rate: Male Youth 0.000 0.001 0.680 0.000 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.000 0.524 
Females always wearing burka 0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.627 
Days spent out. com. (women) -0.003 0.002 0.039 0.002 0.001 0.042 0.003 0.001 0.028 
Observations 21,440 17,205 24,064 
Notes: This tables presents the marginal effect obtained using the delta method.  
Other controls: regional and seasonal fixed effects. 
Regressions control for the NRVA survey design. PSU clustered standard errors. 
MPH = Ministry of Public Health, MTC = monthly total consumption, HH = household. 
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Table 3.10 
  
The Effect of Access to Basic Services on Security and Conflict 
  
 Dependent variables Average CSAS 
 
     Killings 
Independent variable IV OLS  IV OLS 
Access to Electricity  0.424** 0.369*** 
 
 -0.002 -0.019 
Std. Err. (0.173) (0.095)  (0.014) (0.014) 
R
2
 
 
0.522  
 
0.246 
Safe Water  0.761** 0.209  0.018 0.015 
Std. Err. (0.378) (0.173)  (0.019) (0.017) 
R
2
 
 
0.490  
 
0.243 
Improved Sanitation  2.925** 1.843***  0.098 -0.009 
Std. Err. (1.321) (0.506)  (0.123) (0.030) 
R
2
 
 
0.532  
 
0.241 
Observations (PSU-level) 2,568 2,568  2,568 2,568 
Notes: Regressions are run at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level. The measure of access to service is the 
mean at the province level. Each cell represents a separate regression. Controls: urban indicator, an indicator 
for whether the road is impassable all year long, district level density, 9 indicators for the type of terrain 
(baseline terrain is Mid-altitude plains, controlled terrain types are: High-altitude plains, Platforms, Low 
plateaus, Mid-altitude plateaus, High plateaus, Low mountains, Mid-altitude mountains, High mountains, Very 
high mountains, see Meybeck et al. 2001), 8 regional indicators (baseline region is Central), and 3 indicators 
for the relief roughness category. Province clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3.11 
 
Conflict on Access to Basic Services 
 
 Dependent variables Access to electricity  Access to water Access to sanitation 
Average CSAS 0.220*** 0.103*** 0.055*** 
Std. Err. [0.016] [0.011] [0.003] 
R
2
 0.684 0.591 0.748 
Killings -0.299*** 0.118 0.005 
Std. Err. [0.114] [0.108] [0.016] 
R
2
 0.659 0.578 0.723 
Lagged Killings -0.045*** -0.058*** -0.015*** 
Std. Err. [0.010] [0.008] [0.002] 
R
2
 0.658 0.580 0.724 
Observations 2,568 2,568 2,568 
 
Notes: Regressions are run at the PSU level. The measure of access to service is the mean at the province level. Each 
cell represents a separate regression. Controls: urban indicator, an indicator for whether the road is impassable all 
year long, district level density, 9 indicators for the type of terrain (baseline terrain is Mid-altitude plains, controlled 
terrain types are: High-altitude plains, Platforms, Low plateaus, Mid-altitude plateaus, High plateaus, Low 
mountains, Mid-altitude mountains, High mountains, Very high mountains, see Meybeck et al. 2001), 8 regional 
indicators (baseline region is Central), and 3 indicators for the relief roughness category. Regressions control for the 
NRVA survey design. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
Table 3.12 
 
Conflict and the Presence of Health Facilities, by Donor 
 
Dependent variables  Health Facilities by Donor 
 
EU MoPH World Bank USAID 
Average CSAS -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.006*** 0.006*** 
Std. Err. [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R
2
 0.654 0.427 0.457 0.515 
Killings -0.003** -0.001** 0.004 -0.000 
Std. Err. [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003] 
R
2
 0.651 0.408 0.384 0.473 
Lagged Killings
1
 -0.001*** 0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
Std. Err. [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R
2
 0.651 0.442 0.384 0.475 
Observations 2,568 2,568 2,568 2,568 
 
Notes: Regressions are run at the PSU. The measure of access to service is the mean at the district level. Each cell 
represents a separate regression. Controls: urban indicator, an indicator for whether the road is impassable all year 
long, district level density, 9 indicators for the type of terrain (baseline terrain is Mid-altitude plains, controlled terrain 
types are: High-altitude plains, Platforms, Low plateaus, Mid-altitude plateaus, High plateaus, Low mountains, Mid-
altitude mountains, High mountains, Very high mountains, see Meybeck et al. 2001), 8 regional indicators (baseline 
region is Central), and 3 indicators for the relief roughness category. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Appendix 3.1  
 
Table A 3.1 
 
Testing the Endogeneity of Access to Services and the Validity of The Instrument 
IV–2006 Average Yearly Rainfall Deviation from 4-Year Average at the Province Level  
and two rain-shock indicators (+1 and +2 standard deviations). 
  
   Underidentification  
    test 
    - Kleibergen-Paap     
     rk LM statistic    
 
p-
val. 
Weak identification  
test  
- Kleibergen-Paap    
   rk Wald F-statistic 
Overidentification  
test  
of all instruments  
- Sargan statistic 
 χ2 
p-
val  
Endogeneity 
test of 
endogenous 
regressors 
χ2 
p-
val 
CASS 
Access to 
Electricity  
        10.971  0.012       20.035   3.363 0.186 0.271 0.603 
Safe Water            5.894  0.117       10.420   4.354 0.113 1.206 0.272 
Improved 
Sanitation  
          4.594  0.204         3.560   4.764 0.092 1.427 0.232 
Lagged Killings 
Access to 
Electricity  
           10.971  0.012       20.035   1.146 0.564 0.164 0.686 
Safe Water               5.894  0.117       10.420   1.153 0.562 0.090 0.764 
Improved 
Sanitation  
             4.594  0.204         3.560   1.264 0.532 0.093 0.760 
 Killings  
Access to 
Electricity  
           10.971  0.012       20.035   4.294 0.117 0.755 0.385 
Safe Water               5.894  0.117       10.420   4.263 0.119 1.503 0.220 
Improved 
Sanitation  
             4.594  0.204         3.560   4.190 0.123 0.906 0.341 
Notes: First stage regressions run at the PSU level. The measure of access to service is the mean at the province 
level. Controls: urban indicator, an indicator for whether the road is impassable all year long, district level density, 9 
indicators for the type of terrain (baseline terrain is Mid-altitude plains, controlled terrain types are: High-altitude 
plains, Platforms, Low plateaus, Mid-altitude plateaus, High plateaus, Low mountains, Mid-altitude mountains, 
High mountains, Very high mountains; see Meybeck et al. 2001), 8 regional indicators (baseline region is Central), 
and 3 indicators for the relief roughness category. Regressions control for the NRVA survey design. Province level 
clustered standard errors. 
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